# Norway

*This report does not constitute a new rating action for this issuer. It provides more detailed credit analysis than the previously published Rating Action Commentary, which can be found on www.fitchratings.com.*

## Key Rating Drivers

**Robust Fiscal Buffers:** Already exceptional public finances will strengthen in 2026, driven by higher oil and gas prices than in 2025. Norway's fiscal framework channels all net petroleum revenue to the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), which held USD2.3 trillion in assets at May 2026, equal to 4.8x mainland GDP. Norway's internationally comparable general government surplus, including petroleum sector taxes and dividends, was 10.4% of GDP in 2025, and Fitch Ratings expects similarly strong fiscal surpluses in 2026 and 2027.

**Prudent Fiscal Framework:** The government presented a revised annual budget in May. In response to greater global economic uncertainty and inflationary pressures, it slightly reduced its use of GPFG oil revenue, lowering spending to 2.7% of the fund's value from 2.8%, well within the 3% fiscal rule. Fiscal policy remains moderately expansionary. Measures include a higher pension tax credit, changes to wealth tax rules for primary residences to offset inflation-driven tax increases for affected households, temporary fuel tax cuts, and reinforced support for the existing "Norgespris" electricity scheme.

**Low Underlying Public Debt:** The total outstanding stock of government debt issuance was 16.5% of GDP in 2025, up slightly from 15.5% in 2024. Under the Maastricht definition, total general government debt was 54.4% of GDP in 2025. This ratio includes a sizable share of short-term liabilities (26% of GDP), mainly reflecting repurchase agreements related to GPFG portfolio management rather than underlying borrowing needs. Since 2022, the Maastricht debt ratio has increased by 19pp, coinciding with a 70% rise in the value of the GPFG.

**Monetary Stance Turns Hawkish:** Norges Bank raised its key policy rate by 25bp to 4.25% in May 2026, the first increase since 2023. This followed an upward revision of the projected inflation path in the bank's 1Q26 Monetary Policy Report. Headline inflation averaged 3.0% in 2025 and had risen to 3.4% by April 2026.

Fitch expects high global commodity prices and persistently strong wage growth to sustain inflation pressures this year. A stronger krone should partly moderate imported inflation, but about a third of Norway's CPI basket remains exposed to external price developments. Fitch expects one more policy rate increase in 2H26, bringing the rate to 4.5% by end-2026, and projects inflation to fall below 3.0% in 2027.

**Domestic Driven Growth:** Mainland real GDP, excluding oil and gas-related activities, rose by 1.7% in 2025 from 0.6% in 2024, driven by stronger household and government consumption. We project growth will moderate to 1.3% in 2026, as resilient consumption, supported by a balanced labour market, higher real wage growth and a moderately expansionary fiscal stance, is partly offset by higher inflation, renewed policy rate hikes and subdued private investment. We expect investment to remain constrained by high costs and tighter financing conditions, while oil and gas-related investment is declining as earlier tax-driven projects are completed.

**Financial Stability Tail Risks:** A highly indebted household sector, combined with high home prices, remains a key macro-financial vulnerability. Norway's household debt/income ratio, at 208%, is among the highest in the OECD. Debt is largely mortgage-based, with more than 90% at variable rates, increasing households' sensitivity to rising interest rates or a housing market downturn.

Home prices remain high relative to income, reflecting structural supply constraints and strong demand. Price growth has moderated recently, but valuations remain stretched, leaving households exposed to potential corrections. Norwegian households have high average net wealth, but the debt service ratio of 14.2% remains above its 10-year average of 13.7%.

**Well-Capitalised Banking Sector:** Norwegian banks are highly profitable, supported by strong net interest income, low operating costs and limited credit losses. High capital buffers, a systemic risk buffer at 4.5% and countercyclical risk buffer at 2.5%, and ample liquidity, leave the sector well positioned to absorb losses in an adverse scenario. Nonetheless, we expect higher interest rates to increase credit losses in interest rate-sensitive sectors, particularly real estate development and construction. Banks' exposure to commercial real estate (CRE)-related activity is significant, roughly 56% of total corporate lending. However, relatively strong balance sheets in the CRE sector, with equity ratios of around 50%, provide an important buffer that should mitigate rising credit losses.

## Rating Summary

### Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating: AAA

**Sovereign Rating Model: AAA** | **Qualitative Overlay: 0**




### Adjustments relative to SRM data and output

**Structural features:** No adjustment.

**Macroeconomic outlook, policies and prospects:** No adjustment.

**Public finances:** No adjustment.

**External finances:** No adjustment.

Note: See the *Peer Analysis* table for summary data, including rating category medians; see the *Full Rating Derivation* table for detailed SRM data.




### Recent Rating Derivation History

| Review Date | LT FC IDR | SRM Result[ab] | QO | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | S | M | PF | EF |
| Latest | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 12 Dec 2025 | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 13 Jun 2025 | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 13 Dec 2024 | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 14 Jun 2024 | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 15 Dec 2023 | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 16 Jun 2023 | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 20 Jan 2023 | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 29 Jul 2022 | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 Feb 2022 | AAA | AAA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

[a] The latest rating uses the SRM result for 2025 from the chart. This will roll forward to 2026 in July 2026).

[b] Historical SRM results in this table may differ from the chart, which is based on our latest data, due to data revisions.

