Monetary Policy Statement

Norges Bank’s Monetary and Financial Stability Committee decided unanimously to keep the policy rate unchanged at 4% at its meeting on 25 March. The Committee’s current assessment of the inflation outlook implies that it will likely be appropriate to raise the policy rate at one of the forthcoming monetary policy meetings.

Norges Bank is tasked with keeping inflation low and stable. The operational target is inflation of close to 2% over time. We are also mandated to help keep employment as high as possible and to promote economic stability.

In recent years, the tightening of monetary policy has contributed to cooling down the Norwegian economy and to dampening inflation. Last year, the policy rate was reduced from 4.5% to 4%. Since the monetary policy meeting in December, the Committee has noted the following:

• Inflation has been markedly higher than projected. At the same time, wage growth is projected to be higher this year than projected in December, which will likely restrain disinflation ahead. On the other hand, the krone has appreciated considerably. A stronger krone will dampen imported goods inflation.
• Capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy appears to be holding steady at close to a normal level. Unemployment has been slightly lower than projected in December. Nonetheless, Norges Bank’s Regional Network contacts report that it has become a little easier to recruit.
• The war in the Middle East has led to high volatility in energy and financial markets. Oil and gas prices have increased sharply. At the same time, global equity indices have declined, and interest rates have increased both abroad and in Norway. Higher energy prices will likely reduce global growth and push up inflation both abroad and in Norway.

The job of tackling inflation has not been fully completed. The Committee placed emphasis on the fact that inflation has remained above target for several years now and that there are prospects for higher inflation ahead than previously projected. High inflation over time can lead firms and households to plan for greater inflation persistence. Inflation may then become entrenched.

The Committee judges that a tighter monetary policy stance is needed to return inflation to target within a reasonable time horizon. The inflation outlook indicates that an increase in the policy rate will likely be required. At the same time, the unexpected high inflation in recent months makes it difficult to assess underlying inflation pressures, and the uncertainty surrounding oil and gas prices is unusually elevated. The Committee therefore wants to await further information on the prospects for inflation.

The Committee decided to keep the policy rate unchanged at this meeting. The outlook is associated with substantial uncertainty, but if the economy evolves broadly as currently envisaged, the policy rate will likely be raised at one of the forthcoming meetings.

The policy rate forecast has been revised up since December and indicates an increase in the policy rate to between 4¼% and 4½% by the end of this year.

With a policy rate in line with the forecast, inflation is expected to decline from next year and reach 2.0% in 2029. A higher policy rate will cool the economy somewhat, and registered unemployment is projected to edge somewhat higher to around pre-pandemic levels.

The future path of the policy rate will depend on economic developments. The outlook is subject to greater uncertainty than normal due to the war in the Middle East. There have recently been wide swings in energy prices and the krone exchange rate. If energy prices remain elevated or move higher, inflation pressures may build up further. On the other hand, energy prices may fall back faster if the war ends swiftly and there is limited damage to infrastructure. At the same time, the krone could depreciate again should oil prices fall or financial market turbulence increase.

If the outlook indicates higher inflation than currently projected, a higher policy rate than currently envisaged may be required. If labour market conditions become weaker than projected or the outlook indicates a faster decline in inflation to target, the policy rate may become lower than currently envisaged.

Ida Wolden Bache
Pål Longva
Øystein Børsum
Hilde C. Bjørnland
Steinar Holden

25 March 2026

1. Overall picture

The war in the Middle East is adding to the uncertainty about both global and domestic inflation and growth prospects. In Norway, inflation has remained at around 3% for more than a year. Unemployment has risen from low levels following the pandemic but has changed little since autumn 2025. The policy rate forecast indicates a policy rate increase to between 4¼% and 4½% by the end of 2026. Inflation is projected to return to the 2% target in 2029. Registered unemployment is expected to edge somewhat higher to around pre-pandemic levels.

Sustained international activity despite turbulence

In 2025, the world economy was marked by geopolitical tensions and frequent changes in US trade policy. Economic activity nevertheless remains sustained among our main trading partners, where growth in 2025 was higher than expected. International inflation fell rapidly from high levels in the wake of the pandemic, and Swedish and euro area inflation is close to their targets (Chart 1.1). Inflation in the UK and the US is still higher than 2%.

Economic activity remains sustained among our main trading partners.

In recent weeks, military strikes in the Middle East have triggered substantial movements in energy and commodity markets. Oil and gas prices have risen considerably (Chart 1.2). Market interest rates have risen, and market pricing now points to policy rate hikes among a number of Norway’s trading partners.

Economic growth among Norway’s main trading partners is expected to slow in 2026. Higher oil and gas prices are likely to dampen growth and fuel inflation. On the other hand, increased defence spending and AI-related investment are likely to boost economic activity. At the same time, there are prospects that lower wage growth will contribute to curbing inflation ahead.

Inflation in Norway is above the 2% target

In Norway, inflation declined markedly through 2023 and 2024 but has since changed little. Excluding energy prices, which can fluctuate widely from one month to the next, inflation has been close to 3% since the end of 2024. In February, the 12-month rise in the consumer price index (CPI) was 2.7%. CPI inflation adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) was 3.0% in February. In both January and February, inflation was higher than projected in December.

Inflation excluding energy prices has been close to 3% since the end of 2024.

Higher energy prices are expected to push up overall inflation in 2026. The projections for underlying inflation are adjusted upwards for 2026 and 2027. Stronger underlying price pressures push up inflation in the near term. Higher commodity prices and supply chain disruptions owing to the war in the Middle East are expected to drive up imported consumer and intermediate goods inflation. This will contribute to higher inflation in particular towards the end of 2026 and through 2027.

High growth in business costs is sustaining the rise in prices for domestically produced goods (Chart 1.3). Annual wage growth was 4.9% in 2025, in line with the projection in the December Report. Wage growth is expected to be lower in 2026 than in 2025, but higher than previously projected. In addition, rent inflation is expected to increase more than previously assumed.

Since the December Report, the krone exchange rate has appreciated and been stronger than assumed. A stronger krone reduces prices for imported goods. In isolation, this will dampen inflation in Norway.

Household consumption lifts economic growth

High inflation and higher interest rates contributed to restraining the economy in the wake of the pandemic. Developments were particularly weak in the most interest rate sensitive sectors of the economy, but public sector demand, exports and petroleum investment contributed to sustaining activity.

