Unemployment Crises

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These views are those of the authors alone and not of the Federal Reserve System 1 - Matching function with congestion effects a good description of aggregate relationship between unemployment and vacancies going back to the 1920s

2 - Model calibrated to the mean and volatility of unemployment in the postwar sample will generate unemployment rates seen during the Great Depression

Summary of Results

A matching function with congestion effects




• f and q are necessarily linked through the ratio $\theta = V/U$


Matching function G(U,V): increasing and concave


 Increasingly difficult to recruit workers when job seekers become scarce


Unemployment dynamics: $U_{t+1} - U_t = \underbrace{s(1 - U_t)}_{\text{Inflows}} - \underbrace{G(U_t, V_t)}_{\text{Outflows}}$


Greater impact of vacancies on outflows when unemployment is high $\frac{\partial G(U_t, V_t)}{\partial V_t}$ increasing in U_t












Facts The monthly U.S. unemployment rate, 1929:4–2012:12



Data sources: NBER macro history files and B.L.S. U data details


Construct a monthly job vacancy rate for U.S. starting 1929:04

- Metropolitan Life Help-Wanted Index: 1919:01–1960:08
- Conference Board Help-Wanted Index: 1951:01–2006:07
- Barnichon's print and on-line Help-Wanted Index: 1995:01-2012:02
- Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey: 2000:12–2012:12

Normalize by the size of the labor force and scale to a 2% average vacancy rate in 1965 (Abraham 1983, Zagorsky 1998)




Facts Monthly U.S. vacancy rate 1929:04–2012:12




Data sources: NBER macro history files, Barnichon (2010) and B.L.S.

Facts U.S. Beveridge curve, 1929:04–2012:12



Facts U.S. Beveridge curve, 1929:04–2012:12



Matching, Congestion and Unemployment Dynamics

Be agnostic on structural driving forces as first pass:

Fit AR process on US labor market tightness θ_t

$$\theta_t = \omega + \rho_\theta \theta_{t-1} + \upsilon_t$$


• $ho_{ heta}=0.95$; $\omega=0.016$

Pass simulated θ_t through Cobb-Douglas matching function


$$U_{t+1} - U_t = s(1 - U_t) - \chi U_t^{\eta} V_t^{1-\eta}$$

χ such state average unemployment = 5.8%
 η = -0.65: mid range of estimates

Matching, Congestion and Unemployment Dynamics



Matching, Congestion and Unemployment Dynamics



Model: Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides with Hall-Milgrom wages

- 1 exogenous process: AR(1) labor productivity
- Calibrate to post-1951 mean and volatility of unemployment

	MODEL			U.S. DATA				
	U	V	θ	Х	U	V	θ	X
	Non-crisis samples			1951:1-2012:12				
Volatility	0.102	0.191	0.274	0.13	0.131	0.142	0.269	0.013
Correlation U		-0.732	-0.880	-0.742		-0.931	-0.981	-0.232
V			0.966	0.950			0.984	0.391
heta				0.938				0.925

Summary of Results Unemployment Crises

Congestion in matching generates important non-linear dynamics

- Skewness, differences in steady states and stochastic means
- Do not use local solution methods
- Larger impulse responses when labor market is slack

Unemployment crises

- Occasionally unemployment rate similar to Great Depression
- Large welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations

Conclusions

Model Search and matching

Representative large firm

- Post job vacancies, V_t , to attract unemployed workers, U_t
- Matching function CRS:

$$G(U_t, V_t) = \frac{U_t V_t}{(U_t^\iota + V_t^\iota)^{1/\iota}}$$

Job filling rate:

$$q(heta_t) \equiv rac{G(U_t,V_t)}{V_t} = rac{1}{\left(1+ heta_t^{\iota}
ight)^{1/\iota}}$$

in which $\theta_t = V_t/U_t$ is labor market tightness: $q'(\theta_t) < 0$

Model

The costs of job creation

Two costs to job creation costs

- Flow posting cost κ_0
- Fixed cost paid after hiring κ_1

Average cost to hiring a worker:

$$\frac{\kappa_0}{q(\theta_t)} + \kappa_0$$

Per period resources devoted to job creation:

$$[\kappa_0 + q(\theta_t)\kappa_1] V_t = \kappa_t V_t$$

•
$$\kappa_t \equiv \kappa_0 + q(\theta_t)\kappa_1$$

Model

Law of motion for employment and production

Once matched, jobs are destroyed at a constant rate *s*:

$$N_{t+1} = (1-s)N_t + q(\theta_t)V_t$$

Production technology:

$$Y_t = X_t N_t$$
 in which $\log(X_{t+1}) = \rho \log(X_t) + \sigma \epsilon_{t+1}$