Abbreviations: LT FC IDR = Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating; SRM = Sovereign Rating Model; QO = Qualitative Overlay

Source: Fitch Ratings

## Peer Analysis

Norway AAA Median

### Consumer Price Inflation




### Real GDP Growth

(%)


### General Government Balance




### Gross General Government Debt

(% GDP)




### Current Account Balance

(% GDP)




### Net External Debt

(% GDP)



### Real Private-Sector Credit Growth




### Governance Indicators




Source: Fitch Ratings, Statistical Office, Ministry of Finance, IMF, World Bank

## Peer Analysis

| 2025[a] | Norway | AAA median | AA median | A median |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Structural features** | | | | |
| GDP per capita (USD) [SRM] | 94,366 | 76,788 | 56,500 | 34,549 |
| Share in world GDP (%) [SRM] | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Composite governance indicator (percentile, latest) [SRM][b] | 94.1 | 93.6 | 84.3 | 75.5 |
| Human development index (percentile, latest) | 98.9 | 95.1 | 90.0 | 81.7 |
| Broad money (% GDP) [SRM] | 61.9 | 94.7 | 101.2 | 90.7 |
| Private credit (% GDP, 3-year average) | 126.2 | 122.2 | 105.4 | 71.9 |
| Dollarisation ratio (% bank deposits, latest) | 24.1 | 14.5 | 12.5 | 10.3 |
| Bank system capital ratio (% assets, latest) | 23.1 | 15.1 | 16.9 | 16.2 |
| **Macroeconomic performance and policies** | | | | |
| Real GDP growth (%, 3-year average) [SRM] | 1.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 3.8 |
| Real GDP growth volatility (complex standard deviation) [SRM] | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 |
| Consumer price inflation (%, 3-year average) [SRM] | 2.9 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
| Unemployment rate (%) | 4.5 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 6.3 |
| **Public finances (general government)[c]** | | | | |
| Balance (% GDP, 3-year average) [SRM] | 11.4 | -0.3 | -1.3 | -2.5 |
| Primary balance (% GDP, 3-year average) | 9.8 | 1.1 | 0.2 | -0.7 |
| Interest payments (% revenue, 3-year average) [SRM] | 2.5 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 4.3 |
| Gross debt (% revenue, 3-year average) | 90.0 | 112.0 | 145.0 | 134.6 |
| Gross debt (% GDP, 3-year average) [SRM] | 53.8 | 44.2 | 41.8 | 42.2 |
| Net debt (% GDP, 3-year average) | 46.1 | 37.5 | 34.6 | 37.1 |
| FC debt (% gross debt, 3-year average) [SRM] | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 6.3 |
| **External finances[c]** | | | | |
| Current account balance (% GDP, 3-year average) | 13.8 | 5.4 | 1.6 | 1.2 |
| Current account balance + net FDI (% GDP, 3-year avg.) [SRM] | 13.2 | 2.0 | 1.2 | 2.5 |
| Commodity dependence (% CXR) [SRM] | 44.7 | 14.1 | 14.5 | 11.4 |
| Gross external debt (% GDP, 3-year average) | 148.7 | 179.7 | 120.0 | 66.3 |
| Net external debt (% GDP, 3-year average) | -74.9 | 9.5 | -10.0 | -8.5 |
| Gross sovereign external debt (% GXD, 3-year average) | 36.6 | 11.1 | 17.6 | 22.4 |
| Sovereign net foreign assets (% GDP, 3-year average) [SRM] | 361.3 | -3.4 | 10.0 | 11.8 |
| External interest service (% CXR, 3-year average) [SRM] | 9.3 | 7.4 | 4.2 | 2.3 |
| Foreign-exchange reserves (months of CXP) [SRM] | 4.1 | 1.5 | 2.8 | 4.2 |
| Liquidity ratio | 47.6 | 53.2 | 55.3 | 89.6 |

[a] 3-year averages are centred on this year. Fitch does not forecast indicators labelled 'latest', meaning data may be lagging.

[b] Composite of all six World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (see chart on the previous page).

[c] See Appendix 2: Data Notes and Conventions for details of data treatment for public finances and external finances.

Source: Fitch Ratings, Statistical Office, Ministry of Finance, IMF, World Bank, United Nations

**Supplementary Information**

BSI / MPI = a / 1. About the BSI and MPI: Fitch's bank systemic indicator (BSI) equates to a weighted average Viability Rating. The macro-prudential risk indicator (MPI) focuses on one potential source of financial stress, ranging from '3' (high potential vulnerability to financial stress over the medium term based on trends in credit expansion, equity and property prices and real exchange rates) to '1' (low likelihood). For more information, refer to Fitch's most recent Macro-Prudential Risk Monitor report.

Year cured from the most recent default or restructuring event, since 1980 = No event.

The de facto exchange-rate regime, based on the latest IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions report, is 'Free floating'.

## Rating Factors

### Strengths

- A wealthy economy with GDP per capita level far exceeding the 'AAA' category median.
- At the 94.1 percentile, Norway's composite governance indicator scores in line with the 'AAA' category median.
- Norway's underlying fiscal position is stronger than headline metrics under the Maastricht criteria suggest. Of general government debt (at 54.3% of GDP), a sizeable share related to short-term liabilities (26% of GDP) reflecting repurchase agreements related to GPFG portfolio management rather than underlying borrowing needs.
- A robust sovereign net foreign asset (SNFA) position of about 383.8% of GDP at end-2025 (Fitch estimates).

### Weaknesses

- Commodity dependence is higher than peers.
- Household debt, at 208% of net disposable income in 2024, is among the highest in the OECD. The high share of variable-rate mortgages, at more than 90% of the total, leaves households vulnerable to tighter financing conditions.

| Rating | Sovereign |
|---|---|
| AAA | **Norway** |
| | Australia |
| | Denmark |
| | Germany |
| | Luxembourg |
| | Netherlands |
| | Singapore |
| | Sweden |
| | Switzerland |
| | |
| AA+ | Canada |
| | New Zealand |
| | United States of America |

## Rating Sensitivities

### Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action/Downgrade

- **Macro:** A sharp correction in the Norwegian residential or commercial real estate market or large losses on financial system balance sheets, resulting in a severe and protracted macroeconomic shock.

### Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action/Upgrade

- The ratings are at the highest level on Fitch's scale and therefore cannot be upgraded.