The economic situation has since changed. Two years of solid growth in household disposable income have contributed to a pickup in consumption growth. Housing investment has also risen slightly from a low level. At the same time, the expansion in petroleum investment has likely passed.

Two years of solid growth in household disposable income have contributed to a pickup in consumption growth.

Mainland economic activity was slightly higher in 2025 than projected in the December Report and Norges Bank’s Regional Network contacts expect growth to remain close to current levels. The impact of higher oil and gas prices will likely be uneven across different sectors of the Norwegian economy but the overall effect on economic activity is expected to be limited. Mainland GDP is projected to grow by 1.4% in 2026, which is lower than in 2025, but slightly higher than projected in the December Report.

Small changes in unemployment

Unemployment has risen from low levels following the pandemic but is little changed since autumn last year. In February, 2.1% of the labour force was registered as fully unemployed by the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (Nav), adjusted for normal seasonal variations, which was a little lower than projected in the December Report. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) indicates that unemployment has risen somewhat more over time, partly reflecting an increase in the number of young entrants to the labour market. Nonetheless, LFS unemployment has also changed little over the past six months.

At the same time, the number of employed has increased. Measured as a share of the population, employment has declined slightly over the past three years but is nevertheless appreciably higher than pre-pandemic levels (Chart 1.4). Capacity utilisation in the economy is assessed to have declined through 2023 and since remained close to a normal level.

Capacity utilisation in the economy is assessed to have declined through 2023 and since remained close to a normal level.

The policy rate will likely be raised at one of the forthcoming monetary policy meetings

In discussing the monetary policy stance, the Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee placed emphasis on the fact that inflation has remained above target for several years now and that there are prospects for higher inflation ahead than previously projected. High inflation over time may lead firms and households to plan for greater inflation persistence. Inflation may then become entrenched.

The Committee judges that a tighter monetary policy stance is needed to return inflation to target within a reasonable time horizon. The inflation outlook indicates that an increase in the policy rate will likely be required. At the same time, the unexpected high level of inflation in recent months makes it difficult to assess underlying inflation pressures, and the uncertainty surrounding future developments in oil and gas prices is higher than normal. The Committee therefore agreed to await further information on the prospects for inflation.

The Committee decided to keep the policy rate unchanged at this meeting. If the economy evolves broadly as envisaged in this Report, the policy rate will likely be raised at one of the forthcoming monetary policy meetings. The policy rate forecast has been revised up since the December Report and indicates an increase in the policy rate to between 4¼% and 4½% by the end of 2026.

Prospects for lower inflation further out

With a policy rate path in line with the forecast, inflation is expected to decline from next year and reach 2.0% in 2029 (Chart 1.5). A higher policy rate will cool the economy somewhat, and registered unemployment is projected to edge somewhat higher to around pre-pandemic levels.

Wages are expected to rise faster than prices ahead, with a continued strengthening of household purchasing power in the coming years. This will likely contribute to a further increase in private consumption. Housing investment is also projected to rise and employment to increase in the years ahead. The employment ratio is expected to remain stable in the coming year, before rising slightly towards the end of the projection period.

2. Assumptions and projections

International economy

Following rapid economic growth in the first post-pandemic years, growth among trading partners was slow in 2023 and 2024. Inflation was high, and central banks increased rates sharply in 2023. Over the course of 2024, inflation declined, central banks were able to reduce policy rates and growth in economic activity picked up. Growth remained elevated through 2025 despite changes in US trade policy and international political tensions. Trading partner growth in 2025 was stronger than projected and was supported by both expansionary fiscal policy and investment in AI-related technology.

There have been large movements in energy markets following the outbreak of the war in the Middle East. Oil and gas prices have risen considerably (see “Energy and other commodity prices”). As a result, short-term market inflation expectations have increased markedly, leading to a sharp rise in international policy rate expectations. In the euro area, Sweden and the UK, market pricing now indicates that policy rates will be raised in the course of the year. The US policy rate is not expected to change this year (Chart 2.1). International equity indices have fallen and credit premiums have risen somewhat, reflecting heightened uncertainty about the economic outlook and lower growth expectations resulting from higher energy prices.

Overall, economic growth is expected to be lower in 2026 and 2027 than in 2025, before edging up again in the final years of the projection period (Chart 2.2). The projections are based on the following:

• Higher prices for energy and some other commodities will dampen economic activity, particularly in Europe. This is also likely the case for disruptions in global supply chains related to eg the production of metals and artificial fertilisers. Overall growth prospects for Norway’s main trading partners in 2026 and 2027 have been revised down compared with the December Report, partly owing to the war in the Middle East. The projections are based on energy futures prices at 20 March.
• So far, the negative effects of higher tariffs have been limited, but the consequences have likely not yet been fully exhausted. In February, the US Supreme Court ruled that the tariffs imposed under the Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) are unlawful. A new global tariff of 10% has been imposed, but overall US import tariffs are slightly lower than assumed in the December Report. The projections are based on the tariffs in effect on 20 March.
• In the euro area, higher oil and gas prices will likely dampen growth in 2026 and 2027, followed by higher expected growth towards the end of the projection period.
• In the coming years, higher growth is expected in Sweden, where developments were weak for several years and unemployment has increased. The growth projections in this Report have been revised up to reflect expansionary fiscal policy related to both defence and infrastructure investment.
• In the UK, lower GDP growth is expected in the coming year as a result of higher energy prices. Stronger growth in private consumption and higher private investment will likely push up growth towards the end of the projection period.
• US growth is projected to remain firm in 2026 despite higher tariffs from 2025 and reduced labour supply as a result of stricter immigration policies. AI-related investment and an expansionary fiscal policy will support growth. Productivity growth has recently been unexpectedly high and is also expected to remain high ahead. Growth projections have been revised up slightly since the December Report for the entire projection period.
• In China, growth is projected to decline slightly from 2025 to 2026. Domestic demand will likely be dampened by sluggish growth in private investment and household consumption. Chinese goods exports have increased over the past year and have been higher than expected, even though trade with the US has fallen markedly. Chinese high-tech goods exports are expected to continue to expand. Low residential construction, a shrinking labour force and persistently weak growth in private consumption will likely weigh down on growth further out in the projection period.