The firm maximizes the market value of equity, S_t :

$$S_t = \max_{V_t} \left\{ X_t N_t - W_t N_t - \kappa_t V_t + E_t \left[S_{t+1} \right] \right\}$$

Subject to $N_{t+1} = (1-s)N_t + q(\theta_t)V_t$
 $V_t \ge 0$

in which W_t is the wage rate

Model

The intertemporal job creation condition

Let λ_t be the multiplier on the $q(\theta_t)V_t \ge 0$ constraint:

$$\underbrace{\frac{\kappa_{t}}{q(\theta_{t})} - \lambda_{t}}_{\text{Average cost}} = \underbrace{E_{t} \left[\beta \left[X_{t+1} - W_{t+1} + (1-s) \left[\frac{\kappa_{t+1}}{q(\theta_{t+1})} - \lambda_{t+1} \right] \right] \right]}_{\text{Expected benefit}}$$

Response of equilibrium θ_t to productivity shocks:

• Benefit side: hinges on the equilibrium response of wage W

• Cost side:
$$\kappa_t/q(\theta_t) = \kappa_0/q(\theta_t) + \kappa_1$$

The Kuhn-Tucker conditions: $V_t \ge 0, \lambda_t \ge 0, \lambda_t V_t = 0$

Model

Workers: employment and unemployment

Value of employment at a wage W_t

$$J_{Nt}^{W} = W_t + \beta E_t \left[(1-s) J_{Nt+1}^{W} + s J_{Ut+1} \right]$$

Value of unemployment:

$$J_{Ut} = b + \beta E_t \left[f_t J_{Nt+1}^{W} + (1 - f_t) J_{Ut+1} \right]$$

- b: Unemployment flow value, forgone leisure
- s: Job separation rate
- *f_t*: Job finding rate

Model Credible bargaining, Hall and Milgrom (2008)

Alternating wage offers leaving the other party just indifferent:

Firm to worker: W_t

$$= \delta J_{Ut} + (1 - \delta) \left(b + E_t [\beta J_{Nt+1}^{W'}] \right)$$

Value of accepting offer

b: Unemployment flow value; δ : Breakdown probability; χ : Cost of delay

Model Credible bargaining, Hall and Milgrom (2008)

Alternating wage offers leaving the other party just indifferent:

Firm to worker: W_t

$$= \underbrace{\delta J_{Ut} + (1 - \delta) \left(b + E_t [\beta J_{Nt+1}^{W'}] \right)}_{Wt+1}$$

Value of accepting offer

 J_{Nt}^{W}

Value of refusing in order to make counteroffer

• Worker to firm: W'_t

$$S_{Nt}^{W'} = \delta \times 0 + (1 - \delta) \left(-\chi + E_t [\beta S_{Nt+1}^W] \right)$$

b: Unemployment flow value; δ : Breakdown probability; χ : Cost of delay

Model

Assume the firm makes the first offer: W_t is the equilibrium wage

Firm to worker: W_t

$$W_{t} = b - (1 - s) \beta E_{t} \left[J_{Nt+1}^{W} - J_{Ut+1} \right] \\ + \delta f_{t} \beta E_{t} \left[J_{Nt+1}^{W} - J_{Ut+1} \right] + (1 - \delta) \beta E_{t} \left[J_{Nt+1}^{W'} - J_{Ut+1} \right]$$

• Worker to firm: W'_t

$$W'_t = X_t + \beta E_t \left[(1-s) S_{Nt+1}^{W'} \right] + (1-\delta) \left[\chi - \beta E_t S_{Nt+1}^{W} \right]$$

b: Unemployment flow value; δ : Breakdown probability; χ : Cost of delay

Model

Credible bargaining wage W_t : Polar cases $\delta = 1$ and $\delta = 0$

$$\delta = 1 \rightarrow \mathsf{Nash}$$
 Bargaining wage set

$$W_{t} = b - (1 - s) \beta E_{t} \left[J_{Nt+1}^{W} - J_{Ut+1} \right] + \frac{f_{t}}{\beta} E_{t} \left[J_{Nt+1}^{W} - J_{Ut+1} \right] + 0 \times \beta E_{t} \left[J_{Nt+1}^{W'} - J_{Ut+1} \right]$$