## Forecast Summary

| | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026F | 2027F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Macroeconomic indicators and policy** | | | | | | |
| Real GDP growth (%) | 4.1 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| Unemployment (%) | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.8 |
| Consumer price inflation (annual average % change) | 6.3 | 5.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.7 |
| Policy interest rate (annual average, %) | 1.3 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.3 |
| General government balance (% GDP) | 24.6 | 15.9 | 12.7 | 10.4 | 11.0 | 10.2 |
| Gross general government debt (% GDP) | 35.1 | 42.7 | 53.2 | 54.4 | 53.9 | 54.1 |
| NOK per USD (annual average) | 9.6 | 10.6 | 10.7 | 10.4 | 9.7 | 9.7 |
| Real private credit growth (%) | -17.0 | 16.1 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 0.6 | 1.8 |
| **External finance** | | | | | | |
| Merchandise trade balance (USDbn) | 170.5 | 83.0 | 73.9 | 72.0 | 72.2 | 70.8 |
| Current account balance (% GDP) | 27.9 | 17.2 | 15.0 | 14.0 | 12.5 | 11.8 |
| Gross external debt (% GDP) | 112.1 | 144.6 | 144.0 | 156.9 | 145.2 | 146.7 |
| Net external debt (% GDP) | -45.5 | -70.5 | -72.6 | -79.4 | -72.9 | -72.8 |
| External debt service (principal + interest, USDbn) | 130.8 | 142.5 | 148.9 | 148.4 | 169.8 | 176.7 |
| Official international reserves including gold (USDbn) | 72.1 | 80.5 | 81.2 | 85.5 | 85.5 | 85.5 |
| Gross external financing requirement (% int. reserves) | -64.2 | 42.0 | 54.3 | 54.2 | 76.2 | 86.0 |
| **Real GDP growth (%)** | | | | | | |
| US | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| China | 3.1 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.6 | 4.3 |
| Eurozone | 3.5 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 1.1 |
| World | 3.0 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| **Oil (USD/barrel)** | 98.6 | 82.1 | 79.5 | 68.3 | 87.0 | 65.0 |

Source: Fitch Ratings

## Sources and Uses

### Public Finances (Central Government)

| (NOKbn) | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| **Uses** | **40.7** | **62.4** |
| Budget deficit | -189.1 | -219.1 |
| MLT amortisation | 229.8 | 281.5 |
| Domestic | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| External | 229.8 | 281.5 |
| **Sources** | **40.7** | **62.4** |
| Gross borrowing | 427.4 | 415.0 |
| Domestic | 123.0 | 89.8 |
| External | 304.4 | 325.2 |
| Privatisation | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other | -452.5 | -364.8 |
| Change in deposits (- = increase) | 65.8 | 12.2 |

Source: Fitch Ratings

### External Finances

| (USDbn) | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| **Uses** | **44.0** | **65.1** |
| Current account deficit | -74.1 | -74.4 |
| MLT amortisation | 118.1 | 139.5 |
| Sovereign | 22.8 | 29.2 |
| Non-sovereign | 95.3 | 110.3 |
| **Sources** | **-51.8** | **-35.1** |
| Gross MLT borrowing | 172.7 | 188.7 |
| Sovereign | 45.1 | 61.0 |
| Non-sovereign | 127.6 | 127.8 |
| FDI | -104.8 | -109.0 |
| Other | -121.7 | -114.8 |
| Change in FX reserves (- = increase) | 2.0 | 0.0 |

Source: Fitch Ratings

## Credit Developments

### Economic Resilience; Domestic Driven Growth

Mainland real GDP growth, which excludes oil and gas related activities, rose to 1.7% in 2025 from 0.6% in 2024. Stronger growth was driven by higher household and government consumption. We expect both to contribute meaningfully to growth this year and next. Household consumption is resilient, supported by a balanced labour market and positive real wage growth despite risks of higher inflation, while a moderately expansive fiscal stance supports government consumption.

We forecast mainland real GDP growth of 1.4% in 2026 and 1.2% in 2027. Although domestic consumption will remain resilient, higher inflation and renewed policy rate rises will still weigh on activity. Private-sector investment growth will be subdued, as the recovery in commercial and residential real estate construction is constrained by high costs and tight financing conditions. The latest Norges Bank Regional Network survey for 1Q26 points to some upside from planned higher investments in defence, energy infrastructure, manufacturing and ICT. However, as the survey was conducted before Norges Bank adopted a more hawkish stance in its May monetary policy meeting, we expect investment growth in some of these sectors to become more cautious.

Oil and gas-related investment is slowing as many projects launched in response to the petroleum tax package (started in mid-2020) are completed. With existing fields maturing and no new exploration projects in the pipeline, investment activity on the Norwegian continental shelf will gradually turn negative. We expect production, already at capacity, to remain flat in 2026 and 2027 before gradually declining from 2028. For the overall economy, including mainland and oil and gas activities, we expect real GDP growth of 1.1% in both 2026 and 2027.

### Mainland Real GDP




Source: Fitch Ratings, Norges Bank, Statistics Norway

### Inflationary Pressures




Source: Fitch Ratings, Norges Bank, Statistics Norway

### Inflationary Pressures; Tight Monetary Stance

The Norges Bank raised its benchmark rate on 7 May 2026 by 25bp to 4.25%, its first increase since 2023. The move reflects persistent inflationary pressures. About a third of Norway's CPI basket is exposed to imported inflation. This has eased since the 2022 energy price shock, but upside risks remain due to geopolitical uncertainty and its effect on global commodity prices. Inflation for domestically produced goods and services remains high, averaging 4% over the past 12 months, driven by strong wage growth.

This year's wage settlement across social partners in the leading manufacturing sector set a normative wage growth framework of 4.4%. Given overall low unemployment, and some labour market tightness in specific sectors (e.g, healthcare, construction), we expect some wage drift to lift realised wage growth, which should keep underlying inflation elevated. A Norges Bank study highlights the long pass-through from wages to inflation; a 1% wage increase in a given quarter lifts services inflation by 0.5% over three to four years.

Norges Bank faces a challenging task in bringing inflation back towards its 2% target amid both external and domestic headwinds and does not expect to reach this objective until end of 2028. Dampening of inflation pressures is expected to come from the stronger Norwegian krone, as well as from temporary government measures, such as the reduction in duties on road fuel and through the fixed price electricity scheme (Norgespris). Our latest forecast is for CPI to average 3.4% in 2026, slightly up from 3.0% in 2025, before moderating to 2.9% in 2027. Our baseline implies that we expect one more policy rate rise in 2H26, with a rate of 4.5% by end-2026.

