

Macro Uncertainty and Unemployment Risk

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Motivation

Question: 'How does uncertainty affect the macroeconomy?'

+ **Empirical evidence:** Identified macro uncertainty shock reduces

- ▶ Output, Consumption, Investment, Employment, Inflation

Bloom (2009), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015), Leduc & Liu (2016), Basu & Bundick (2017), Oh (2020)

+ **Existing models:** Unable to match empirical evidence

- ▶ RANK: Response of macro variables muted

Born & Pfeifer (2014), de Groot et al. (2018)

- ▶ Inflation increases

Born & Pfeifer (2014), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015), Mumtaz & Theodoridis (2015)

Our Paper

Households' heterogeneity key for uncertainty propagation

- + **VAR evidence** using both aggregate and household-level data:
 - ▶ Macro uncertainty shock acts like aggregate demand shock
 - ▶ Households in bottom 60% of income distrib. most responsive to uncertainty


- + **HANK model** with SaM and Calvo:
 - ▶ Unemployment risk reinforces precautionary savings of uninsured HHs
 - ▶ Uncertainty generates drop in prices & amplifies responses to match data

Empirical Evidence




VAR Evidence

- ▶ Data: US quarterly, 1982Q1-2015Q3
 - ▶ Macro uncertainty [Jurado et al. \(2015\)](#)
Common variation in macro indicators' unforecastable factors
 - ▶ Macro data: National Income and Product Account
 - ▶ Household-level data: Consumer Expenditure Surveys [▶ More](#)
- ▶ Identification: Cholesky ordering
 - ▶ Macro uncertainty ordered first:
[Macro uncertainty, GDP, Job finding rate, Separation rate, Unemployment rate, Consumption, Inflation, Policy rate]
 - ▶ Constant and two lags

VAR Evidence: Macro Data ▶ Robustness




VAR Evidence: Micro Data ▶ Robustness



Model

Feedback Loop









HANK: IRFs to 1SD Technology Uncertainty Shock


▶ Calibration

▶ Different Ω

▶ Robust



Consumption Heterogeneity



Conclusion

Households' heterogeneity important to uncertainty propagation

1. Macro uncertainty \uparrow \rightarrow consumption, inflation, policy rate \downarrow
2. Most responsive HHs: Bottom 60% of income distrib.
3. HA + Calvo + SaM
 - ▶ Uncertainty reduces AD and AS
 - ▶ Uninsured unemployment risk reinforces prec. savings (AD)
 - ▶ Responses in line with data

Appendix

Consumer Expenditure Surveys

CEX: Rotating panel data

- ▶ Consumption: Non-durable

Food and beverages, tobacco, apparel and services, personal care, gasoline, public transportation, household operation, medical care, entertainment, reading material, and education

- ▶ Income: before tax

Wages, salaries, business and farm income, financial income, and transfers

- ▶ Real per capita: divide by number of family members, deflate by CPI-U series, and seasonally adjust by X-12-ARIMA

Literature

- ▶ HANK

McKay and Reis (2016), Kaplan et al. (2018)

- ▶ HANK and SaM


Gronemann et al. (2016), McKay and Reis (2017), Ravn & Sterk (2017, 2018), Cho (2018), Challe et al. (2017), Challe (2019)

- ▶ Uncertainty


Bloom (2009), Born & Pfeifer (2014), Jurado et al. (2015), Mumtaz & Theodoridis (2015), Leduc & Liu (2016), Basu & Bundick (2017), Fasani & Rossi (2018), Bayer et al. (2019), Ludvigson et al. (2019), Oh (2019)

Robustness: Macro Data

[▶ Back](#)



Robustness: Micro Data [▶ Back](#)



HANK with SaM and Uncertainty

+ Unit mass of **Households**

- ▶ Share $1 - \Omega$ perfectly insured against unemployment risk
⇒ Assets and C do **not** depend on employment status
- ▶ Share Ω imperfectly insured against unemployment risk
⇒ Subject to borrowing limit tighter than natural
⇒ Assets and C **do** depend on employment status