• $\delta = 0 \rightarrow$ Limited influence of labor market conditions

$$W_{t} = b - (1 - s) \beta E_{t} \left[J_{Nt+1}^{W} - J_{Ut+1} \right] + 0 \times f_{t} \beta E_{t} \left[J_{Nt+1}^{W} - J_{Ut+1} \right] + 1 \times \beta E_{t} \left[J_{Nt+1}^{W'} - J_{Ut+1} \right]$$

b: Unemployment flow value; δ : Breakdown probability; χ : Cost of delay;

Model Equilibrium

The goods market clearing condition:

$$C_t + \kappa_t V_t = X_t N_t$$

The recursive competitive equilibrium consists of vacancies, V_t^* ; multiplier, λ_t^* ; and wages W_t^* and $W_t^{'*}$:

- V_t^{*} and λ_t^{*} satisfy the intertemporal job creation condition and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, while taking the wage equation as given
- W_t^{\star} and $W_t^{\prime \star}$ satisfy the indifference conditions of the bargaining game
- The goods market clears

[Back]

Computation

Projection with parameterized expectations a la Christiano and Fisher (2000)

Solve for:

1 $V(N_t, X_t)$ and $\lambda(N_t, X_t)$ 2 $W(N_t, x_t)$ 3 $J_U(N_t, x_t), J_N^W(N_t, x_t)$, and $J_N^{W'}(N_t, x_t)$

From five functional equations:

- 1 A job creation condition
- 2 Wage offer to workers
- **3** Definitions of J_{Ut} , J_{Nt}^{W} and $J_{Nt}^{W'}$

while obeying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.

Numerical Details

Calibration

Monthly frequency

Notation	Parameter	Value
β	Time discount factor	$e^{-5.524/1200}$
ρ	Aggregate productivity persistence	$0.95^{1/3}$
σ	Conditional volatility of productivity shocks	0.00635
5	Job separation rate	0.045
ι	Elasticity of the matching function	1.25
Ь	The value of unemployment activities	0.71
δ	Probability of breakdown in bargaining	0.1
χ	Cost to employer of delaying in bargaining	0.25
κ_0	The proportional cost of vacancy posting	0.15
κ_1	The fixed cost of vacancy posting	0.2

Target simulation means in non-crises samples to post-war data:


- January 1951 to December 2012 mean of 5.84%
- Steady state unemployment rate : 5.1%

Calibration Monthly frequency

	MODEL			U.S. DATA				
	U	V	θ	Х	U	V	θ	X
	Non-crisis samples			1951:1-2012:12				
Volatility	0.102	0.191	0.274	0.13	0.131	0.142	0.269	0.013
Correlation U		-0.732	-0.880	-0.742		-0.931	-0.981	-0.232
V			0.966	0.950			0.984	0.391
heta				0.938				0.925

- Simulate 50,000 artificial samples from the model, with 1,005 months in each sample
- Split the samples into two groups
 - Non-crisis samples maximum unemployment rate < 20%
 - Crisis samples maximum rate is $\geq 20\%$
- Report cross-simulation averages conditionally on the non-crisis samples and on the crisis samples

Properties: model's stationary distribution




Unemployment

Labor	market	tightness
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mean	5.84%	mean	2.57
median	5.40%	median	2.49
2.5 pctles	4.70%	2.5 pctles	0.40
97.5 pctles	15.15%	97.5 pctles	5.15

Frequency $V_t = 0$: 0 Back


Projection vs. Linear Approximation



See Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2013), Solving the DMP model Accurately (Back)

Results


Nonlinear impulse response functions, θ_t




Results

Back)

Nonlinear impulse response functions, unemployment




Nonlinear impulse response functions, W_t




Median ($U_t = 5.40\%$, $x_t = 0$) Good ($U_t = 4.75\%$, $x_t = 0.0564$) (Back)

An illustrative crisis example



Beveridge curve Model and U.S., 1929:04-2012:12



(Back)

Labor market volatilities in the model and data

		MOD	EL		U.S. DATA			
	U	V	θ	Х	U	V	θ	X
	Non-crisis samples				1951:1-2012:12			
Volatility	0.102	0.191	0.274	0.13	0.131	0.142	0.269	0.013
Correlation U		-0.732	-0.880	-0.742		-0.931	-0.981	-0.232
V			0.966	0.950			0.984	0.391
heta				0.938				0.925
	U	V	θ	X	U	V	θ	X
	Crisis samples					1929:4–2	012:12	
Volatility	0.149	0.216	0.331	0.013	0.218	0168	0.368	
Correlation U		-0.630	-0.861	-0.710		-0.827	-0.967	
V			0.937	0.926			0.943	
θ				0.925				