#### Inflationary Pressures




Source: Fitch Ratings, Norges Bank, Statistics Norway

#### Fiscal Prudence




Source: Fitch Ratings, Ministry of Finance

### Moderate Expansionary Fiscal Stance

The Norwegian government presented its annual revised national budget in May. In response to increased global economic uncertainty, inflationary pressures and evolving domestic conditions, the government marginally reduced its use of oil revenues from its Oil Fund (GPFG), lowering spending to 2.7% of the fund's value, down from an initial 2.8% projection, and comfortably within the 3% fiscal rule. At the revised withdrawal rate, the government estimates oil fund transfers to the budget amounting to NOK579 billion, corresponding to a structural oil-adjusted deficit target of around 12.6% of mainland trend GDP.

Since 2021, Norway's structural non-oil deficit has been gradually widening – accommodative fiscal policy corresponding with the strong performance of the GPFG, which as of May 2026 was valued at USD 2.29 trillion (close to 4x total GDP). Funds transferred from the GPFG now make up about 27% of budget expenditure. To an extent, this exposes budget spending to financial market risk, but, in Fitch's assessment, this is more than offset by Norway's sizeable fiscal buffers and highly prudent fiscal framework.

May's revised budget includes targeted fiscal measures aimed at balancing household support with macroeconomic stability. These include an increase in the pension tax credit and adjustments to wealth tax rules for primary residences to offset inflation-driven tax increases for affected households. In addition, the government introduced temporary fuel tax cuts and reinforced the Norgespris electricity support scheme due to high energy costs.

The government estimates that the revised budget will have a moderately expansionary fiscal impulse, despite the slight reduction in oil fund spending. The fiscal impulse is projected at 0.9%, up from 0.6% in the initially adopted budget. This increase partly reflects an improved starting position from 2025, rather than significant discretionary loosening.

For peer comparison purposes, Fitch reports Norwegian general government statistics under IMF and Maastricht definitions, which includes oil-related revenue. This would correspond to an estimated 2026 general government surplus of 11% of GDP by our estimates.

### Expenditure to Increase on Defence Commitments

Norway has committed to a significant and sustained increase in defence spending in response to a more challenging security environment and evolving NATO requirements. In March 2026, the Norwegian Parliament unanimously approved a new Long-term Defence Plan that sets a clear trajectory toward meeting the NATO target of allocating 3.5% of GDP to defence by 2035. This represents a substantial scaling-up from current levels, as of end-2025 a government estimate of 2.07% of GDP. Expenditure will build up on existing commitments, including enhanced military support to Ukraine under the Nansen Programme. Priorities also include strengthening personnel capacity, improving conditions for service members, upgrading ICT and intelligence capabilities, and modernising critical assets, such as air defence systems and the naval fleet.

**Transfers from GPFG**




Source: Fitch Ratings, Norway Statistics, Ministry of Finance

**General Government Debt**
(% of GDP, Maastricht definition)




Source: Fitch Ratings, Eurostat

### *Low Underlying Debt*

General government debt reached 54.4% of GDP (Maastricht definition) at end of 2025. This includes a sizeable share of short-term liabilities, largely reflecting repurchase agreements related to GPFG portfolio management rather than underlying borrowing needs. Specifically, debt issuance is not used to finance budget deficits, as these are covered by transfers from the GPFG in line with the national fiscal rule. At end-2025, the outstanding stock of government debt issuance was 16.5% of GDP, slightly up from 15.5% of GDP in 2024.

**Household Sector Indebtedness**




Source: Fitch Ratings, Norges Bank, Statistics Norway

**Residental Real Estate and Household Credit**


Source: Fitch Ratings, Norges Bank, Statistics Norway

### Solid Bank Balance Sheets Mitigate Sector Vulnerabilities

Norwegian banks are highly profitable, supported by high net interest income, low operating costs and low credit losses. In combination with high capital buffers, a systemic risk buffer at 4.5% and countercyclical risk buffer at 2.5%, as well as ample liquidity, the banking sector is well positioned to absorb losses in an adverse stress scenario.

Nonetheless, higher interest rates are expected to increase credit losses in interest rate–sensitive sectors, particularly real estate development and construction, where non-performing loans (NPLs) remain above 10-year averages. At end-2025, NPLs in the real estate development sector were slightly above 4%, compared with a 10-year average of just below 1.5%. In the construction sector, NPLs were around 4.5%, versus a 10-year average of about 3.5%. Banks' exposure to CRE-related activity is significant, accounting for about 56% of total corporate lending. However, relatively strong balance sheets in the CRE sector, with equity ratios of around 50%, provide an important buffer that should help mitigate rising credit losses.

Elevated household debt remains a key macro-financial vulnerability. At around 208% of net disposable income (DTI) in 2025, Norwegian household indebtedness is among the highest in the OECD. Debt is predominantly mortgage-based, with more than 90% at variable rates, heightening households' sensitivity to adverse shocks, including higher interest rates, weaker economic conditions, and housing market downturns.

Stronger growth in households' real disposable income over 2024-2025 has contributed to a notable decline in the DTI ratio from around 220% in 2023. However, despite some improvement in debt-servicing capacity, key indicators remain elevated. As of end-2025, the household debt service ratio (i.e. interest expenses and principal repayments as a share of after-tax income) was 14.3%, down slightly from around 15% at end-2023. Persistently high interest rates are expected to keep the interest burden elevated and could push it modestly higher.

## Climate Vulnerability Considerations

Fitch uses Climate Vulnerability Signals (Climate.VS) as a screening tool to identify issuers whose credit profiles have a higher potential exposure to climate-related risks, and to subject those ratings to additional analysis and consideration in rating reviews. Climate.VS range from 0 (lowest risk) to 100 (highest risk).

The Climate.VS for Norway for 2035 is 35 out of 100, which indicates a potential illustrative rating impact of 0.375 of a rating notch for a representative issuer, other things equal. This reflects a physical risk (VSp) component signal of 15 and a transition risk (VSt) component signal of 30. Any potential future impact on the rating may differ from the illustrative rating impact in the Climate.VS framework, reflecting the evolution of Fitch's assessment of the global risks, action the entity may take to adapt to or mitigate the exposure, and any other relevant factors. For more information on Climate.VS, see Fitch's *Sovereign Rating Criteria*.