▶ Details

Imperfectly Insured Households

ASSUMPTION: Borrowing limit binding after 1 period unemp. (Challe et al. (2017))

- ▶ Three corresponding types of imperfectly insured households:
 1. Employed
 2. Unemployed for 1 period
 3. Unemployed for > 1 period

- ▶ Three consumption levels

- ▶ Two asset levels
 1. Assets for the employed impatient
 2. Borrowing limit

With 3 types of imperfectly insured, no need to keep track of whole distribution

HANK with SaM and Uncertainty

+ Firms ▶ More

- ▶ Search and matching frictions
- ▶ Calvo pricing

+ Monetary authority

- ▶ Taylor rule








+ Uncertainty in technology process

$$\log z = \rho_z \log z_{-1} + \sigma^z \varepsilon^z$$

$$\log \sigma^z = (1 - \rho_{\sigma^z}) \log \bar{\sigma}^z + \rho_{\sigma^z} \log \sigma_{-1}^z + \sigma^{\sigma^z} \varepsilon^{\sigma^z}$$

- ## + Third-order perturbation method
- (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011)

RANK: IRFs to 1SD Technology Uncertainty Shock



Direct Effect of Increased Uncertainty (RANK)

- ▶ Households: Precautionary savings [▶ Example](#)

$U \uparrow \rightarrow C \downarrow$ ∴ Risk aversion

\rightarrow Nominal marginal cost $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Price $\downarrow \rightarrow$ Markup \uparrow ∴ Sticky prices

$\Rightarrow Y \downarrow, P \downarrow$ ∴ $AD \downarrow$

- ▶ Firms: Precautionary pricing [▶ Example](#)

$U \uparrow \rightarrow P \uparrow \rightarrow$ Markup \uparrow ∴ Risk aversion

$\Rightarrow Y \downarrow, P \uparrow$ ∴ $AS \downarrow$

- ▶ $P \uparrow$ since $AS \downarrow > AD \downarrow$

Indirect Effect: Uninsured Unemployment Risk (HANK)

- ▶ Uncertainty \uparrow
 1. Precautionary savings: $AD\downarrow$
 2. Precautionary pricing: $AS\downarrow$
- ▶ $Y\downarrow \rightarrow \text{Vacancy}\downarrow \rightarrow \text{Job finding rate}\downarrow \rightarrow \text{Separation rate}\uparrow$
- ▶ Unemployment risk $\uparrow \rightarrow$ Imperfectly insured HHs' savings \uparrow
- ▶ $C'\downarrow \rightarrow AD\downarrow$

$$V^P(a^P, n^P, X) = \max_{a^{P'}, c^P} \{ u(c^P) + \beta^P \mathbb{E} [V^P(a^{P'}, n^{P'}, X')] \}$$

subject to:

$$c^P + a^{P'} = w^P n^P + (1 + r) a^P + \Pi$$

Perfect insurance $\Rightarrow a^{P'}$ & c^P do not depend on employment status

Imperfectly Insured Households

ASSUMPTIONS:

1. Partial risk sharing
 2. Borrowing limit tighter than natural
- ▶ Cross-sectional distribution $\mu(a, N)$ over:
 - ▶ Assets $a \in \mathbb{R}$
 - ▶ Length of unemployment spell $N \in \mathbb{Z}_+$
 - ▶ Becomes with countable and finite support
 - ▶ Can be summarized by:
 - ▶ Assets: $\mathbf{a}^i(\mathbf{N})$
 - ▶ Associated number of HHs: $\mathbf{n}^i(\mathbf{N})$