Consumer price inflation among Norway’s main trading partners has slowed substantially in recent years. In the euro area and Sweden, inflation is now close to their 2% targets, while inflation in the UK and the US remains higher. Goods inflation is low and back to pre-pandemic levels in most countries, but higher tariffs have contributed to a renewed pickup in goods inflation in the US. Energy consumer price inflation will likely increase considerably ahead, particularly in Europe. Services inflation remains high, particularly in the UK and US, partly because post-pandemic wage increases were substantial. Nevertheless, international wage growth has slowed since 2023 and is expected to decline further in the coming years. Overall, the projections for underlying inflation are little changed since the December Report. The projections are based on the following:

• Higher oil and gas spot and futures prices will result in higher energy consumer price inflation ahead, and prices for some other commodities and freight rates have also risen. Underlying inflation is expected to rise somewhat. Nevertheless, with lower-than-expected inflation in Sweden and the US so far in 2026, projections for underlying inflation among Norway’s advanced trading partner economies in 2026 will be slightly lower than in the December Report.
• Services inflation is expected to slow in pace with lower wage growth. In Sweden, underlying inflation is already well below 2%, and the halving of VAT on food from April 2026 will have a further dampening effect. Among Norway’s other European trading partners, underlying inflation is projected to move down towards 2% in the course of 2027.
• In the US, the pass-through from higher tariffs to consumer prices has been weaker than expected, but trade policy measures are still expected to keep US inflation elevated in 2026. However, underlying inflation in the US is also projected to be close to target in 2027.

Norwegian mainland GDP

Norwegian mainland economic growth was sluggish through 2023 and 2024. Higher interest rates and elevated price and cost inflation weighed down on investment and dampened household consumption growth. On the other hand, the krone depreciation in the period to summer 2023 led to strong export growth. An expansionary fiscal policy and increased petroleum investment also boosted activity. Growth in mainland Norway picked up in 2025 (Chart 2.3). Higher household income resulted in solid consumption growth. Petroleum investment and export growth remained high, while public sector demand growth was low.

Mainland GDP rose slightly less than projected in 2025 Q4, but revisions of previously published figures entail that the level of activity was nevertheless slightly higher than projected in the December Report. Growth is expected to remain moderate in the coming quarters. The projections are based on the following:

• The war in the Middle East is adding to uncertainty surrounding economic developments ahead. The projections are based on energy and commodity futures prices. Given these prices and the current assessment of the effects of the war on trading partner growth, developments since December do not contribute to substantial changes in the projections of overall mainland activity. Higher energy and commodity prices may in isolation dampen demand from households and mainland business investment, while petroleum sector investment may benefit.
• Most interviews in this Regional Network survey were conducted prior to the US-Israeli attack on Iran in late February. Overall, Regional Network contacts expect growth to be slightly slower in 2026 Q1 than through 2025 and to pick up in Q2 (Chart 2.4, left panel), boosted by increased defence investment, an expansion of energy supply infrastructure and higher expected household demand. However, the completion of projects initiated in response to the petroleum tax package and low building construction activity are dampening growth.

• According to Norges Bank’s System for Model Analysis in Real Time (SMART), which weights forecasts from a broad set of models, mainland GDP growth will pick up slightly in the coming quarters (Chart 2.4, right panel).

Mainland GDP growth is projected to slow from 1.8% in 2025 to 1.4% in 2026 and then to 0.9% in 2027 (Chart 2.5). The growth projection for 2026 has been revised up slightly from the December Report, while projections for 2027 and 2028 have been revised down.

Household consumption is the primary driver of GDP growth in the coming years. Housing investment is projected to pick up somewhat from 2026, while growth in business investment will likely be moderate ahead. Growth in public sector demand is projected to increase in 2026 before gradually drifting down. Export growth will likely decline ahead. Petroleum sector investment is expected to decline as ongoing development projects reach completion. For detailed projections and changes from the previous Report, see Annex Tables 2 and 3.

Households

In 2023, higher interest rates and high inflation reduced household purchasing power and contributed to a fall in consumption. In 2024, household real disposable income rose markedly. Consumption picked up, albeit less than income. Together with higher pension saving, this led to an increase in the saving ratio. Strong income growth continued in 2025. At the same time, consumption increased markedly, resulting in little change in the saving ratio compared with 2024. In 2025, consumption growth was slightly higher than the average for the past 15 years.

The increase in goods consumption was broad-based through 2025, while services consumption only rose in H2 (Chart 2.6). In the projection, consumption growth declines from 2.8% in 2025 to 1.9% in 2026. Further out in the projection period, growth is expected to slow slightly. The consumption growth projections for 2026 have been revised down since the December Report. The projections are based on the following:

• Household car purchases fluctuated markedly around the turn of the year, reflecting tax changes for electric vehicles. Retail sales increased from December to January.
• As a result of the tax changes for electric vehicles, Regional Network retail contacts expect only weak activity growth in 2026 Q1, followed by a marked pickup in Q2.
• Household real disposable income growth is projected to slow from 3.2% in 2025 to 2.1% in 2026 and to 1.5% in 2027. Higher consumer price inflation and higher interest rates have contributed to a marked downward revision of income growth compared with the December Report. Lower income growth will likely dampen consumption growth somewhat, but households are also projected to adjust saving in order to smooth the movements in income growth. Income growth is expected to pick up towards the end of the projection period when consumer price inflation moves down towards the inflation target and employment growth increases slightly.
• Pension saving is assumed to remain elevated ahead and consumption to increase on average less than household real disposable income in the coming years. The saving ratio is projected to rise slightly in 2026 before falling slightly in 2027.
• Statistics Norway has published a main revision of quarterly household income accounts. Real disposable income growth has been revised down for the past couple of years, but income growth has been revised up further back in time. The saving ratio has been revised down historically, but the path is broadly as previously published (Chart 2.7).

• Households are highly indebted and in the period to 2024, the interest burden increased before falling slightly through 2025 (Chart 2.8). Higher interest rates are likely to contribute to a slight increase in households’ interest burden in 2027. Interest burdens are projected to be higher than in the December Report. Debt levels are expected to rise broadly in pace with household income, resulting in minor changes in debt-to-income ratios ahead.