**Climate Vulnerability Signals for Norway**




Source: Fitch Ratings

## Data Tables

### General Government Summary

| % GDP | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026F | 2027F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 54.7 | 52.1 | 54.7 | 61.0 | 60.2 | 59.8 | 59.2 | 60.5 | 60.5 |
| Expenditure | 48.4 | 54.7 | 44.7 | 36.3 | 44.3 | 47.0 | 48.9 | 49.5 | 50.3 |
| o/w interest payments | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Interest payments (% revenue) | 1.2 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Primary balance | 5.6 | -3.3 | 9.6 | 24.1 | 14.8 | 11.2 | 8.9 | 9.4 | 8.6 |
| Overall balance | 6.3 | -2.6 | 10.0 | 24.6 | 15.9 | 12.7 | 10.4 | 11.0 | 10.2 |
| Gross government debt | 38.4 | 43.4 | 39.8 | 35.1 | 42.7 | 53.2 | 54.4 | 53.9 | 54.1 |
| % of government revenue | 70.1 | 83.2 | 72.9 | 57.5 | 71.0 | 88.9 | 91.8 | 89.1 | 89.4 |
| Issued in domestic market | 29.5 | 33.4 | 30.6 | 28.0 | 34.1 | 43.2 | 44.4 | 44.0 | 44.1 |
| Issued in foreign markets | 8.9 | 10.0 | 9.2 | 7.1 | 8.7 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 9.9 | 9.9 |
| Local currency | 38.4 | 43.4 | 39.8 | 35.1 | 42.7 | 53.2 | 54.4 | 53.9 | 54.1 |
| Foreign currency | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Central government deposits | 9.8 | 15.6 | 12.1 | 8.6 | 9.5 | 8.7 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 6.6 |
| Net government debt | 28.6 | 29.2 | 27.4 | 26.2 | 33.6 | 44.0 | 47.3 | 47.2 | 47.5 |
| Financing | | 2.6 | -10.0 | -24.6 | -15.9 | -12.7 | -10.4 | -11.0 | -10.2 |
| Domestic borrowing | | 2.7 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 2.8 | 9.6 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
| External borrowing | | 1.2 | 0.9 | -0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 0.3 |
| Other financing | | -1.3 | -14.6 | -28.8 | -19.2 | -22.8 | -14.0 | -13.3 | -12.0 |
| Change in deposits (- = increase) | | -5.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Privatisation | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other | | 4.1 | -15.0 | -29.4 | -19.3 | -23.4 | -15.2 | -13.5 | -12.0 |

Source: Fitch Ratings, Ministry of Finance

## Balance of Payments

| (USDbn) | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026F | 2027F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current account | 11.9 | 4.2 | 74.5 | 172.0 | 86.2 | 75.3 | 74.1 | 74.4 | 72.9 |
| % GDP | 2.8 | 1.1 | 14.3 | 27.9 | 17.2 | 15.0 | 14.0 | 12.5 | 11.8 |
| Goods | 15.8 | 2.1 | 75.6 | 170.5 | 83.0 | 73.9 | 72.0 | 72.2 | 70.8 |
| Services | -9.7 | -5.4 | -1.5 | -2.6 | -5.4 | -7.9 | -10.4 | -10.4 | -10.4 |
| Primary income | 12.5 | 15.3 | 8.9 | 10.2 | 16.1 | 15.9 | 19.1 | 19.1 | 19.1 |
| Secondary income | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Capital account | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -1.1 | -5.4 | -5.4 | -5.4 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial account | 466.3 | 392.4 | 564.0 | 724.8 | 632.0 | 658.4 | 685.4 | 698.2 | 690.3 |
| Direct investment | 87.6 | 82.1 | 97.8 | 105.7 | 96.4 | 98.5 | 104.8 | 109.0 | 106.8 |
| Portfolio investment | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Derivatives | 195.3 | 157.2 | 270.3 | 395.6 | 310.9 | 317.6 | 327.4 | 331.8 | 328.2 |
| Other investments | 183.4 | 153.0 | 195.8 | 223.5 | 224.7 | 242.3 | 253.3 | 257.5 | 255.3 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Net errors and omissions | -20.2 | -11.8 | -1.6 | -26.3 | 3.7 | -6.7 | 20.9 | 29.5 | 26.4 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Change in reserves (+ = increase) | 0.1 | 3.8 | 10.1 | -2.5 | 3.3 | -0.5 | -2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| International reserves, incl. gold | 66.9 | 75.3 | 84.3 | 72.1 | 80.5 | 81.2 | 85.5 | 85.5 | 85.5 |
| Liquidity ratio (%) | 51.8 | 52.5 | 55.9 | 54.2 | 50.0 | 51.5 | 47.6 | 42.4 | 40.9 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Memo | | | | | | | | | |
| Current external receipts (CXR) | 195.3 | 157.2 | 270.3 | 395.6 | 310.9 | 317.6 | 327.4 | 331.8 | 328.2 |
| Current external payments (CXP) | 183.4 | 153.0 | 195.8 | 223.5 | 224.7 | 242.3 | 253.3 | 257.5 | 255.3 |
| CXR growth (%) | -11.3 | -19.5 | 71.9 | 46.3 | -21.4 | 2.2 | 3.1 | 1.3 | -1.1 |
| CXP growth (%) | -1.0 | -16.6 | 28.0 | 14.2 | 0.5 | 7.8 | 4.5 | 1.7 | -0.8 |
| Gross external financing requirement | 95.8 | 107.7 | 47.1 | -54.1 | 30.3 | 43.7 | 44.0 | 65.1 | 73.5 |
| % International reserves | 151.6 | 160.9 | 62.5 | -64.2 | 42.0 | 54.3 | 54.2 | 76.2 | 86.0 |
| Net external borrowing | 45.5 | 17.1 | 30.2 | 60.6 | 47.1 | 47.7 | 35.1 | 29.8 | 31.8 |

