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The Transmission of the Financial Crisis in 1907: An Empirical Investigation

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THE TRANSMISSION OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN 1907: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

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I. Introduction.

The Panic of 1907 has received renewed attention since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and the analysis by scholars, both financial historians as well as financial economists, draws parallels between the events despite the century that separates them. Both crises focused on New York City financial intermediaries -- the trust companies in 1907 and the investment banks in 2007-09. In each case, the stricken intermediaries were not able to access directly the liquidity provision services of the relevant lender of last resort -- the New York Clearing House in 1907 and the Federal Reserve System in 2007-09.

We investigate when the financial crisis among New York City trust companies that initially affected the call loan market and New York Stock Exchange in October of 1907 subsequently spread into the broader financial markets and then to the rest of the country. To address this question, we use data on a monthly, weekly, and daily frequency to isolate indications from financial markets of when the market distress mainly reflected specific events. For example, we first look at the failed attempt to corner the stock of United Copper by F. Augustus Heinze and Charles W. Morse. For a time, the distress appeared limited to those banks and stock brokers (and the copper stock) related to their scheme. The panic then spread beyond that limited group, leading to an extended run on trust companies in New York City. We investigate when the initial distress led to a general weakness in the stock market and was then magnified into a full-fledged financial panic. We define a financial panic as a widespread run on deposits from intermediaries coupled with and increase in perceived risk across a spectrum of assets. We make the concept operational by investigating the degree to which financial asset returns displayed direct correlation during the crisis, and we also look to see if there were periods other than those of crisis that displayed high correlation of returns. Our initial empirical focus is on presenting measures of financial distress, and we spend much of the paper describing the data set that we continue to build.

Our results confirm the conventional view that the Banking Panic of 1907 was sparked by the suspension of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, after which trust companies throughout New York City became subject to runs on deposits. The panic focused on trust companies largely because the New York Clearing House chose to let Knickerbocker Trust suspend, in contrast to the aid provided by the clearing house to Heinze banks in the week before the panic. The suspension of Knickerbocker Trust apparently had an immediate effect on the call money interest rate, which spiked toward 50 percent at an annual rate on the day of the suspension. Given the active and well-known role that trust companies played in providing call loan financing, the effects of the Knickerbocker suspension on stock market and call loan market activity are not surprising. But we believe that the transmission of the Banking Panic of 1907 to the financial market more generally, and the rest of the country (and rest of the world) was not the result of only the trust company runs. Despite the initial distress on the stock market, the panic had only minor effects on the interior of the United States or on international markets until the New York Clearing House imposed a suspension of convertibility of deposits into currency on October 26.

Our investigation using high-frequency data from the Panic of 1907 was inspired by the numerous inquiries into the recent financial crisis. Specifically, we find a paper by Gorton and Metrick (2009) that investigates the 2007-2009 financial crisis to be particularly useful. Gorton and Metrick examine how the co-movement of risk spreads indicated a "systemic event," one that began as a shock in the subprime mortgage market, but one that soon was transmitted

throughout the financial system. Thus, in their analysis, an initial disturbance to the financial markets arising from a small sub-market can influence and eventually envelop the entire financial market. Their econometric analysis uncovers a path through which a shock to subprime mortgage asset valuations spread to other areas of financial investment through the workings of the financial market.

In our investigation, contemporary observers of the financial markets in 1907 considered the initial shock – the failed attempt to corner a copper stock -- as small. But subsequent events accumulated into a panic. The liquidity crisis in New York City was reflected in financial markets by sharp increases in the call money interest rate; the crisis spread as a result of a restriction of a normal market mechanism – the suspension of convertibility – that generated a currency premium, a market price for the scarce good, cash.¹ We also find that the issuance of clearing house loan certificates offered only a modest reduction in financial distress, likely a result of legal prohibition on their passing to the public as hand-to-hand currency. Symptoms of financial distress across markets in the United States disappeared only after the convertibility resumed, the amount of cash reserves in New York Clearing House banks was no longer in deficit (relative to required reserves), and the currency premium was eliminated. At that point, the New York Clearing House banks accelerated the cancellation of their outstanding clearing house loan certificates, and financial market asset values stabilized.