Imperfectly Insured Households

$$V^i(a^i(N), n^i(N), X) = \max_{\{a^{i'}(N), c^i(N)\}_{N \in \mathbb{Z}_+}} \left\{ \sum_{N \geq 0} n^i(N) u(c^i(N)) + \beta^i \mathbb{E}_{\mu, X} [V^i(a^{i'}(N), n^{i'}(N), X')] \right\}$$

subject to:

- ▶ Borrowing constraint

$$a^{i'}(N) \geq \underline{a}$$

- ▶ Budget constraint if employed, $N = 0$

$$a^{i'}(0) + c^i(0) = (1 - \tau)w + (1 + r)A$$

- ▶ Budget constraint if unemployed for $N \geq 1$ periods

$$a^i(N) + c^i(N) = b^u + (1 + r)a$$

State Vector

Tilde variables correspond to beginning of labor transition stage.

$$X = \left\{ \mu(\tilde{\cdot}), a^p, a^i(0), R_{-1}, \Delta_{-1}, \tilde{\mathbf{n}}, z, \sigma^z \right\}$$

FOCs Impatient Households

- ▶ If $N = 0$

$$A' = \frac{1}{n^{i''}(0)} \left[(1 - s') a^{i''}(0) + f' \sum_{N \geq 1} a^{i''}(N) n^i(N) \right]$$

$$n^{i''}(0) = (1 - s') n^i(0) + f' (1 - n^i(0))$$

- ▶ If $N \geq 1$

$$a^i(N) = a^{i''}(N - 1)$$

$$n^{i''}(1) = s' n^i(0) \text{ and } n^{i''}(N) = (1 - f') n^i(N - 1) \text{ if } N \geq 2$$

Monetary Policy and Unemployment Insurance Scheme

- ▶ Taylor rule

$$\frac{1 + R}{1 + \bar{R}} = \left(\frac{1 + R_{-1}}{1 + \bar{R}} \right)^{\rho_R} \left(\left(\frac{1 + \pi}{1 + \bar{\pi}} \right)^{\phi_\pi} \left(\frac{y}{y_{-1}} \right)^{\phi_y} \right)^{1 - \rho_R}$$

- ▶ Balanced unemployment insurance scheme

$$\tau_W \mathbf{n}^i = b^u (1 - \mathbf{n}^i)$$
$$\tau_W^P \mathbf{n}^P = b^{uP} (1 - \mathbf{n}^P)$$

Firms

1. Final goods firms: Perfectly competitive
2. Intermediate goods firms: Face Calvo pricing
3. Wholesale goods firms: Perfectly competitive
 - ▶ Use technology $y_m = z\tilde{n}$
4. Labor intermediaries: Hire both types of households
 - ▶ Job finding rate

$$f = \frac{m}{u} = \frac{\mu u^\chi v^{1-\chi}}{u}$$

- ▶ Period-to-period job loss rate
- $$s = \rho(1 - f)$$
- ▶ Wages set according to rule

▶ Final

▶ Intermediate

▶ Wholesale

▶ Labor inter

▶ Back

Final Goods Firms

- ▶ Solve

$$\max_y y - \int_0^1 p_i y_i di$$

subject to

$$y = \left(\int_0^1 y_i^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} di \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

- ▶ Solution: final goods firms' demand of intermediate good

$$y_i(p_i) = p_i^{-\epsilon} y$$

Intermediate Goods Firms I

- ▶ Linear technology with fixed cost: $y_i = x_i - \Phi$
- ▶ Produce intermediate goods sold at price p_m
- ▶ Earn profit: $\Xi = (p_i - p_m)y_i - p_m\Phi$
- ▶ Value if reset prices:

$$V^R(X) = \max_{p_i} \left\{ \Xi + \theta \mathbb{E}_X \left[M^{P'} V^N(p_i, X') \right] + (1 - \theta) \mathbb{E}_X \left[M^{P'} V^R(X') \right] \right\}$$