Source: Fitch Ratings, IMF

## External Debt and Assets

| (USDbn) | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026F | 2027F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross external debt | 620.3 | 676.1 | 684.3 | 692.1 | 726.2 | 721.5 | 831.8 | 866.7 | 904.8 |
| % GDP | 146.2 | 176.9 | 131.2 | 112.1 | 144.6 | 144.0 | 156.9 | 145.2 | 146.7 |
| % CXR | 317.6 | 430.0 | 253.2 | 175.0 | 233.6 | 227.2 | 254.1 | 261.2 | 275.7 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Short-term debt (% GXD) | 9.8 | 10.1 | 13.9 | 15.9 | 18.0 | 18.1 | 16.2 | 15.5 | 14.9 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| By debtor | | | | | | | | | |
| Sovereign | 124.5 | 139.5 | 189.1 | 204.9 | 223.7 | 252.3 | 296.5 | 338.5 | 385.7 |
| Monetary authorities | 3.6 | 4.2 | 10.0 | 8.4 | 11.0 | 10.3 | 10.4 | 10.9 | 10.8 |
| General government | 120.8 | 135.3 | 179.1 | 196.4 | 212.7 | 242.0 | 286.1 | 327.6 | 375.0 |
| Banks | 197.4 | 206.9 | 215.0 | 211.9 | 226.9 | 225.9 | 263.1 | 253.7 | 244.1 |
| Other sectors | 298.5 | 329.7 | 280.2 | 275.3 | 275.6 | 243.3 | 272.2 | 274.5 | 274.9 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Gross external assets (non-equity) | 794.9 | 863.3 | 965.7 | 973.2 | 1,080.5 | 1,085.1 | 1,252.7 | 1,301.6 | 1,353.4 |
| Sovereign | 419.7 | 443.3 | 516.2 | 521.7 | 615.4 | 679.7 | 814.4 | 863.2 | 915.0 |
| International reserves, incl. gold | 66.9 | 75.3 | 84.3 | 72.1 | 80.5 | 81.2 | 85.5 | 85.5 | 85.5 |
| Other sovereign assets | 352.8 | 368.0 | 431.9 | 449.6 | 534.9 | 598.4 | 728.9 | 777.7 | 829.5 |
| Banks | 192.3 | 224.8 | 217.1 | 217.3 | 235.5 | 209.2 | 209.2 | 209.2 | 209.2 |
| Other sectors | 209.1 | 227.8 | 260.7 | 265.0 | 304.4 | 223.0 | 240.6 | 240.6 | 240.6 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Net external debt | -174.6 | -187.1 | -281.4 | -281.0 | -354.3 | -363.6 | -420.9 | -434.9 | -448.6 |
| % GDP | -41.2 | -49.0 | -53.9 | -45.5 | -70.5 | -72.6 | -79.4 | -72.9 | -72.8 |
| Sovereign | -295.2 | -303.8 | -327.1 | -316.8 | -391.7 | -427.4 | -517.9 | -524.7 | -529.3 |
| Banks | 31.2 | 14.8 | 26.2 | 25.5 | 66.2 | 43.5 | 65.3 | 56.0 | 46.4 |
| Other sectors | 89.4 | 101.8 | 19.5 | 10.3 | -28.8 | 20.3 | 31.6 | 33.8 | 34.3 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| International investment position | | | | | | | | | |
| Assets | 1,919.4 | 2,132.5 | 2,360.1 | 2,192.1 | 2,566.4 | 2,761.6 | 3,292.4 | - | - |
| Liabilities | 923.0 | 994.7 | 1,037.9 | 1,025.0 | 1,070.5 | 1,028.8 | 1,181.4 | - | - |
| Net | 996.4 | 1,137.8 | 1,322.2 | 1,167.1 | 1,495.8 | 1,732.8 | 2,110.9 | - | - |
| Net sovereign | 1,111.8 | 1,243.3 | 1,339.4 | 1,191.8 | 1,485.0 | 1,678.5 | 2,034.8 | 2,178.5 | 2,309.7 |
| % GDP | 262.1 | 325.3 | 256.8 | 193.1 | 295.7 | 335.1 | 383.8 | 365.0 | 374.6 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| External debt service (principal + interest) | 119.6 | 119.5 | 128.5 | 130.8 | 142.5 | 148.9 | 148.4 | 169.8 | 176.7 |
| Interest (% CXR) | 6.1 | 4.8 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 8.4 | 9.4 | 9.3 | 9.1 | 9.2 |

Source: Fitch Ratings, central bank, IMF, World Bank

## Full Rating Derivation

| | |
|---|---|
| **Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (SRM + QO)** | **AAA** |

## Sovereign Rating Model

| Input Indicator | Weight (%) | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Adjustment to Final Data | Final Data | Coefficient | Output (notches) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | Model Result and Predicted Rating | | 18.33 = AAA |
| | | | | | | Applied Rating[d] | | AAA |
| **Structural features** | | | | | | | | **11.08** |
| Governance indicators (percentile) | 22.1 | n.a. | 94.1 | n.a. | - | 94.1 | 0.079 | 7.44 |
| GDP per capita (USD) | 11.7 | n.a. | 94,366 | n.a. | Percentile | 95.9 | 0.037 | 3.53 |
| Nominal GDP (% world GDP) | 14.5 | n.a. | 0.47 | n.a. | Natural log | -0.8 | 0.645 | -0.49 |
| Most recent default or restructuring | 4.3 | n.a. | None | n.a. | Inverse 0-1[a] | 0.0 | -1.744 | 0 |
| Broad money (% GDP) | 1.1 | n.a. | 61.9 | n.a. | Natural log | 4.1 | 0.148 | 0.61 |
| **Macroeconomic performance, policies and prospects** | | | | | | | | **-0.42** |
| Real GDP growth volatility | 4.5 | n.a. | 1.5 | n.a. | Natural log | 0.4 | -0.704 | -0.29 |
| Consumer price inflation | 3.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3-yr avg.[b] | 2.9 | -0.068 | -0.20 |
| Real GDP growth | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 3-yr avg. | 1.2 | 0.054 | 0.06 |
| **Public finances** | | | | | | | | **-0.92** |
| Gross general govt debt (% GDP) | 9.2 | 53.2 | 54.4 | 53.9 | 3-yr avg. | 53.8 | -0.023 | -1.25 |
| General govt interest (% revenue) | 4.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 3-yr avg. | 2.5 | -0.044 | -0.11 |
| General govt fiscal balance (% GDP) | 2.1 | 12.7 | 10.4 | 11.0 | 3-yr avg. | 11.4 | 0.039 | 0.44 |
| FC debt (% of total general govt debt) | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3-yr avg. | 0.0 | -0.008 | 0 |
| **External finances** | | | | | | | | **3.71** |
| Reserve currency (RC) flexibility | 7.1 | n.a. | 0.0 | n.a. | RC score 0 - 4.5[c] | 0.0 | 0.484 | 0 |
| SNFA (% of GDP) | 7.5 | 335.1 | 383.8 | 365.0 | 3-yr avg. | 361.3 | 0.010 | 3.77 |
| Commodity dependence | 1.0 | n.a. | 44.7 | n.a. | Latest | 44.7 | -0.003 | -0.16 |
| FX reserves (months of CXP) | 1.2 | n.a. | 4.1 | n.a. | n.a. if RC score> 0 | 4.1 | 0.021 | 0.09 |
| External interest service (% CXR) | 0.2 | 9.4 | 9.3 | 9.1 | 3-yr avg. | 9.3 | -0.004 | -0.04 |
| CAB + net FDI (% GDP) | 0.4 | 16.3 | 12.3 | 11.0 | 3-yr avg. | 13.2 | 0.004 | 0.05 |
| **Intercept Term (constant across all sovereigns)** | | | | | | | | **4.88** |