A series of studies by Gary Gorton (2008; 2009a,b; 2010) emphasizes perhaps the most compelling similarities, highlighting common characteristics of the recent financial crisis and the sequence of crises that took place throughout the National Banking Era (1863-1913). Gorton argues that the recent crisis was, in fact, a panic reminiscent of the financial crises in the United

¹ At that point, the exchange rate between cash and bank deposits became a market price.

States of a century ago. We follow up on this assertion and provide more detail showing institutional and financial similarities between the panic of 1907 and the recent crisis of 2008.

A. Common themes in 1907 and 2008

A central difference between the Panic of 1907 and the earlier panics of the National Banking Era was that panic-related withdrawals centered on New York City trust companies rather than on national banks. The Mercantile National Bank, an institution that was part of the Heinze-Morse-Thomas banking chain, along with National Bank of North America, New Amsterdam National Bank, and Mechanics' and Traders' Bank (a state-chartered member of the New York Clearing House) were subject to runs by their depositors following the collapse of the Heinze copper corner attempt. But there was no widespread attempt to remove deposits from New York City national banks that were not implicated in the scheme. Reassurances from the New York Clearing House regarding the solvency of its member institutions – Mercantile National was emphasized most prominently, but the others mentioned above were included – settled the depositors sufficiently so that the banks could operate effectively, although with notable credit support from the New York Clearing House. The support included loans from the New York Clearing House, and those loans were eventually exchanged into clearing house loan certificates, one of the benefits of membership in the clearing house association.

"Panic-related" withdrawals separates the onset of the financial panic, a widespread attempt to remove deposits from intermediaries generally, from what had been perceived as a transfer of deposits from weakened Heinze national banks toward stronger and more reliable banks. The efforts of the New York Clearing House to settle the financial situation required cooperation among its member institutions and decision-making by its executive committee. But a key element of those decisions was the information about the financial condition of its member institutions, and detailed examinations took place at those institutions prior to the executive decisions to aid the member banks. That is not to say that there was no uncertainty about the outcome for the Mercantile National. The New York Sun (October 20, 1907 page 2) reported that in weekly reports, the cash balances of Mercantile National Bank were around 15 percent, far below the 25 percent minimum for central reserve city banks. Its debit balances at the New York Clearing House were reported to be \$1.14 Million (New York Times October 20, 1907) Perhaps in response to such numbers, the New York Clearing House had an equivocal response in its treatment of Mercantile National, when a clearing house representative expressed that the clearing house would not pay off the depositors of the Mercantile National Bank, and that the aid that was offered was temporary. However, on the following day, October 21, 1907, the New York Clearing House made a public announcement that the member banks (Mercantile National, National Bank of North America, and New Amsterdam National) were examined and deemed to be solvent.

The key difference between depositors withdrawals from Mercantile National Bank and from the Knickerbocker Trust Company reflected the relationship of these intermediaries to the New York Clearing House – effectively, the lender of last resort in the New York City financial market. In the same New York Times issue (October 22, 1907) that described the New York Clearing House announcement in support of member banks, another headline read "Knickerbocker Will Be Aided," and the article described clearly financial amounts allegedly committed to support it. There was public perception of a \$15 Million backstop fund to support Knickerbocker, but that amount turned out to be only \$3 Million, and it was not tapped at all prior to the suspension of the Knickerbocker Trust.²

We have not uncovered any unambiguous financial evidence to substantiate the alleged insolvency of Knickerbocker Trust during the Panic of 1907. We have looked at the stock and bond investments of Knickerbocker Trust as of September 17, 1907 and noted three dubious investments that may be considered associated with Charles Morse's investments – American Ice (valued at nearly \$600K), Consolidated Steamship (\$85 K), and Mercantile National (\$91K). The total value of these investments approaches 10 percent of Knickerbocker Trust's equity value, although the perceived losses were less than that total.³

Reasonable explanations for what spurred the depositor withdrawals from Knickerbocker Trust emphasize that the President of Knickerbocker Trust, Charles T. Barney, was associated with Charles Morse, a member of the Heinze group.⁴ The run on Knickerbocker had reportedly begun as early as Friday, October 18, and the National Bank of Commerce had been extending credit to Knickerbocker Trust to cover those withdrawals. The debit balance of the National Bank of Commerce at the New York Clearing House on October 22, 1907 was reported to be \$7 million, and was largely assumed to reflect its dealings for Knickerbocker.⁵ For legal reasons, the National Bank of Commerce had an incentive to limit its exposure to Knickerbocker's possible suspension; as the clearing agent for Knickerbocker, the National Bank of Commerce would have no priority as a claimant to Knickerbocker assets if the trust suspended, and its assets went into receivership. Then, the National Bank of Commerce would have to wait in line for its

² New York Tribune, October 23, 1907, p. 1.