Housing market

Housing investment fell by around 25% between the beginning of 2022 and autumn 2025, partly reflecting a marked increase in material costs and higher interest rates. Housing investment growth was higher in 2025 Q4 than projected in the December Report. Annual housing investment growth is expected to pick up slightly from 2026, but less than projected in the December Report. At the end of 2029, the level is expected to be slightly lower than at the beginning of 2022 (Chart 2.9). The projections are based on the following:

• Activity among many Regional Network construction contacts is low, but they expect some pickup over the course of 2026 H1.
• Figures for housing starts and new home sales indicate weak growth in housing investment in the near term.
• Compared with the previous Report, prospects for a higher policy rate will likely dampen housing investment.
• Increased household purchasing power is expected to lead to somewhat higher demand for both new and existing homes ahead.
• Further out in the projection period, lower interest rates and higher house prices will likely improve profitability in construction and lead to an increase in project starts.

Constant 2023 prices. In billions of NOK (investment). Index. January 2003 = 100 (prices)

Regulatory easing of equity requirements for house purchases and expectations of lower interest rates likely contributed to a pickup in existing home prices in 2025. The annual rise in existing home prices increased from 3.0% in 2024 to 5.9% in 2025. In recent months, house prices have changed little and been lower than projected in December. House prices are expected to rise through spring, but annual house price inflation will likely be moderate this year and lower than projected in the December Report. From 2027, annual house price inflation for existing homes is expected to edge higher. The projections are based on the following:

• Compared with the previous Report, prospects for a higher policy rate will likely dampen house price inflation.
• The increase in household income and high employment will likely boost housing demand in the coming years.
• A low supply of new homes points to higher house prices.
• Further ahead, a decrease in interest rates will pull in the direction of higher house prices.

Firms

Mainland business investment was sluggish between 2022 and 2024, primarily due to the rise in interest rates and other costs. In 2025, mainland business investment increased by almost 2%. Strong growth in 2025 H2 contributes to lifting annual growth in 2026. Business investment is expected to increase going forward (Chart 2.10), but less than projected in the previous Report. The projections are based on the following:

• Information from the Regional Network indicates that services investment will increase in 2026 and 2027. Many of the interviews with Regional Network contacts were conducted before the war in the Middle East broke out, and the contacts likely had lower policy rate expectations at the time of the survey than indicated by the policy rate path in this Report. Lower investment growth in services is therefore expected than indicated by the Regional Network.
• According to the investment intentions survey from Statistics Norway, published in mid-February, investment in manufacturing and mining and quarrying will increase moderately in 2026. Prospects for a higher policy rate, higher costs due to the war in the Middle East and greater uncertainty about growth prospects ahead are expected to reduce investment in this sector more than indicated by the investment intentions survey.
• Changes in the monetary policy outlook are assumed to have little effect on power investment. The investment intentions survey indicates that power investment will increase markedly from 2025 to 2026, in line with projections in the December Report. The increase is primarily driven by investment related to power grid upgrades. Information from grid companies indicates that power grid investment will continue to increase in the coming years.

Petroleum sector investment has increased markedly over the past three years, reflecting the launch of a number of development projects in 2022 in response to the petroleum tax package and high oil and gas prices. Petroleum investment is expected to fall from 2026 to 2028, but less than projected in the December Report. The projections are based on the following:

• Investment in ongoing development projects is expected to fall by around NOK 100bn between 2025 and 2028 as projects reach completion.
• Oil companies have announced a host of new development projects ahead. This will generate substantial investment, but not enough to fully compensate for the decline in ongoing development projects in the period to 2028. However, petroleum investment is expected to increase somewhat in 2029 owing to the new projects.
• The investment intentions survey published in February indicates that petroleum investment will fall less in 2026 and 2027 than projected in the December Report.
• The war in the Middle East has led to a sharp rise in oil and gas prices (see discussion on page 18). The price increases are expected to curb the decline in petroleum investment ahead.

Mainland exports have expanded markedly since 2021, largely driven by the krone depreciation in the period to summer 2023 and increased tourism, as well as higher investment in oil, gas and green technology abroad. In addition, aquaculture exports were very high in 2025.

Export growth is expected to decline in these sectors ahead, and mainland exports are projected to grow moderately from 2026 to the end of the projection period. Annual growth projections for 2026 and 2027 have been revised down from the December Report. The projections are based on the following:

• Trading partner GDP growth will likely decline from 2025 to 2026 but is expected to increase slightly thereafter.
• The krone has appreciated since December and is assumed to be considerably stronger ahead than in the December Report.
• Developments in global petroleum investment are likely to be weaker ahead than in the period between 2021 and 2025. Compared with the outlook in December, the sharp rise in petroleum prices is expected to boost Norwegian oil services exports.
• Export-oriented Regional Network contacts expect output to increase moderately in 2026 H1.

Fiscal policy

Growth in public sector demand has declined from a high level over the past two years. Public investment fell through much of 2025, before increasing markedly towards the end of the year. Growth in public sector demand is assumed to be slightly higher than mainland GDP growth ahead (Chart 2.11). The projections for public demand growth are little changed from the December Report for the years 2026–2028. The projections are based on the following:

• Growth in public sector demand through 2026 is assumed to be in line with the approved fiscal budget.
• The structural non-oil budget deficit as a share of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) is assumed to be in line with the final budget for 2026. As a share of the GPFG, the deficit is estimated at 2.8% in 2026. In isolation, higher oil and gas prices contribute to higher petroleum revenue for the GPFG, while lower equity prices and a stronger krone lower the market value of the GPFG. Overall, the market value of the GPFG is projected to be lower in 2027 than in the December Report, contributing to an increase in the deficit to 2.9% in 2027 and 2028.
• Support to Ukraine accounts for some of the growth in government spending in 2026 but is expected to have little effect on domestic demand.
• Defence spending is expected to boost growth in public sector demand through the projection period. Developments are assumed to be in line with the long-term plan for the Norwegian defence sector adopted in 2024.

