



Deleveraging in a highly indebted property market: Who does it and are there implications for household consumption?

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Norges Bank, Household Credit and Demand Risk Workshop, March 24th 2015



Background

- ▶ Prior to the financial crisis significant increase, across countries, in household debt
- ▶ Lead to considerable deleveraging since
 - ▶ Reduction in personal debt levels
- ▶ Mainly examined at an aggregate level
- ▶ A number of reasons why you might want to address this at a microeconomic, household level



What we do

- ▶ Using micro level, household data
- ▶ Determine who is deleveraging in the Irish mortgage market and
- ▶ Assess the implications for consumption
- ▶ Irish market particularly affected by high debt levels
- ▶ Cussen, O'Leary and Smith (2012) estimate for a 24 country sample
 - ▶ Between 2005 and 2007 Irish household debt increased the most
- ▶ Housing market developments central to this
 - ▶ OECD: Irish house price growth between 1995 and 2007 the largest



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Figure 1: Irish household liabilities: 2002 - 2013







Figure 3: Quarter on quarter change in Irish household liabilities: 2002 - 2013





Background to the data sources

- ▶ **Two related data sets used:**

1. Loan level data (LLD) collected for PCAR and
2. Income survey of mortgaged households

- ▶ Loan level data:

- ▶ Actual house prices and mortgage information

- ▶ Income survey:

- ▶ Economic characteristics on 2,000 mortgaged households
- ▶ Representative sample based on loan level data



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How we measure deleveraging

- ▶ Survey respondents asked if concerned about their debt
 - ▶ 55 per cent reported that they were concerned
- ▶ These respondents then asked about actions to deal with their concerns
 - ▶ 12 per cent making overpayments to clear their debt more quickly or using savings to supplement payments
- ▶ We generate a dummy variable “Deleverage”:
 - ▶ =1 if concerned and making overpayments/using savings
 - ▶ =0 if concerned and not making overpayments/using savings



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Model of Deleveraging

$$\text{Prob}(y_i = 1) = F(\beta(x_i)) + \epsilon_i; i = 1, 2, \dots, n$$

- ▶ Where: x comprises a set of characteristics posited to influence deleveraging behaviour (including demographic, socio-economic and financial variables), β is a set of parameters to be estimated and ϵ_i is the error term



Table 1: Probability of deleveraging - baseline probit regression

| Dependent variable: Deleverages | Marginal Effect | Std. Error |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|
| <i>male</i> | -0.012 | 0.023 |
| <i>married</i> | -0.007 | 0.037 |
| <i>HH size</i> | 0.012 | 0.011 |
| <i>age – 3544</i> | 0.001 | 0.034 |
| <i>age – 4554</i> | -0.009 | 0.037 |
| <i>age – 5564</i> | 0.079 | 0.062 |
| <i>age – 65+</i> | -0.051 | 0.070 |
| <i>medium education</i> | 0.068 | 0.043 |
| <i>high education</i> | 0.082* | 0.048 |
| <i>employed</i> | 0.071 | 0.037 |
| <i>retired/inactive</i> | 0.166** | 0.104 |
| <i>hh income</i> | 0.053** | 0.025 |
| <i>mrti</i> | 0.032 | 0.021 |
| <i>current ltv</i> | -0.013 | 0.016 |
| <hr/> | | |
| N | 830 | |
| LR chi ² | 24.16 | |
| Prob>chi ² | 0.0438 | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.0396 | |

Note: ***Significant at 1 per cent level; **Significant at 5 per cent level; *Significant at 10 per cent level.
Omitted categories for dummy variables are: age 18-35; low education and unemployed.



Table 2: Probability of deleveraging - including income quintiles

| Dependent variable: Deleverages | Marginal Effect | Std. Error |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| <i>male</i> | -0.013 | 0.023 |
| <i>married</i> | 0.003 | 0.035 |
| <i>HH size</i> | 0.012 | 0.011 |
| <i>age – 3544</i> | -0.002 | 0.034 |
| <i>age – 4554</i> | -0.012 | 0.036 |
| <i>age – 5564</i> | 0.075 | 0.062 |
| <i>age – 65+</i> | -0.054 | 0.067 |
| <i>medium education</i> | 0.074* | 0.043 |
| <i>high education</i> | 0.087* | 0.048 |
| <i>employed</i> | 0.078* | 0.034 |
| <i>retired/inactive</i> | 0.169** | 0.103 |
| <i>Income Quintile 2</i> | 0.040 | 0.042 |
| <i>Income Quintile 3</i> | -0.017 | 0.035 |
| <i>Income Quintile 4</i> | 0.021 | 0.043 |
| <i>Income Quintile 5</i> | 0.112** | 0.059 |
| <i>mrti</i> | 0.021 | 0.020 |
| <i>current ltv</i> | -0.009 | 0.016 |
| N | 830 | |
| LR chi ² | 29.61 | |
| Prob>chi ² | 0.0293 | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.0485 | |

Note: ***Significant at 1 per cent level; **Significant at 5 per cent level; *Significant at 10 per cent level.