³ A full examination of the value of Knickerbocker Trust during the crisis would require a separate paper.

⁴ Barney was on the Board of Directors of the National Bank of North America and the Mercantile National Bank (See Bruner and Carr 2008). His involvement in any of the Heinze-Morse activities has not been proven. There were reports of Knickerbocker Trust having extensive investments in real estate (New York Sun, October 23, 1907 p. 2), although we have been so far unable to verify that claim. The irony for comparison to 2008 is nonetheless worth mentioning.

⁵ The New York Tribune on October 23, 1907, p. 1.

payment as an ordinary depositor.⁶ On October 21, 1907, the National Bank of Commerce announced that it would no longer act as clearing agent for the Knickerbocker Trust Company, and at this point, the runs on Knickerbocker took off.

The National Bank of Commerce had approached the New York Clearing House for a loan on the behalf of Knickerbocker Trust, but the request was denied and the denial noted specifically that the New York Clearing House retained its resources to aid its member institutions.⁷ The Knickerbocker Trust was not aided and suspended on October 22, 1907 after depositors withdrew all its cash. Hanover National Bank presented the final check totaling \$1.5 million to Knickerbocker Trust. The event spawned the full-scale financial crisis in New York City as we will examine further below.

Financial events of 2008 among New York City intermediaries are eerily similar to those described above in reference to 1907. In March 2008, Bear Stearns faced a crisis of confidence from its over-night lenders. The financial condition of Bear Stearns had been monitored closely by its lenders for several months following the failure of two of its hedge funds, both of which invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities. On March 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve System issued a \$30 billion loan to JPMorgan-Chase, who could then arrange to buy Bear Stearns at \$2 per share. The loan was collateralized by assets of Bear Stearns. The Federal Reserve System received substantial criticism for this arrangement, which was perceived as an intervention by the Federal Reserve System in a market – investment banking – over which it has no supervisory or regulatory authority. Aside from this criticism, there were also concerns that the Federal Reserve

⁶ In a similar action, the New York Clearing House ordered the Mercantile National Bank to stop clearing for Hamilton Bank, a bank related to E.R. Thomas, to avoid potential losses from its possible suspension. The Hamilton Bank suspended October 24, 1907.

⁷ Minutes of the New York Clearing House Committee, October 21, 1907.

System was engaging in fiscal action, although Secretary of the Treasury Paulson was effectively in support.

The Bear Stearns "bail out" by the Federal Reserve System (through a member bank – JPMorgan-Chase) appears analogous to the Mercantile National Bank interactions with the New York Clearing House. First, there was some perception that the institution under consideration had engaged in undesirable financial activities. Secondly, there was some equivocation on the part of the respective lenders of last resort (the Fed allegedly had originally planned to lend directly to Bear Stearns, but opted for an indirect loan through JPMorgan Chase). Thirdly, there was a sense of relief that followed the announcement, giving the financial markets a short-term respite from financial distress.

The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the suspension of Knickerbocker Trust in October 1907 share a dubious distinction – their demise marked the beginning of the most severe observations of financial crisis in their respective eras. Rumors of Lehman Brothers' shaky financial condition were circulating from the time of the Bear Stearns collapse in March. Although the summer had several important financial events, the announcement of the conservatorship of Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company) on September 7, 2008 was likely the biggest shock to the financial market in the year up to that time. As the magnitude of the financial problems was becoming apparent, it was also perceived as unlikely that the Federal Reserve System would be able to enact an initiative with Lehman Brothers as it had with Bear Stearns; for one thing, the condition of banks and the financial market conditions in general were weaker in September and there were few candidate institutions capable of taking over Lehman Brothers, an institution much larger than Bear Stearns. Policymakers aimed at a market-based solution to the situation; Treasury Secretary Paulson was apparently unwilling to negotiate a bail out by the public sector, although there was sentiment to consider some kind of public support to facilitate a resolution.⁸ Unfortunately, the negotiations for Barclays Bank to take over Lehman fell apart, and on September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection.