Facts

Aggregate state transition matrix in the data: Chatterjee and Corbae (2007)

Fit a three-state Markov chain model via maximum likelihood:

- Economy evolves through good (g), bad (b), and crisis (c) states with different employment prospects
- Transition matrix of the Markov chain be given by:

$$\Lambda = \left[\begin{array}{cc} \lambda_{gg} & \lambda_{bg} & \lambda_{cg} \\ \lambda_{gb} & \lambda_{bb} & \lambda_{cb} \\ \lambda_{gc} & \lambda_{bc} & \lambda_{cc} \end{array} \right]$$

- Good: $U \le 5.70\%$
- Bad: 5.70% < U ≤ 20%
- Crisis: *U* > 20%

Facts

Aggregate state transition matrix in the data

	Good	Bad	Crisis
Good	0.959 (0.009)	0.041 (0.009)	0 (0)
Bad	0.039 (0.009)	0.949 (0.010)	0.012 (0.005)
Crisis	0 (0)	0.177 (0.065)	<mark>0.824</mark> (0.065)
Unconditional probability	0.468	0.497	0.035

- Good: $U \le 5.70\%$
- Bad: $5.70\% < U \le 20\%$
- Crisis: U > 20%

Aggregate state transition matrix in a macro labor model

	Good	Bad	Crisis
Good	0.979 (0.007)	0.021 (0.007)	0 (0)
Bad	0.022 (0.007)	0.975 (0.008)	0.004 (0.002)
Crisis	0 (0)	0.157 (0.221)	0.842 (0.223)
Unconditional probability	0.494	0.473	0.032

- Good: *U* < 5.70%
- Bad: $5.70\% < U \le 20\%$
- Crisis: U > 20%

Non-linear dynamics and unemployment crises a robust feature

- Survives setting high or low flow value of unemployment b
- Survives absence of fixed costs
- Survives assumption on wage bargaining
- Key : Match mean and volatility of unemployment post W.W. II
 - Two parameters matter for credible bargaining Comp Statics
 - A low probability of breakdown δ
 - \blacksquare A high cost to delaying production χ

Welfare Costs of Business Cycles

Lucas (1987): Negligible welfare cost of business cycles

Log utility with log-normal consumption growth:

 The agent is willing to sacrifice only 0.008% of consumption in perpetuity to eliminate all aggregate fluctuations

The welfare cost might be underestimated by overlooking:

- Crises in which the agent's marginal utility is high
- Steady state consumption great than stochastic mean

Permanent percentage of the consumption flow C_t that the household would sacrifice to eliminate aggregate fluctuations:

$$E_t\left[\sum_{\triangle t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{\triangle t}\log\left[(1+\psi_t)C_{t+\triangle t}\right]\right] = \sum_{\triangle t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{\triangle t}\log\left(C^{\star}\right)$$

• C^* : aggregate consumption at the deterministic steady state

The welfare cost is 1.2%, which is 150 times of the Lucas estimate

The stochastic mean is 0.95% lower than the steady state consumption

A search and matching model with credible wage bargaining can add to our understanding of unemployment during the Great Depression

- Beveridge curve: supports complementarity of U and V in the matching function
- Credible bargaining: limited response of the wage to labor market conditions contributes to the crisis dynamics
- Policy and institutional shocks will have a greater (deleterious) effects on the labor market when it is slack

Computation The five functional equations

$$\begin{split} \frac{\kappa_t}{q(\theta_t)} &-\lambda(N_t, x_t) &= \\ & E_t \left[\beta \left[X_{t+1} - W_{t+1} + (1-s) \left[\frac{\kappa_{t+1}}{q(\theta_{t+1})} - \lambda(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) \right] \right] \right] \\ & W(N_t, x_t) &= b + (1-\delta)\beta E_t \left[J_N^{W'}(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) - J_U(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) \right] \\ & - (1-s-\delta f_t) \beta E_t \left[J_N^W(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) - J_U(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) \right] \\ & J_U(N_t, x_t) &= \\ & b + E_t \left[\beta \left(f_t J_N^W(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) + (1-f_t) J_U(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) \right) \right] \\ & J_N^{W'}(N_t, x_t) &= \\ & W_t + E_t \left[\beta \left((1-s) J_N^W(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) + s J_U(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) \right) \right] \\ & J_N^{W'}(N_t, x_t) &= \\ & W_t' + E_t \left[\beta \left((1-s) J_N^{W'}(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) + s J_U(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) \right) \right] \end{split}$$