Labour market and the output gap

Output is estimated to have been close to potential over the past few years. Since the December Report, different output gap indicators have pulled in slightly different directions. The output gap is expected to remain largely unchanged in the coming quarters, and the projections are little changed compared with the December Report (Chart 2.12). The projections are based on the following:

• Registered unemployment, adjusted for normal seasonal variations, was 2.1% in February. This is slightly lower than projected in the December Report, partly reflecting recent transitions among job seekers from fully unemployed to participation in labour market programmes. Unemployment is expected to fall temporarily to 2.0% in the coming months as more fully unemployed job seekers transition into labour market programmes. This is somewhat lower than the level consistent with output at potential. As some of the decline in unemployment can be attributed to temporary factors, the overall assessment is that unemployment indicates that the output gap is close to zero.
• The Labour Force Survey (LFS) indicates that over time unemployment has risen more than registered unemployment, partly reflecting an increase in the number of young job seekers. Trend LFS unemployment has changed little over the past six months, indicating that the output gap has remained largely unchanged recently.
• Employment rose further in 2025 Q4, broadly as projected in the December Report. Preliminary figures for the number of wage earners indicate further growth in January, and Regional Network contacts expect weak employment growth in 2026 Q1 and Q2.
• The share of Regional Network contacts reporting capacity constraints and labour shortages has declined slightly and is a bit below their historical averages, indicating that the output gap is declining and is somewhat below zero.
• Developments in both the stock of vacancies and the inflow of new vacancies have changed little recently. This may indicate that labour demand is little changed compared with the December Report.
• Norges Bank’s modelling system for estimating the output gap, which takes into account mainland GDP, employment, unemployment, wage growth and inflation, has been revised up slightly since the December Report. The upward revision reflects lower unemployment and a slight upward revision of mainland GDP growth forecasts. The models indicate that capacity utilisation declined somewhat towards the end of 2025, but that the output gap is still close to zero (Chart 2.12).

In the projections, the output gap declines and bottoms out at the end of 2027. The output gap remains negative throughout the projection period. Further out, the December projection has been revised down, reflecting a higher policy rate path than in the previous Report throughout the projection period. In the projections, unemployment rises somewhat more than in the December Report and increases to 2.3% (Chart 2.13).

Potential output

Potential output growth is assessed to have been lower over the past decade than in the preceding decade (Table 2.1). Potential output growth is projected to slow gradually throughout the projection period. The potential output estimates for 2026 have been revised up slightly compared with the December Report and are little changed further out in the projection period. The assessment of potential output is based on the following:

• Productivity growth was low in 2023 and 2024 (Chart 2.14). National accounts figures show that productivity picked up through 2025. Regional Network contact expectations indicate that productivity is holding steady at the beginning of 2026, which is close to the Bank’s assessment of underlying productivity growth. For the years ahead, projected underlying productivity is little changed.

• Population growth has picked up in recent years, primarily reflecting the large inflow of Ukrainian refugees. This has pushed up trend employment. Higher employment among younger and older cohorts has also lifted trend employment somewhat (see Monetary Policy Report 3/2025 for further details). Looking ahead, trend employment growth is projected to gradually slow, reflecting an expected decline in population growth in line with Statistics Norway’s population projections.
• Trend employment will also be affected by developments in the number of temporary foreign workers. The level has recently been stable but is expected to continue to rise in the coming years in pace with a pickup in construction activity.

Table 2.1 Output and potential output4

Wage growth

Wage growth has risen in recent years owing to high inflation, a tight labour market and high profitability in some business sectors. In 2025, wage growth was 4.9%, as projected in the December Report. In 2026, wage growth is expected to decline to 4.5%, somewhat higher than projected in the December Report. The projections for 2026 are based on the following:

• Regional Network contacts and the social partners in Norges Bank’s Expectations Survey expect wage growth to slow to 4.2% and 4.1%, respectively, in 2026 (Chart 2.15). Wage expectations have been revised up somewhat compared with 2025 Q4. The expectations may indicate that wage growth will slow more in 2026 than projected. However, wage expectations have been somewhat lower than actual wage growth in recent years.

• Unemployment has declined slightly compared with the December Report, indicating a slightly tighter labour market. Unemployment is projected to show little change between 2025 and 2026, suggesting that wage growth will remain elevated in 2026.
• The Norwegian Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Settlements puts inflation at 3.2% in 2026. This is 0.8 percentage point higher than Norges Bank’s December projection and contributes to an upward revision of projected wage growth in 2026 compared with the December Report.
• The overall wage share in the business sector was somewhat above a historical average in 2025. The wage share in manufacturing has been lower than its historical average in recent years and declined between 2024 and 2025. In isolation, a low wage share in manufacturing pushes up wage growth.
• Prices for a number of commodities have increased sharply, and futures prices have risen (see “Energy and other commodity prices”), contributing to higher profitability in some parts of the export industry. At the same time, the krone has recently appreciated and is stronger than projected in December, contributing in isolation to lower profitability in the export industry. Overall, profitability in the export industry is projected to improve somewhat compared with the December Report. This pulls in the direction of higher wage growth.
• Norges Bank’s empirical models for total annual wage growth indicate wage growth of 4.5% and 4.7% (Chart 2.15).

In the projections, real wage growth declines in 2026 compared with 2025, a downward revision compared with the December Report due to higher CPI projections (Chart 2.16).

Further out in the projection period, wage growth is expected to decline further, reflecting projections of a less tight labour market, lower inflation and lower profitability in the export industry. The wage growth projections for the coming years are somewhat higher than in the December Report. The Bank’s projections indicate that real wage growth will outpace productivity growth. This is due to Norges Bank’s estimates of firms’ selling prices rising more than consumer prices.

Inflation

The 12-month rise in the consumer price index (CPI) peaked at 7.5% in 2022. Inflation fell markedly through 2023 and 2024 but the decline has since stalled. High services inflation is keeping inflation elevated, while the contribution from the rise in goods inflation has declined (Chart 2.17). The twelve-month rise in the CPI in February was 2.7%, while the rise in the CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) was 3.0%.

Core inflation

Core inflation, as measured by the CPI-ATE and other indicators, has been close to 3% for some time (Chart 2.18). In recent months, inflation has remained elevated and has not declined as expected in the December Report. Looking ahead, twelve-month core inflation is expected to increase before declining through 2027 and reaching 2% in 2029. The projections for core inflation in the coming year have been revised up compared with the December Report, but a higher policy rate is expected to pull down inflation further out in the projection period. The projections are based on the following:

• According to Norges Bank’s System for Model Analysis in Real Time (SMART), which weights forecasts from a broad set of models, underlying inflation will increase slightly in the near term, suggesting an upward revision compared with the December Report (Chart 2.19). The forecasts for core inflation in the coming quarters are closely aligned with the SMART forecasts.

• Due to the war in the Middle East, spot and forward prices for oil and a number of other commodities have increased substantially and freight rates have risen, pushing up Norges Bank’s indicators of international price impulses to imported intermediate goods (IPI) and international price impulses to imported consumer goods (IPK) (Chart 2.20). Further out in the projection period, international price impulses are assumed to ease gradually, but there is considerable uncertainty surrounding future developments in price impulses.