The similarities of the two instances highlight the dramatic effect of isolation from prospective support. As Knickerbocker Trust opened for business on October 22, 1907, it was not *known* that there was no support for it, but it was suspected and the depositors were ready to be wrong in that inference as long as their deposit funds were in their possession. For Lehman Brothers, the lack of a financial suitor forced the firm to seek bankruptcy protection, from which few observers thought that Lehman could recover. The financial losses to Lehman Brothers' creditors have been substantial, and the losses on Lehman commercial paper generated a run on money market mutual funds in general (and the failure of the Prime Reserve Fund).⁹

There were significant differences between the failures of Knickerbocker Trust in 1907 and Lehman Brothers in 2008. Among the most significant is the fact that Knickerbocker Trust reopened in March 1908 following the infusion of \$2.4 million in new capital. The capital infusion represented about 25 percent of the capital value at the time of suspension, but was about 4 percent of the total assets of the trust. In contrast, the remnants of Lehman Brothers have been purchased by a variety of firms around the world, and the net losses to Lehman creditors have not yet been accounted for completely.

II. What Usually Happened in National Banking Era Panics?

⁸ Stewart, James B., Eight Days, September 21, 2008, *The New Yorker*.

⁹ See Dwyer and Tkac (2009) for an examination of the run on money market mutual funds.

A familiar pattern of events took place during panics that occurred in the National Banking Era (1863-1913). The recognition of that pattern suggests that there are important similarities in the key elements that trigger a banking panic. Contemporary economists like Sprague (1910), Laughlin (1911), and Kemmerer (1910) attribute the financial crises or panics to the shortcomings of the existing National Banking System. The system had no reliable mechanism to expand quickly the base money supply in response to increased demand, and the inability of the system to expand credit (or ship cash) to interior banks sufficiently during the crop-moving season (autumn) was perceived as the main culprit of sparking banking panics. In more recent research, Miron (1986) employs the conventional description in which the cash demands of the interior of the country drain cash from the New York City money market in order to finance the shipment of grain during harvest season.¹⁰ This drain leads to a seasonal rise in New York City interest rates in the fall, which thereby attracts some of the cash that flowed to the interior back toward New York City. In a panic, those flows toward New York City do not occur, and in fact are reversed.

There is an extensive research literature focused on the panics of the National Banking Era (see, for example, Champ 2007, Calomiris and Gorton 1991, Gorton 1988, Donaldson 1992, and Wicker 2000). The analysis in Donaldson (1992) provides the closest parallels to our investigation, which arise from the close attention paid to the existing institutional structure and the use of high-frequency (weekly) data for empirical analysis.¹¹ Donaldson demonstrates that there appear to be different co-movements between interest rates and three key data series (bank reserves, bank deposits, and stock returns) during a panic. Donaldson's findings provide an

¹⁰ Goodhart (1969) emphasizes the balance of trade between New York City and the interior of the country, arguing that Sprague (1910), Kemmerer (1910), and Laughlin (1911) concentrate entirely on the capital flows.

¹¹ Donaldson investigates whether panics were the result of the conventional "seasonal patterns" plus an external shock or whether they were a systematic event within the standard behavior of the economy.

interesting comparison with the work by Gorton (2008, 2009, 2010) on the recent financial crisis, in which the financial markets appear to behave differently as the panic ensues. Gorton (2009, 2010) argues that the conventional suspect, sub-prime mortgage backed assets, can explain the spark of the crisis but that the financial crisis widened as counter-party risk spread among financial market participants.

The seasonal pattern of money flows during the National Banking Era tended to produce upward spikes in New York City interest rates in the fall. When the interest rate spike was also accompanied by concerns about the solvency of the banking system, then the typical equilibrium response of interior banks leaving cash balances in New York City was disrupted. Muhleman (1908) emphasizes that the demands of interior (or country) banks for cash from New York City banks were largely responsible for the depletion of cash balances among New York Clearing House banks in 1907.¹² Chart 1 displays the seasonal pattern in net cash flows to New York City banks averaged over the years 1899-1908 versus the net cash flows observed in 1907. The divergence is striking

During banking panics, there was often an unusually large increase in the demand for cash, and the ratio of cash to bank deposits rose notably (cash rose and deposits fell). In the literature, it is referred to as "cash hoarding." Financial market volatility rose dramatically, and credit was typically unavailable. In the Panic of 1907, there were notable differences from earlier panics; for example, trust companies were struck with widespread runs on deposits, unlike national banks.¹³ The drain of cash from New York City intermediaries and the lack of liquidity (or credit) on the call loan money market were the unambiguous signs of financial distress at the

¹² Sprague (1910) emphasizes similar points about the source of the cash drain.