Omitted categories for dummy variables are: age 18-35; low education; unemployed; and income quintile 1 (lowest income group).



Table 3: Probability of deleveraging - including savings

| Dependent variable: Deleverages | Marginal Effect | Std. Error |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| <i>male</i> | -0.011 | 0.023 |
| <i>married</i> | -0.012 | 0.038 |
| <i>HH size</i> | 0.015 | 0.011 |
| <i>age – 3544</i> | -0.000 | 0.034 |
| <i>age – 4554</i> | -0.009 | 0.036 |
| <i>age – 5564</i> | 0.089 | 0.064 |
| <i>age – 65+</i> | -0.051 | 0.070 |
| <i>medium education</i> | 0.058 | 0.043 |
| <i>high education</i> | 0.061* | 0.043 |
| <i>employed</i> | 0.066 | 0.038 |
| <i>retired/inactive</i> | 0.156* | 0.102 |
| <i>hh income</i> | 0.046* | 0.025 |
| <i>mrti</i> | 0.032 | 0.021 |
| <i>current ltv</i> | -0.012 | 0.016 |
| <i>savings</i> | 0.042* | 0.026 |
| N | 826 | |
| LR chi ² | 27.03 | |
| Prob>chi ² | 0.0285 | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.0443 | |

Note: ***Significant at 1 per cent level; **Significant at 5 per cent level; *Significant at 10 per cent level.
Omitted categories for dummy variables are: age 18-35; low education and unemployed.



Table 4: Probability of deleveraging - including negative equity

| Dependent variable: Deleverages | Marginal Effect | Std. Error |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| <i>male</i> | -0.012 | 0.023 |
| <i>married</i> | -0.011 | 0.037 |
| <i>HH size</i> | 0.014 | 0.011 |
| <i>age – 3544</i> | -0.004 | 0.034 |
| <i>age – 4554</i> | -0.016 | 0.036 |
| <i>age – 5564</i> | 0.082 | 0.064 |
| <i>age – 65+</i> | -0.055 | 0.067 |
| <i>medium education</i> | 0.061 | 0.043 |
| <i>high education</i> | 0.073* | 0.048 |
| <i>employed</i> | 0.066 | 0.038 |
| <i>retired/inactive</i> | 0.155* | 0.102 |
| <i>hh income</i> | 0.046* | 0.025 |
| <i>mrti</i> | 0.032 | 0.021 |
| <i>current ltv</i> | -0.001 | 0.020 |
| <i>savings</i> | 0.042* | 0.026 |
| <i>negative equity</i> | -0.028 | 0.030 |
| N | 826 | |
| LR chi ² | 27.91 | |
| Prob>chi ² | 0.0324 | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.0458 | |

Note: ***Significant at 1 per cent level; **Significant at 5 per cent level; *Significant at 10 per cent level.
Omitted categories for dummy variables are: age 18-35; low education and unemployed.



Table 5: Probability of deleveraging - including credit constraints

| Dependent variable: Deleverages | Marginal Effect | Std. Error |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| <i>male</i> | -0.011 | 0.023 |
| <i>married</i> | -0.013 | 0.038 |
| <i>HH size</i> | 0.014 | 0.011 |
| <i>age – 3544</i> | 0.000 | 0.034 |
| <i>age – 4554</i> | -0.008 | 0.036 |
| <i>age – 5564</i> | 0.089 | 0.065 |
| <i>age – 65+</i> | -0.051 | 0.070 |
| <i>medium education</i> | 0.061 | 0.043 |
| <i>high education</i> | 0.073 | 0.048 |
| <i>employed</i> | 0.065 | 0.038 |
| <i>retired/inactive</i> | 0.156* | 0.102 |
| <i>hh income</i> | 0.047* | 0.025 |
| <i>mrti</i> | 0.032 | 0.021 |
| <i>current ltv</i> | -0.012 | 0.016 |
| <i>savings</i> | 0.045* | 0.026 |
| <i>credit constrained</i> | 0.015 | 0.029 |
| <hr/> | | |
| N | 826 | |
| LR chi ² | 27.33 | |
| Prob>chi ² | 0.0380 | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.0448 | |

Note: ***Significant at 1 per cent level; **Significant at 5 per cent level; *Significant at 10 per cent level.
Omitted categories for dummy variables are: age 18-35; low education and unemployed.