• Wage growth has been high in recent years compared with productivity growth. This has resulted in a rapid rise in business costs, which has contributed to keeping inflation elevated (Chart 2.21). Compared with the December Report, wage growth projections have been revised up ahead.

• Following the inflation surge, rent inflation in the CPI has also increased, albeit with a lag, which may reflect limits on how much rent can be raised in existing leases. Rent inflation declined considerably through spring 2025 but has since slowed and recently edged up. Higher rent inflation may be a result of low residential construction in recent years and higher interest rates (see box on page 50 for a further discussion). If so, this may indicate that rent inflation will also remain elevated ahead. In the projections, rent inflation is assumed to continue to outpace core inflation in the coming years. Projected rent inflation has been revised up from the December Report.
• The krone exchange rate has recently appreciated (see “Krone exchange rate”). In the projections, the stronger krone has a dampening effect on inflation in the coming years (Chart 2.21).
• Capacity utilisation is expected to decline somewhat in the years ahead. Lower capacity utilisation dampens inflation through lower demand for labour, goods and services. Compared with the December Report, the near-term output gap projections are little changed and have been revised down somewhat further out in the projection period.
• Household inflation expectations ahead, as measured by Norges Bank’s Expectations Survey, are still higher than the inflation target. Business leaders’ inflation expectations are also high and can in particular provide information about inflation ahead (see “The role of expectations in price formation” for a more detailed discussion).

Consumer price inflation

Consumer price inflation measured as an annual average is expected to increase to 3.4% in 2026 and to decline thereafter through the projection period. Compared with the December Report, CPI inflation projections for 2026 have been revised up substantially. The projections are based on the following:

• Prospects for higher core inflation in 2026 contribute to raising overall inflation. In the coming years, core inflation is expected to gradually decline towards 2%.
• This winter, electricity prices have been higher than futures prices indicated in December, and upon which Norges Bank’s projections were based. In southern Norway, the fixed electricity price scheme "Norgespris" has shielded a majority of households, but this has not been the case to the same extent in central and northern Norway.
• Following the outbreak of the war in the Middle East, energy prices have increased, and futures prices indicate that they will remain elevated for a period ahead. Petrol and diesel prices have increased as a result of higher oil prices, while higher gas prices have led to a rise in electricity prices, particularly in southern Norway. While fixed price contracts shield households from the rise in electricity prices, higher petrol prices have a direct impact on consumer prices. There is substantial uncertainty concerning the duration of the war and its implications for energy markets (see “Energy and other commodity prices”).

3. Monetary policy analysis

Model implications of new information

New information

The forecasts and the monetary policy analysis are based on the macroeconomic model NEMO and other economic models, as well as on analyses of the current economic situation and assumptions regarding key driving forces. For 2026 Q1 and Q2, NEMO is conditioned on projections based on the information and analyses presented in Section 2. Beyond the first two quarters, the model is conditioned on various exogenous driving forces, including oil and gas prices, global economic developments and petroleum investment. After conditioning on historical data, short-term forecasts and exogenous driving forces, NEMO provides forecasts for the remainder of the forecast horizon. The forecasts are cross-checked against other models.

To summarise how new information and new assessments of the economic situation have affected the forecasts since the December Monetary Policy Report, Chart 3.1 presents forecasts of the output gap and inflation adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) given the same policy rate path as in December. Key premises for this analysis are:

• The rise in the CPI-ATE has been higher than projected in the December Report, and the short-term inflation projection has been revised up. Higher wage growth in 2026 than previously projected is expected to push up inflation further out.
• The output gap forecast is little changed for the near term. The real interest rate is lower given the same policy rate path as in December, reflecting higher-than-projected inflation, which increases the output gap slightly in this exercise.
• The krone has appreciated since the December Report, contributing to lower inflation and a lower output gap further out. This appreciation must be viewed in the context of higher policy rate expectations and a wider interest rate differential against other countries. In the exercise with an unchanged policy rate path, the exchange rate is therefore assumed to be somewhat weaker ahead.
• Prices for oil and a number of other commodities have increased as a result of the war in the Middle East (see “Energy and other commodity prices”). This has fuelled inflation through higher prices for power and imported goods, which weighs down on household purchasing power in the model framework. In the model, higher oil prices have also contributed to a stronger krone. At the same time, the rise in prices of Norwegian exports, such as oil and aluminium, will strengthen profitability and boost activity in some segments of the Norwegian business sector. In isolation, this pushes up wage growth and purchasing power. Overall, higher oil prices lift inflation in the model framework, but the overall effect on the output gap is small.

The exercise indicates that given an unchanged rate path, inflation will be higher than projected in December throughout the projection period, and the output gap becomes slightly higher in the period to mid-2028.

The model’s policy rate path

NEMO generates a policy rate path aimed at striking a balance between low and stable inflation and high and stable output and employment given the structure of the model. New information and new assessments will normally generate changes in the model-based policy rate path (model path).

The model path is higher than the rate path from the December Report throughout the forecast horizon (Chart 3.1, left panel). Owing to a higher policy rate, the model indicates prospects for lower inflation and capacity utilisation than in the exercise with an unchanged rate path. Compared with the forecasts from December, the output gap given the model path is lower from 2026 Q4 (Chart 3.1, right panel), and inflation is higher throughout the forecast horizon (Chart 3.1, middle panel). The krone exchange rate is assumed to weaken somewhat upon publication of this Report if the rate path follows the model path, reflecting the fact that the model path is lower than market policy rate expectations ahead.

In the decomposition in Chart 3.2, NEMO and the monetary policy rule GEORG are used together to decompose how the rule would have changed the policy rate given new information since the December Report. Unlike previous Reports, the decomposition does not show the underlying driving forces behind the changes in the rate path. The bars in the chart show how changes in the model forecasts for inflation, the output gap and the krone exchange rate, among other factors, contribute to changes in the model path (see box "A monetary policy rule for understanding changes in the policy rate path" in Monetary Policy Report 4/2025). The forecasts assumed in the decomposition are consistent with new information and the model path. The broken line shows the sum of the bars, and the solid line shows changes in the policy rate forecast.