- ▶ Set optimal price:

$$p^* = \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \frac{p^A}{p^B}$$

$$p^A = p_m y + \theta \mathbb{E}_X \left[M^{P'} \left(\frac{1 + \pi'}{1 + \bar{\pi}} \right)^\varepsilon p^{A'} \right]$$

$$p^B = y + \theta \mathbb{E}_X \left[M^{P'} \left(\frac{1 + \pi'}{1 + \bar{\pi}} \right)^{\varepsilon - 1} p^{B'} \right]$$

Intermediate Goods Firms II

- ▶ Inflation law of motion:

$$\pi = \frac{\theta(1 + \bar{\pi})}{(1 - (1 - \theta)p^{*1-\varepsilon})^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}} - 1$$

- ▶ Price dispersion:

$$\Delta = (1 - \theta)p^{*\varepsilon} + \theta \left(\frac{1 + \pi}{1 + \bar{\pi}} \right)^\varepsilon \Delta_{-1}$$

- ▶ Value if do not reset prices:

$$V^N(p_{i,-1}, X) = \Xi + \theta \mathbb{E}_X [M^{P'} V^N(p_i, X')] + (1 - \theta) \mathbb{E}_X [M^{P'} V^R(X')]$$

- ▶ Index price

$$p_i = \frac{1 + \bar{\pi}}{1 + \pi} p_{i,-1}$$

Wholesale Firms

- ▶ Perfectly competitive, use linear technology: $y_m = z\check{n}$

- ▶ Solve:

$$\max_{n^d} \{p_m z \check{n} - Q \check{n}\}$$

- ▶ Q is real unit price of labor services n , given by FOC:

$$Q = p_m z$$

Labor Intermediaries

- ▶ Beginning of period exogenous separation rate ρ
- ▶ Skill premium ψ for patient households
- ▶ Value of match with impatient and patient

$$J^i = Q - w + \mathbb{E}_X [(1 - \rho') M^{i'} J^{i'}]$$

$$J^P = \psi Q - \psi w + \mathbb{E}_X [(1 - \rho') M^{P'} J^{P'}]$$

- ▶ Free entry condition where λ is job filling rate

$$\underbrace{\lambda (\Omega J^i + (1 - \Omega) J^P)}_{\text{value}} = \underbrace{\kappa}_{\text{cost}}$$

- ▶ Wage rule

$$w = w_{-1}^{\gamma_w} \left(\bar{w} \left(\frac{\mathbf{n}}{\bar{\mathbf{n}}} \right)^{\phi_w} \right)^{1 - \gamma_w}$$

Uncertainty

$$\log z = \rho_z \log z_{-1} + \sigma^z \varepsilon^z$$

$$\log \sigma^z = (1 - \rho_{\sigma^z}) \log \bar{\sigma}^z + \rho_{\sigma^z} \log \sigma_{-1}^z + \sigma^{\sigma^z} \varepsilon^{\sigma^z}$$

- ▶ Third-order perturbation method
(Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011)

▶ MP and b^u

▶ Clearing

Market Clearing

- ▶ Labor market

$$\text{Beginning of period} \quad \tilde{n}^P = \tilde{n}^i = \tilde{\mathbf{n}}^P = \tilde{\mathbf{n}}^i = \tilde{\mathbf{n}}$$

$$\text{End of period} \quad n^P = n^i = \mathbf{n}^P = \mathbf{n}^i = \mathbf{n}$$

$$\Omega \mathbf{n}^i + (1 - \Omega) \psi \mathbf{n}^P = (\Omega + (1 - \Omega) \psi) \mathbf{n} = \check{\mathbf{n}}$$