Expectations



Table 6: Probability of deleveraging - incorporating financial expectations

| Dependent variable: Deleverages | Marginal Effect | Std. Error |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| <i>male</i> | -0.010 | 0.024 |
| <i>married</i> | -0.014 | 0.039 |
| <i>HH size</i> | 0.015 | 0.011 |
| <i>age – 3544</i> | 0.003 | 0.035 |
| <i>age – 4554</i> | -0.001 | 0.039 |
| <i>age – 5564</i> | 0.102* | 0.068 |
| <i>age – 65+</i> | -0.052 | 0.073 |
| <i>medium education</i> | 0.062 | 0.044 |
| <i>high education</i> | 0.070 | 0.049 |
| <i>employed</i> | 0.064 | 0.040 |
| <i>retired/inactive</i> | 0.155* | 0.103 |
| <i>hh income</i> | 0.047* | 0.026 |
| <i>mrti</i> | 0.026 | 0.019 |
| <i>current ltv</i> | -0.011 | 0.017 |
| <i>savings</i> | 0.042* | 0.026 |
| <i>expect deterioration</i> | -0.039* | 0.023 |
| N | 797 | |
| LR chi ² | 28.36 | |
| Prob>chi ² | 0.0287 | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.0471 | |

Note: ***Significant at 1 per cent level; **Significant at 5 per cent level; *Significant at 10 per cent level.
Omitted categories for dummy variables are: age 18-35; low education and unemployed.



Deleveraging and Consumption

- ▶ Implications of a financial shock
 - ▶ Typically assessed through a wealth effect channel
 - ▶ An endogenous reduction in debt
 - ▶ Less spending leads to less borrowing and
 - ▶ A reduction in debt levels

- ▶ But, do households respond to the *level* of debt itself?
 - ▶ They may target a certain leverage rate
 - ▶ Respond when debt levels are in excess of this

- ▶ Also, financial institutions reluctant to lend to indebted households
 - ▶ Another reason why households care about the level of their debt

- ▶ Quite an important issue
 - ▶ As standard models of consumption
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Information on Consumption

- ▶ Survey respondents asked how consumption has changed over the previous year
 - ▶ Increase / Decrease / No Change
- ▶ These respondents then asked about Euro amount of change
- ▶ We generate a continuous dependent variable and use OLS regression to assess impact of controls on consumption change
 - ▶ include same binary controls as before
 - ▶ but changes in independent continuous variables
- ▶ Importantly, we control for housing wealth



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Table 7: Implications for consumption - OLS regression results

| Dependent variable: Euro change in consumption | Coefficient | Std. Error |
|------------------------------------------------------|------------------|---------------|
| <i>constant</i> | -321.124*** | 128.778 |
| <i>male</i> | 1.155 | 28.252 |
| <i>married</i> | 23.986 | 41.948 |
| <i>HH size</i> | 22.856* | 13.101 |
| <i>age – 3544</i> | -7.767 | 40.855 |
| <i>age – 4554</i> | -24.598 | 42.978 |
| <i>age – 5564</i> | 43.854 | 53.396 |
| <i>age – 65+</i> | -126.671 | 101.278 |
| <i>medium education</i> | 86.378** | 41.431 |
| <i>high education</i> | 74.391* | 42.957 |
| <i>employed</i> | 57.406 | 47.702 |
| <i>retired/inactive</i> | 61.616 | 64.939 |
| <i>change in hp</i> | -8.584 | 7.280 |
| <i>income : no change</i> | 76.255** | 38.410 |
| <i>income : increase</i> | 88.537 | 60.065 |
| <i>deleverage</i> | -78.761** | 40.491 |
| N | 902 | |
| F (15,886) | 1.72 | |
| Prob>F | 0.0417 | |
| R ² | 0.0283 | |

Note: ***Significant at 1 per cent level; **Significant at 5 per cent level; *Significant at 10 per cent level.



Concluding comments

- ▶ It is those households who can deleverage, who do. Expectations play a role
 - ▶ Implications? Less well-off segments of the mortgaged population are likely to remain significantly indebted for quite some time
 - ▶ Of interest in the context of possible debt resolution strategies
- ▶ Importantly, we find that, controlling for housing wealth effects, deleveraging has negative implications for changes in consumption
 - ▶ As household income levels begin to recover, the knock on implications for consumer demand may not be as significant as would be expected
- ▶ More generally, the importance of debt levels for consumption behaviour illustrates an important linkage between financial sector developments and the real economy



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