The model path is higher than in the December Report throughout the forecast horizon. The main contributions to the changes are:

• Inflation has been higher than projected in the December Report and is also projected to be higher ahead. Under the GEORG monetary policy rule, higher inflation results in a higher policy rate. Prices therefore push up the model path (red bars).
• The output gap is little changed in the near term but lower further out. This pulls down the model path from beginning of 2026 H2 (orange bars). Further out in the forecast horizon, higher interest rates also pull down the output gap.
• Compared with the December Report, wage growth is projected to be higher throughout the projection period, reflecting stronger business profitability and prospects for higher inflation. Projected productivity is little changed. Combined, these factors push up unit labour costs, which, in the model, is an indicator of future inflationary pressure. Unit labour costs push up the model path throughout the forecast horizon (light blue bars).
• The krone exchange rate has appreciated since the December Report and is projected to remain strong ahead, which will help ease inflationary pressures further out through lower prices for imported consumer and intermediate goods and weaker net exports. The krone exchange rate therefore pulls down the rate path (dark blue bars).
• In the near term, market-implied policy rates abroad are somewhat higher than in the December Report, which pulls the rate path up slightly (green bars).

Even though oil prices are not directly included in GEORG, they will affect the rate path through multiple channels. Higher oil prices have likely contributed to strengthening the krone exchange rate (see “Krone exchange rate”), which in isolation pulls down the rate path. In NEMO, higher oil prices also contribute to higher wage and price inflation, which pushes up the rate path. Overall, higher oil prices push up the policy rate in the model.

The policy rate forecast in this Report is higher than the model path. As a higher policy rate affects prospects for eg inflation and the output gap, the assumed paths for these variables in the decomposition will deviate from the projections in the Report. Inflation is for example assumed to be lower when the policy rate follows the rate path rather than the model path.

Other indicators relevant to monetary policy analysis

Other indicators relevant to the conduct of monetary policy have also been presented to the Committee:

• Norges Bank’s simple Taylor rule is used as a simple cross-check of the model path. The rule provides an estimated relationship between the policy rate on the one hand and, the policy rate in the previous quarter, the projection for the long-term interest rate level and inflation and output gap projections based on the historical monetary policy response pattern on the other hand (see Monetary Policy Report 1/2025). The rule now indicates a higher money market rate in the coming quarters than in the December Report (Chart 3.3) as the inflation projection has been revised up. Compared with the December Report, the simple rule implies that the policy rate will be 0.3 percentage point higher in 2026 Q2.

• Market-implied policy rates ahead can provide an indication of the market’s interpretation of new information since December and market expectations of the monetary policy response. Since December, market-implied policy rates ahead have risen throughout the forecast horizon (Chart 3.4, left panel). Policy rate expectations rose by up to 0.3 percentage point on 10 February when the January CPI inflation figure was published. Since then, market pricing has risen further, primarily for the period to end-2027, and pricing is now up to 1.0 percentage point higher than in December. Market pricing may differ from Norges Bank’s policy rate forecast eg if market participants have different expectations for inflation and developments in the Norwegian economy. In addition, term premiums may cause policy rate expectations to be below levels indicated by the market pricing in Chart 3.4.

• Norway is a small and open economy, with financial markets closely intertwined with those of its trading partners. Changes in foreign market rates can affect the krone exchange rate, and they provide an indication of market expectations for the global economic outlook. Market-implied policy rates among Norway’s main trading partners are higher towards the end of the forecast horizon (Chart 3.4, right panel). Policy rate expectations have risen since the outbreak of the war in the Middle East, reflecting higher inflation expectations on the back of increased oil and gas prices. Market-implied policy rates among trading partners are now higher than in the December Report, and expectations shown in the chart are 0.6 percentage point higher than in December. As the increase in market-implied policy rates ahead is smaller abroad than in Norway, the interest rate differential against other countries has increased.

The monetary policy stance

Description of the policy rate path

The policy rate forecast (policy rate path) is higher than in the December Report. The policy rate path is consistent with an increase in the policy rate at one of the forthcoming policy rate meetings and is consistent with a policy rate between 4.25 % and 4.5% at the end of 2026. The forecast indicates a gradual decline in the policy rate from mid-2027, reaching 3.4% towards the end of the projection period.

Market rates and measures of monetary policy restrictiveness

How the policy rate affects the economy depends on both the pass-through to market rates and how high these rates are compared with inflation and the long-term neutral interest rate level. Key factors in this Report are:

• The money market spread is the difference between three-month Nibor, which is an important reference rate in the Norwegian money market, and the expected policy rate. From June 2026, forward-implied pricing increased slightly upon publication of information about Norges Bank's certificate programme on 25 February. Overall forward-implied pricing of the spread is nevertheless broadly as assumed in the December Report, and spread projections ahead are unchanged. The money market rate forecast has therefore been revised broadly to the same extent as the policy rate forecast (Chart 3.5).
• The residential mortgage rate has been broadly as projected in the December Report. The forecast indicates that the mortgage rate will rise approximately in line with the policy rate and the money market rate. The mortgage rate is projected to rise from 5.1% in 2026 Q1 to 5.4% in 2027 Q1, before drifting down from the end of 2027 (Chart 3.5).

• The expected real interest rate relative to the neutral level is a measure of monetary policy restrictiveness. The neutral real interest rate is the real interest rate level that is consistent with a balanced economy over time. Here, the expected real interest rate is defined as Norges Bank’s money market rate forecast less the Bank’s inflation forecast. The expected real interest rate is higher than in the December Report throughout the projection period (Chart 3.6), which reflects the Committee’s intention to pursue a more restrictive monetary policy stance. The real interest rate is slightly higher than the interval of Norges Bank’s estimate of the neutral real interest rate.

Monetary policy trade-offs

The trade-offs between low and stable inflation and high and stable output and employment are reflected in the Monetary Policy Statement and in the inflation and output gap forecasts. The policy rate, inflation and output gap forecasts are shown in the chart in the Monetary Policy Statement.

The points in Chart 3.7 show the average forecasts one to three years ahead for the output gap and the inflation gap (difference between inflation and the target) in different reports. The location of the points in the chart depends on the shocks to the economy and the monetary policy response. In this Report, inflation one to three years ahead is little changed, while the output gap is lower.

Compared with previous Reports, the forecasts now indicate that a larger decline in the output gap is needed ahead to return inflation to target within a reasonable time horizon.