- ▶ Asset market

$$\Omega (A + (1 - \mathbf{n}) \underline{a}) + (1 - \Omega) a^P = 0$$

- ▶ Goods market

- ▶ Final

$$c + \kappa v = y$$

- ▶ Intermediate

$$\Delta y = y_m - \Phi$$

- ▶ Wholesale

$$\int_0^1 x_i di = y_m = z \check{\mathbf{n}}$$

Quarterly Calibration 1

Parameter	Description	Value	Target/Source
Households			
Ω	Share of imperf. households	0.60	Challe et al. (2017)
\underline{a}	Borrowing limit	0	Challe et al. (2017)
σ	Risk aversion	2.00	Standard
β^I	Discount factor of imperf. households	0.917	21% consumption loss
β^P	Discount factor of pat. households	0.993	3% annual real interest rate
b^u	Unemployment benefits	0.27	33% replacement rate
Firms			
ε	Elasticity of substitution btw goods	6.00	20% markup
Φ	Production fixed cost	0.22	Zero steady-state profit
θ	Price stickiness	0.75	4-quarter stickiness

Quarterly Calibration 2


Parameter	Description	Value	Target/Source
Labor Market			
μ	Matching efficiency	0.72	71% job filling rate
χ	Matching function elasticity	0.50	Standard
ρ	Job separation rate	0.23	73% job find. & 6.1% job loss rates
κ	Vacancy posting cost	0.037	1% of output
ψ	Skill premium	2.04	Bottom 60% cons. share (42%)
γ_w	Wage stickiness	0.75	Challe et al. (2017)
ϕ_w	Wage elasticity wrt employment	1.50	Challe et al. (2017)
Monetary Authority			
$\bar{\pi}$	Steady-state inflation	1.005	2% annual inflation rate
ρ_R	Interest rate inertia	0	Standard
ϕ_π	Taylor rule coefficient for inflation	1.50	Standard
ϕ_y	Taylor rule coefficient for output	0.20	Standard

Quarterly Calibration 3









Parameter	Description	Value	Target/Source
Exogenous Processes			
ρ_z	Persistence of technology shock	0.95	Standard
$\bar{\sigma}^z$	Volatility of technology shock	0.007	Standard
ρ_{σ^z}	Persistence of uncertainty shock	0.85	Katayama & Kim (2018)
σ^{σ^z}	Volatility of uncertainty shock	0.37	Katayama & Kim (2018)

Different Degrees of Heterogeneity

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









Robustness Check 1




Robustness Check 2

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Calvo vs. Rotemberg

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Precautionary Savings

- ▶ Risk averse households

$$\beta \left(\frac{c'}{c} \right)^{-\gamma} = IMRS'$$

- ▶ Jensen's inequality ($0 < q < 1$)


$$\begin{aligned} IMRS_{certainty} &= \beta (cc)^{-\gamma} \\ &\leq q\beta (cc^l)^{-\gamma} + (1-q)\beta (cc^h)^{-\gamma} = IMRS_{uncertainty} \end{aligned}$$

IMRS of Impatient Households

- ▶ $N = 0$
- ▶ IMRS increasing in separation rate

$$M^i(0) = \beta^i \frac{(1 - s') u_c^{i'}(0) + s' u_c^{i'}(1)}{u_c^i(0)}$$

Precautionary Savings [▶ Back](#)



Precautionary Pricing


- ▶ Certainty

$$MP = \left((1 - \varepsilon) \left(\frac{P^*_{certainty}}{P} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} + \varepsilon mc \left(\frac{P^*_{certainty}}{P} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \right) Y$$


- ▶ Uncertainty: $EMP > MP \Rightarrow$ Risk averse

$$\begin{aligned} EMP = & q \left((1 - \varepsilon) \left(\frac{P^*_{uncertainty}}{P^l} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} + \varepsilon mc \left(\frac{P^*_{uncertainty}}{P^l} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \right) Y \\ & + (1 - q) \left((1 - \varepsilon) \left(\frac{P^*_{uncertainty}}{P^h} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} + \varepsilon mc \left(\frac{P^*_{uncertainty}}{P^h} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \right) Y \end{aligned}$$

Precautionary Pricing [▶ Back](#)




AS-AD: Households



AS-AD: Firms

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AS-AD: HHs' Heterogeneity [▶ Back](#)