[a] Inverse 0-1 scale, declining weight; [b] of truncated value (2%-50%); [c] Declining weight; [d] Sovereign rating committee can override SRM Predicted Rating if a marginal change in the Model Result leads to a notch change which is judged to be temporary or caused by a re-estimation of the SRM, a process that Fitch undertakes on at least an annual basis. Please refer to the Rating Action Commentary for further information when the Applied Rating differs from the Predicted Rating.

Note: This table contains data as at the date of the most recent rating action. There may be minor differences to data presented elsewhere in this report, which may have been updated where appropriate, for example in the event of subsequent data releases.

Source: Fitch Ratings

| Qualitative Overlay (notch adjustment, range +/-3) | 0 |
|---|---|
| Structural features | 0 |
| Macroeconomic outlook, policies and prospects | 0 |
| Public finances | 0 |
| External finances | 0 |

## About the SRM and QO

Fitch’s SRM is the agency’s proprietary multiple regression rating model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch’s QO is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.

## Supplementary Ratings

### Local-Currency Rating

As Norway’s Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR is ‘AAA’, there is no capacity for upward notching of the Long-Term Local-Currency IDR, which is therefore also ‘AAA’.

### Debt Instrument Ratings

Senior Unsecured Debt Equalised: The senior unsecured long-term debt ratings are equalised with the applicable Long-Term IDR, as Fitch assumes recoveries will be ‘average’ when the sovereign's Long-Term IDRs are 'BB-' and above.

No Recovery Ratings are assigned at this rating level.

### Country Ceiling

The Country Ceiling for Norway is ‘AAA’. In line with its Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at the upper limit of the rating scale. We view the risk of exchange and capital controls as de minimis.

Fitch's Country Ceiling Model produced a starting point uplift of three notches and Fitch's rating committee did not apply a qualitative adjustment to the model's result.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Overall Country Ceiling Uplift (CCM + QA, notches)** | | | **+3** |
| **Country Ceiling Model (CCM, notches)** | | | **+3** |
| **Pillar I = Balance of payments restrictions** | | | **+3** |
| Current account restrictions (% of 40) | Latest | 10.0 | +3 |
| Capital account restrictions (% of 69) | Latest | 17.4 | +3 |
| **Combined pillar II & III incentives score** | | | **+3** |
| **Pillar II = Long-term institutional characteristics** | | | **+2** |
| **Governance (WB WGI)** | Latest | 94.1 | +3 |
| **International trade** | | | +1 |
| Trade openness | 2021-25 avg | 51.7 | +2 |
| Volatility of change in CXR (across 10yrs) | 2025 | 29.7 | 0 |
| Export share to FTA partners | 2021-25 avg | 90.3 | +3 |
| **International financial integration**[a] | 2021-25 avg | 88.4 | +3 |
| **Pillar III = Near-term risks** | | | **+3** |
| **Macro-financial stability risks** | | | +2 |
| Composite inflation risk score | | | +2 |
| Volatility of CPI (across 10yrs) | 2025 | 1.6 | +2 |
| Recent CPI peak | 2021-25 max | 6.3 | +3 |
| Cumulative broad money growth | 2020-25 chg % | 29.6 | +3 |
| Volatility of change in REER (across 10yrs) | 2025 | 4.8 | +2 |
| Dollarisation | Most recent | 24.1 | +2 |
| **Exchange rate risks** | | | +3 |
| Net external debt (% of CXR) | 2023-25 avg | -119.0 | +3 |
| Exchange rate regime | Latest | Free floating | +3 |
| **Qualitative Adjustment (QA, notches)** | | | **0** |
| Pillar I = Balance of payments restrictions | | | 0 |
| Pillar II = Long-term institutional characteristics | | | 0 |
| Pillar III = Near-term macro-financial stability risks | | | 0 |

[a] Data for international financial integration are the average of private external assets (% of GDP) and private external debt (% of GDP).

Source: Fitch Ratings

## Full Rating History

| | Foreign-Currency Rating | | | Local-Currency Rating | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Date | Long-Term | Short-Term | Outlook/Watch | Long-Term | Short-Term | Outlook/Watch | Country Ceiling |
| 22 Jul 2016 | AAA | F1+ | Stable | AAA | F1+ | Stable | AAA |
| 17 Jun 2004 | AAA | F1+ | Stable | AAA | - | Stable | AAA |
| 23 Jul 2002 | AAA | F1+ | Stable | AAA | - | Stable | - |
| 28 Jun 2001 | AAA | F1+ | Stable | AAA | - | - | - |
| 21 Sep 2000 | AAA | F1+ | Stable | AAA | - | Stable | - |
| 26 Oct 1995 | AAA | F1+ | - | AAA | - | - | - |
| 13 Mar 1995 | AAA | - | - | - | - | - | - |