¹³ See Moen and Tallman (1992) for more analysis of how the Panic of 1907 was different.

onset of the 1907 financial panic.¹⁴ Chart 2 displays the seasonal pattern in call money interest rates averaged over the years 1899-1908 compared to the pattern observed in 1907. Again, the disruption in the financial market during 1907 is a striking divergence from a general pattern.

The New York Clearing House would typically take two actions to quell the drain of reserves from its member banks. First, it would issue clearing house loan certificates (CHLCs), which provided a temporary form of liquidity (near-reserves) because the certificates could be used to settle balances between member banks at the clearing house. The issues would be claims on the New York Clearing House, not on the borrowing bank, and the New York Clearing House would manage and monitor the loans. In order to take out CHLCs, a member bank would have to post collateral judged as acceptable by the clearing house Loan Committee. In exchange, the bank posting collateral would then receive certificates in the amount of around 75 percent of the perceived value of the collateral, although the 'haircut' varied. The second action typically taken by the New York Clearing House was the imposition of a suspension of convertibility of deposits into cash, although there was an aversion to imposing suspension (See Sprague 1910, Wicker 2000, and Friedman and Schwartz 1963). Normally, these instances were partial suspensions, so that some currency would be available to depositors, but the idea of suspension was to limit the drain of reserves out of the banking system. Hence, the supply of cash would not match demand, and the standard fixed exchange rate (at par) between currency and deposits would be negated. The periods of suspension would also reflect this excess demand for cash with a currency premium. It is notable that the timing of the issuance of clearing house loan certificates and of

¹⁴ The description of a panic shares similarities with those of Wicker (2000), and Kindleberger (2005), and also fits with the general framework of asymmetric information as described by Calomiris and Gorton (1991).

the announcement of suspension were separate decisions in prior National Banking Era panics, while in 1907 they were made simultaneously.¹⁵

The Panic of 1907 differed from earlier panics in one important respect—the recent rise of trust companies and their isolation from the clearing house. Trusts were state-chartered intermediaries and were much less regulated than the national banks. The Knickerbocker Trust, like most New York City trust companies, had a predominance of local depositors. Trusts were not approved depositories for reserve balances of interior national banks, so the trusts had less susceptibility to the reserve drain faced by New York City national banks and their central role in the correspondent banking system.¹⁶ Still, trusts paid interest on deposits, so they attracted ample supplies of deposits in stable financial periods. The downside of a local depositor base, however, is that the depositors have easy access to their deposits, and the depositors made quick work of liquidating those deposits.

The role of trust companies in the Panic of 1907 has been recognized throughout the analysis of that event, dating as early as the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* issues in January 1908.¹⁷ Measures of credit aggregates on balance sheets, however, have been limited to

¹⁵ James, McAndrews, and Weiman (2008) examine the costs of the payments disruptions that arise from the retrictions on convertibility of deposits into cash.

¹⁶ Further, New York City trust companies had only 7 percent of the clearing volume of New York City national banks, which were not much larger in aggregate resources.

¹⁷ Newspaper reports were even-handed for the first few days following the suspension of Knickerbocker Trust, because there were still some reports of concerns at Morse-Heinze-Thomas banks other than Mercantile National Bank. The tone of some early reports, October 23 and 24, read like a description of a general financial crisis. Over the following several days, the news reports become more specific about how the New York Clearing House was aiding its members, and comments are made that such aid is for the sake of the general financial market. It was also made clear that the solution to the trust company runs was going to require the cooperation of trust companies to come up with their own solution to their problems.

call reports by the New York State Superintendent of Banks; we have used some of those aggregates that were accumulated by Hagen (1932).¹⁸

The standard analysis of New York City trust companies in the Panic of 1907 highlights their role as sparking the financial distress as runs on their deposits force liquidation of assets and depletion of cash (and cash like) reserves. But, trusts may have been more than catalysts for the financial crisis, and their actions in key markets may have triggered directly some of the indications of financial distress such as those observed in the call money market and in the stock and bond markets. Unfortunately, data limitations have prevented us from uncovering any unambiguous evidence regarding the trust companies and the size of their role in the call money market.

