Government intervention and moral hazard in the financial sector
2–3 September 2010
The past few years have seen large scale government interventions in the financial sectors of advanced economies. The support measures have mostly been determined by immediate concerns, such as maintaining the supply of financial services and they have been scaled for that purpose. But these measures are also likely to have a longer term impact on the incentives for risk-taking by financial intermediaries, and maybe more so for large financial institutions that may consider themselves too big to fail. The objective of this conference was to discuss this long term impact, and what can be done to mitigate any adverse aspects of this impact.
Key note speakers were Franklin Allen (Wharton) and Xavier Freixas (Pompeu Fabra).
Scientific Committee: Franklin Allen (Wharton), Charles Calomiris (Columbia), Xavier Freixas (Universitat Pompeu Fabra), Farooq Akram (Norges Bank), and Bent Vale (Norges Bank) (chair).
Local organizers: Bent Vale, Farooq Akram and Sigbjørn Atle Berg