Source: Fitch Ratings

## Appendix 1: Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)

### Credit Relevance Scores

| General Issues | Key Sovereign Issues | SRM | QO | Score[a] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Environmental (E)** | | | | |
| GHG Emissions and Air Quality | Emissions and air pollution as a constraint on GDP growth | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Energy Management | Energy resource management, including potential for 'stranded assets', affecting exports, government revenues and GDP | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Water Resources and Management | Water resource availability and management as a constraint on GDP growth | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Biodiversity and Natural Resource Management | Natural resource management, including potential for 'stranded assets', affecting exports, government revenues and GDP | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Natural Disasters and Climate Change | Impact of adverse climate trends, and likelihood of and resilience to shocks | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| **Social (S)** | | | | |
| Human Rights and Political Freedoms | Social stability, voice and accountability, regime legitimacy | 4 | 2 | 4+ |
| Human Development, Health and Education | Impact of human development, health and education on GDP per capita and GDP growth | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Employment and Income Equality | Impact of unemployment and income equality on GDP per capita, GDP growth and political and social stability | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Public Safety and Security | Impact of public safety and security on business environment and/or economic performance | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Demographic Trends | Population decline or ageing, rapidly rising youth population; pensions sustainability | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| **Governance (G)** | | | | |
| Political Stability and Rights | Political divisions and vested interests; geo-political risks including conflict, security threats and violence; policy capacity: unpredictable policy shifts or stasis | 5 | 2 | 5+ |
| Rule of Law, Institutional & Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption | Government effectiveness, control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality | 5 | 2 | 5+ |
| International Relations and Trade | Trade agreements, membership of international organiszations, bilateral relations; sanctions or other costly international actions | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Creditor Rights | Willingness to service and repay debt | 4 | 2 | 4+ |
| Data Quality and Transparency | Availability, limitations and reliability of economic and financial data, including transparency of public debt and contingent liabilities | 3 | 2 | 3 |

Source: Fitch Ratings

### About ESG Credit Relevance Scores

The scores signify the credit relevance of the respective E, S and G issues to the sovereign entity's credit rating, according to the following scale:

5 – Highly relevant to the rating, a key rating driver with a high weight.

4 – Relevant to the rating, a rating driver.

3 – Relevant, but only has an impact on the entity rating in combination with other factors.

2 – Irrelevant to the entity rating but relevant to the sector (sovereigns).

1 – Irrelevant to the entity rating and irrelevant to the sector (sovereigns).

The score for each 'General Issue' comprises a component SRM and QO score, and is simply the higher of the two. SRM scores are fixed across all sovereigns as the weights in the SRM are the same for all sovereigns; QO component scores vary across all sovereigns.

All scores of '4' or '5' result in a negative impact on the rating, unless indicated otherwise. Where a positive impact is occurring, the score of '4' or '5' is appended with a '+' symbol. Scores of '3', '2' and '1' do not have a direction of impact assigned.

Please refer to ESG Relevance Scores for Sovereigns for further information on the framework, including 'Sovereign Rating Criteria References' (which identify specific potentially related SRM variables and QO factors for each 'General Issue').

### Credit-Relevant ESG Derivation

Norway has an ESG Relevance Score of '5[+]' for Political Stability and Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with a high weight. As Norway has a percentile rank above 50 for the respective governance indicator, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

Norway has an ESG Relevance Score of '5[+]' for Rule of Law, Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as WBGI have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a high weight. As Norway has a percentile rank above 50 for the respective governance indicators, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

Norway has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for Human Rights and Political Freedoms as the voice and accountability pillar of the WBGI is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As Norway has a percentile rank above 50 for the respective governance indicator, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

Norway has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for Creditor Rights as willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and is a rating driver for Norway, as for all sovereigns. As Norway has a record of more than 20 years without a restructuring of public debt and captured in our SRM variable, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision. For more information on Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores, visit www.fitchratings.com/topics/esg/products#esg-relevance-scores.

## Appendix 2: Data Notes and Conventions

### Acronyms

Acronyms used in the above table and elsewhere in report are: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Current External Receipts (CXR), Current External Payments (CXP), Current Account Balance (CAB), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WBGI), Sovereign Rating Model (SRM), Qualitative Overlay (QO). For a full list of indicator definitions, please refer to the most recent Sovereign Data Comparator.

### Medians

Medians underlying the SRM relative to rating category chart on the Rating Summary page and as reported in the Peer Analysis table on page 4 are long-term historical medians. These are based on actual data since 2000 for all sovereign-year observations when the sovereign was in the respective rating category at year-end. Current year ratings and data are excluded.

Chart medians on page 3 are based on data for sovereigns in the respective rating category at the end of each year. Latest ratings are used for the current year and forecast period.

### Notes for Norway

All data are on a calendar-year basis, which aligns with the domestic fiscal year for this sovereign.

Public finances data referenced in this report relate to the consolidated general government, as per our principal approach, unless specifically noted otherwise where cited.

The external balance- sheet data referenced in this report are derived from the international investment position dataset, as per our principal approach.

## Ratings

| | |
|---|---|
| **Foreign Currency** | |
| Long-Term IDR | AAA |
| Short-Term IDR | F1+ |
| | |
| **Local Currency** | |
| Long-Term IDR | AAA |
| Short-Term IDR | F1+ |
| | |
| **Country Ceiling** | AAA |
| | |
| **Outlooks** | |
| Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR | Stable |
| Long-Term Local-Currency IDR | Stable |

| **Highest ESG Relevance Scores** | |
|---|---|
| Environmental | 0 |
| Social | 0 |
| Governance | 0 |

| **Climate Vulnerability** | |
|---|---|
| 2035 Climate Vulnerability Signal | 35 |
| Transition (Climate.VSt) | 30 |
| Physical (Climate.VSp) | 15 |

## Rating Derivation

| | |
|---|---|
| Sovereign Rating Model (SRM) | AAA |
| Qualitative Overlay (QO) | 0 |
| Structural features | 0 |
| Macroeconomic | 0 |
| Public finances | 0 |
| External finances | 0 |
| Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR | AAA |

## Data

| | 2025 |
|---|---|
| GDP (USDbn) | 530 |
| Population (m) | 5.6 |
| Source: Fitch Ratings | |

## Applicable Criteria

Country Ceiling Criteria (July 2023)
Sovereign Rating Criteria (April 2026)

## Related Research

Fitch Affirms Norway at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable (June 2026)
Global Economic Outlook (June 2026)
Interactive Sovereign Rating Model
Fitch Fiscal Index - Analytical Tool
Click here for more Fitch Ratings content on Norway

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