Trust companies deposits and assets fluctuate somewhat over the period from September 1905 through December 1908, the period over which we examine the aggregate data.¹⁹ But for this discussion, we focus on the contraction in New York City trust company deposits, loans and investments, and cash reserves from August 22, 1907 to December 19, 1907. The aggregate contraction in deposits (general, including "due to" classifications to all other intermediaries) totaled \$323 million. Investments and loans contracted by \$280 million, and cash balances (-\$12 million) and cash balances at other intermediaries (-\$30 million) contracted by \$42 million. The contraction in investments was approximately \$50 million, whereas the contraction in loans was \$230 million.

¹⁸ Hagen is an outstanding and underutilized source for information about the Panic of 1907, and trust companies especially. Hagen examines the aggregate measures of deposits, loans and other investments, and cash and cash like deposits in an explanation of the Panic of 1907.

¹⁹ Deposit at NYC trust companies declined from its level in September 1905, which Hagen attributes to the influence of the Armstrong Commission that investigated the practices of life insurance companies in New York State (p. 28, Hagen 1932). Further, there is a noticeable decline in deposits in August 1906, which perhaps reflects the liquidation of trust balances held by UK insurance companies to pay claims related to the San Francisco earthquake (See Weidenmeir and Odell 2004, p. 1015, fn. 38).

The trusts were the source of a substantial volume of liquidations, either by asset sales (stock and bond investment sale) or loan contraction or by liquidation of trust deposit accounts held at other institutions. The loan contraction may have largely been comprised of call loans, although we have no way to prove that speculation. The ultimate response of clearing house banks to the contraction in loans may bear some evidence on how to view the loan contraction. Over a comparable period, the New York Clearing House banks offset about \$80 million of that contraction by increasing their loans by that amount. Then, there was still a \$150 million reduction in loans outstanding as of December 19, 1907. The size of this contraction in credit likely helps explain the spread of financial distress throughout the financial market during the panic.

Trusts held substantial net deposit holdings at New York City national banks. The liquidation of these deposits upon request by the trust companies was potentially another source of cash drain from the New York City clearing house banks. Although we cannot at this point verify the identity of the deposit contraction, it seems possible that the contraction in trust deposits at approved depository institutions (and other intermediaries) would be concentrated among banks. Hagen (1932, p. 22) indicates that an aggregate measure of New York City trust deposits at other intermediaries contracted by \$30 million from August 22 to December 19, 1907. Here, even though indirectly, the trust company difficulties would have a negative effect on the ability of the New York Clearing House banks to provide liquidity to the call market as its cash reserves were drained. From this viewpoint, the distress faced by the trust companies gets conveyed to the financial markets through the national banks as the trusts make financial demands on them.

III. New Evidence for 1907.

A new source of information in this paper is the data on clearing house loan certificate issues during the Panic of 1907 (see Appendices 1a and 1b). We have daily observations of clearing house loan certificate issues taken from the New York Clearing House designated by bank, by amount and on the specific date of issue. In addition, we have (tentative) measures of the value of collateral provided by the banks to the clearing house Loan Committee in exchange for the CHLCs. We have accumulated daily observations of call loan interest rates on the New York Stock Exchange (from various issues of the New York Times and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle) and we use estimates of the premium on currency in New York City as collected by Andrew (1908). As additional financial market indicators, we employ an index of daily stock returns (G. William Schwert 1990), and exchange rates (both 60 day and sight) with the United Kingdom and for banker's bills exchange rates (both from Andrew 1910). We also have accumulated the data on weekly aggregates of New York Clearing House banks (deposits, loans and reserves; a subset of Donaldson 1992) and a selection of bond prices (from Andrew 1910).

Some data series that are important for our inquiry are unavailable on a daily basis, as far as we have been able to determine to date.²⁰ As a result, we supplement our analysis of daily data with data recorded on a weekly and on a monthly frequency. For series that span several panic time periods, the series show similarities across panic observations (in some situations for some data series) and also expose some features that distinguish the Panic of 1907 from earlier National Banking Era panics. For the weekly data, we have all the series described above as

²⁰ Here, we are referring mainly to banking aggregates, and daily balances between banks. The ledger books of the New York Clearing House would be helpful for this enterprise, but the archives are no longer accessible.

daily data, along with weekly net gold inflows, and a selection of bond prices (from Andrew (1910).