Computation

Parameterized expectations a la Christiano and Fisher (2000)

Approximate the right-hand side of the Euler equation

$$\mathcal{E}(N_t, X_t) = E_t \left[\beta \left[X_{t+1} - W_{t+1} + (1-s) \left[\frac{\kappa_{t+1}}{q(\theta_{t+1})} - \lambda(N_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) \right] \right] \right]$$

No need to parameterize λ_t separately

$$\frac{\kappa_t}{q(\theta_t)} - \lambda_t = \mathcal{E}_t$$

After obtaining \mathcal{E}_t , calculate $\tilde{q}(\theta_t) = \kappa_t / \mathcal{E}_t$


• If $\tilde{q}(\theta_t) \ge 1$ (binding constraint): $V_t = 0$, $\theta_t = 0$, $q(\theta_t) = 1$, and $\lambda_t = \kappa_t - \mathcal{E}_t$

If
$$\tilde{q}(\theta_t) < 1$$
 (nonbinding constraint): $\lambda_t = 0$,
 $q(\theta_t) = \tilde{q}(\theta_t) \Rightarrow \theta_t = q^{-1}(\kappa_t / \mathcal{E}_t)$, $V_t = \theta_t (1 - N_t)$

Computation


Solution method: Projection with parameterized expectations

- $\log(X_t)$ discretized with 17 grid points
- Cubic splines (20 basis functions) in N for each log(X)-level



Back

Linear Approximation Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2013): Solving DMP Accurately



Back

Data - Unemployment rate Step 1

Construct monthly unemployment rate for U.S. starting 1929:04


- April 1929 to February 1940 National Industrial Conference Board, published by G. H. Moore Business Cycle Indicators, vol. II, p. 35 and p.123, from NBER data series m08292a
- March 1940 to December 1946 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Labor Force series P-50, no. 2, 13, and 19. From NBER data series m08292b.
- January 1947 to December 1947 use monthly (not S.A.) from January 1947 to December 1966 from Employment and Earnings and Monthly Report on the Labor Force, vol. 13, no. 9, March 1967 (NBER data series m08292c. Source:); apply X-12-ARIMA seasonal adjustment program from the U.S. Census Bureau; use S.A. series from January to December of 1947.
- January 1948 to December 2012 S.A. civilian unemployment rates from from Bureau of Labor Statistics (FRED series id: UNRATE)

Back


Data - Unemployment rate Step 2

Adjust pre-1948 data as in Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013)


- Use the monthly unemployment rates from January 1930 to December 1947 to interpolate annual unemployment rates data from Weir (1992) using the Denton (1971) proportional interpolation procedure
- Scale the nine monthly rates from April to December 1929 so that their average matches the annual unemployment rate for 1929 reported in Weir.



Data Help-Wanted Index: MetLife and Conference Board



Data Help-Wanted Index: Conference Board and Barnichon (2010)



Comparative statics, labor market volatilities

	U	V	θ	X		U	V	θ	X		
	Non-crisis samples				Crisis samples						
	_			$\delta =$	= 0.15	0.15					
Volatility	0.070	0.150	0.209	0.013	0.1	06	0.162	0.245	0.014		
Autocorrelation	0.792	0.708	0.772	0.775	0.8	49	0.686	0.791	0.785		
Correlation		-0.781	-0.895	-0.792	U		-0.650	-0.863	-0.735		
			0.977	0.970	V			0.944	0.950		
				0.960	θ				0.949		
	$\chi=$ 0.2										
Volatility	0.032	0.128	0.155	0.013	0.1	80	0.173	0.253	0.014		
Autocorrelation	0.763	0.747	0.769	0.775	0.8	55	0.709	0.803	0.786		
Correlation		-0.847	-0.901	-0.776	U		-0.596	-0.834	-0.502		
			0.993	0.968	V			0.939	0.883		
				0.951	θ				0.819		

Comparative statics, unemployment crises

	Good	Bad	Crisis		Good	Bad	Crisis
	$\delta=$ 0.15					$\chi = 0.2$	
	(% crisis samples $= 1.85$)				(% crisi	s samples	= 1.54)
Good	0.9807	0.0193	0		0.9801	0.0199	0
Bad	0.0197	0.9780	0.0023		0.0199	0.9779	0.0023
Crisis	0	0.2127	0.7873		0	0.2660	0.7340
Uncond. prob.	0.4946	0.4852	0.0201		0.4901	0.4929	0.0170

