We argue that the planned transition toward alternative benchmark rates gives reason to mourn Libor. Guided by a model in which banks and non-banks can lend to each other, subject to realistic regulatory constraints, we show empirically that tighter ﬁnancial regulation increases interbank rates but lowers broad rates (in which lenders are non-banks) and that all market rates increase with more Treasury bill issuance. Hence, the proportion of non-bank lenders aﬀects the alternative rates, introducing variation in the benchmark that is unrelated to banks' marginal funding costs and creating a basis between regions with interbank rates and broad rates.
- Sven Klingler and Olav Syrstad
- Working Paper
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ISSN 1502-8190 (online)