Forecast errors and trade-offs

There is substantial uncertainty associated with the projections in the Monetary Policy Report. The box "Historical forecast errors and uncertainty indicators" shows the uncertainty of the projections based on historical forecast errors. This box shows how the inflation and output gap forecasts have been revised in recent years.

The Norwegian economy may evolve differently than envisaged for a number of reasons. First, new and unforeseen shocks may occur. One example is foreign demand and supply shocks, which pushed up imported inflation in 2022 and 2023 (see box "What has driven inflation – supply or demand?" in Monetary Policy Report 2/2024). Second, economic relationships may differ from assumptions in our model framework. One example is that monetary policy may be more or less restrictive than assumed because the neutral real interest rate may differ from that assumed or because inflation expectations differ from the expectations in the model framework. Another example is that shocks to the economy may have a more persistent impact than they have had historically.

Chart 3.A shows the projections for inflation and the output gap for 2026 Q1 published in different reports. The first bar in the chart shows the projection for the current quarter published in Monetary Policy Report 1/2023, ie 12 quarters earlier. The last bar shows the projection for the same quarter published in this Report. The chart shows that the projections for both inflation and the output gap have been revised up over time. Compared with Monetary Policy Report 1/2023, the output gap is now projected to be 0.4 percentage point higher and inflation to be 0.6 percentage point higher in the current quarter.

The projections have been changed at the same time as the economy has evolved differently than envisaged. Chart 3.B shows the inflation projections relative to the target (vertical scale) and the output gap (horizontal scale) for each quarter ahead in different monetary policy reports, from Monetary Policy Report 1/2023 to 1/2026. In each of these reports, inflation was projected to gradually decline from the high levels in 2023, while the output gap would decrease and become negative. For example, the green points show the quarterly projections published in Monetary Policy Report 1/2023. Inflation was at that time projected to be 4.2 percentage points above the inflation target in 2023 Q1 (green point, top right) and to gradually move down along the green line and end 0.4 percentage point above target at the end of the forecast horizon (last green point). The red, orange and blue points show the corresponding projections for Monetary Policy Report 1/2024, 1/2025 and 1/2026, respectively.

The thick blue line in Chart 3.B shows the actual changes in inflation and the output gap from 2023 Q1 (point, top right) to 2025 Q4. Through 2023, inflation declined approximately as quickly as assumed at the start of 2023, while the output gap remained somewhat higher than projected. Through 2024, inflation declined faster than expected, while the output gap decreased less than expected. From the end of 2024, inflation has been stable at around 1 percentage point above the inflation target while output has been close to potential.

1. 1 Projections for the output gap (left panel) and growth in CPI-ATE (right panel) for first quarter 2026. The projections have been published in different Monetary Policy Reports.
2. 2 Broken lines show the quarterly projections for inflation relative to the inflation target (vertical axis) and the output gap (horizontal axis). Different colours show the projections published in different monetary policy reports. The blue solid line shows the actual path for inflation and the output gap from 2023 Q1 until 2025 Q4.

Historical forecast errors and uncertainty indicators

The analyses in this box form part of the basis for assessing the uncertainty related to Norges Bank’s forecasts. Fan charts based on historical forecast errors provide an indication of the general level of forecast uncertainty. Model uncertainty indicators suggest that the uncertainty surrounding GDP and underlying inflation forecasts is close to historical levels.

Historical forecast errors are deviations between forecasts and actual developments (see box "Indicators of uncertainty surrounding point forecasts in the near and medium term" in Monetary Policy Report 3/2025). Chart 3.C shows the uncertainty of the forecasts in this Report based on historical forecast errors from the past 20 years. The fan charts are centred on the forecasts in this Report. If future forecast errors follow the same pattern as the historical errors, actual outcomes will lie within the light shaded areas with a 70% probability. The distributions will change little from one report to the next.

Historical forecast errors provide an indication of the uncertainty normally surrounding Norges Bank’s forecasts but provide little indication about changes in uncertainty over time. Uncertainty indicators from an estimated model framework are used to show how uncertainty has changed in recent years and how the range of possible outcomes is expected to look ahead.2 The model framework captures the relationship between a range of economic variables and uncertainty ahead. The upside risk is measured here as the difference between the 95th percentile and the median of the distribution, while the downside risk is measured as the difference between the median and the 5th percentile. As the models are based on information up to and including 2025 Q4, they will not capture the potential effects on uncertainty resulting from the war in the Middle East.

The models indicate that near-term uncertainty surrounding mainland GDP is at a normal level (Chart 3.D, left panel). In the longer term, the downside risk is somewhat lower than the historical average (right panel). Both the upside and downside risk to GDP are little changed since the December Report.

There are also minor changes in uncertainty related to underlying inflation in the near term (Chart 3.E, left panel). In the longer term, the distribution is slightly skewed towards the downside but has moved a little closer to its historical average since the December Report (Chart 3.E, right panel).

1. 1 The range of possible outcomes for underlying inflation (CPI-ATE), the policy rate and the output gap are based on forecasting errors over the past 20 years. The distributions are centered on the projections from this report.
2. 2 The models use quantile regressions, with different indicators to estimate the distribution of output growth, house price inflation and consumer price inflation ahead. See further description in Bowe, F., S.J. Kirkeby, I.H. Lindalen, K.A. Matsen, S.S. Meyer and Ø. Robstad (2023) “Quantifying macroeconomic uncertainty in Norway". Staff Memo 13/2023. Norges Bank.
3. 3 The charts show developments in the spread between the 5th and 95th percentiles and the median for the model-estimated distribution of GDP growth one and eight quarters ahead, respectively. Broken lines indicate average 5th and 95th percentiles compared to the median between 2010 and 2019.
4. 4 The charts show developments in the spread between the 5th and 95th percentiles and the median for the model-estimated distribution of consumer price inflation one and eight quarters ahead, respectively. Broken lines indicate average 5th and 95th percentiles compared to the median between 2010 and 2019.

Boxes

Annex

Detailed tables of projections

Table 1 International projections

Table 2 Short-term estimates

Table 2a Consumer prices. Twelve-month change. Percent

Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank

Table 2b House prices. Monthly change. Seasonally adjusted. Percent

Sources: Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Real Estate Norway and Norges Bank

Table 2c Registered unemployment (rate). Percent of labour force. Seasonally adjusted

Sources: Nav and Norges Bank

Table 2d GDP for mainland Norway. Quarterly change.1 Seasonally adjusted. Percent

Table 3 Projections of main economic aggregates