Our collection of daily issues of clearing house loan certificates (CHLC) enables an investigation of the real-time effect of the temporary credit created by these issues on the financial distress that gripped the New York City financial market in October 1907. The frequency and the distribution extend beyond what prior examinations of the effects of clearing house loan certificates could investigate.

IV. How the Panic Spread: Evidence from the Call Market and Clearing House Loan Certificates.

Our evidence points toward a conventional conclusion that the Banking Panic of 1907 began in earnest with the suspension of the Knickerbocker Trust Company on October 22, 1907. Signals of stress arose in specific financial markets in New York City before this date, and such an observation is unsurprising. The failure of the Heinze-Morse banking chain in its attempt to corner the stock of United Copper on October 16, 1907 created notable unease among participants in the call loan market and the stock market.²¹ But these initial reactions were, though notable relative to the previous several years of data, modest in comparison to the observations during previous financial panics and especially relative to the Panic that was to unfold in the next week.

The Heinze-Morse banks – National Bank of North America, Mercantile National Bank, New Amsterdam National Bank, and Merchants and Trader's Bank – were national banks and were members of the New York Clearing House. In those cases, the New York Clearing House took pre-emptive action that prevented extensive runs on the associated banks in the week before

²¹ Wicker (2000) provides an extensive investigation into the key events that preceded the Panic of 1907.

the Panic. During our examination of clearing house loan certificates issues, we found that the New York Clearing House issued loans approaching \$10 million to these banks (with appropriately discounted collateral) during the week before the run on Knickerbocker Trust.²² So it appears that even before the Federal Reserve System, the private clearing house played the role of lender of last resort, even to misbehaving (member) banks. The New York Clearing House also made public statements reaffirming the decision to support these banks. These actions prevented widespread liquidation of deposits from those banks. This observation is an important contrast to the lack of such actions in response to the problems that arose at the Knickerbocker Trust company. The rumored connection of the Knickerbocker Trust with the Heinze-Morse corner attempt led to the notorious run on Knickerbocker, which may have begun as early as Friday, October 18, 1907 (Carosso 1987).

The New York Clearing House did not aid the Knickerbocker Trust when it was struck by runs on deposits on October 22. The justification given by JP Morgan and clearing house officials for not aiding the Knickerbocker Trust was that the trust companies were not members of the clearing house, and the clearing house was available for support only to its members. Clearly, there is a moral hazard argument in support of such a decision -- to prevent the other nonmember trusts from relying on the New York Clearing House for support, and perhaps holding a more risky asset portfolio in response to a perceived "lender of last resort" for trusts. But it is unlikely that the clearing house had anticipated the extreme runs on deposits that took hold in response to the Knickerbocker Trust suspension, even though there were reasons to suspect that bad things would happen as a result.

²² Once the New York Clearing House announced clearing house loan certificate issues on October 26, 1907, the loans were accumulated among the Clearing house loan certificate issues.

The first financial indicator to reveal the stress of the panic is likely the call loan interest rate. Chart 3 displays the daily call loan interest rate estimates that we have compiled. The slight increase in the week of October 14th would look more significant in the absence of the spike of the following week. Following the suspension of Knickerbocker Trust on Tuesday, October 22, 1907, depositor runs in New York City focused mainly on trust companies. Three characteristic elements hindered the New York City financial markets as a consequence. Firstly, the runs on trust companies forced those institutions to liquidate reserve deposit balances held with New York City national banks (approved reserve depositories), which placed those important clearing house banks into the cash drain. Secondly, it was widely reported that trust companies participated actively in the call loan market, and the liquidation of these loans by trust companies stricken with runs would be the secondary source for reserve assets to satisfy depositor cash demands. The apparent distress on the call loan market likely arose from these two sources of credit contraction (both arising from runs at trust companies). Thirdly, the notable contraction in credit on the call loan market produced a dramatic upward spike in the call loan interest rate observed immediately following the Knickerbocker Trust suspension.

The *New York Times* reported that the call loan rate on October 22 reached a high of 70 percent²³, with most transactions taking place at between 40 and 50 percent (*New York Times, Financial Markets*, October 23, 1907). As a gauge of financial distress on the stock market, the call loan interest rate illustrates the sharp rise in short-term loan funding costs on stock collateral, and indicates the impact of the Knickerbocker Trust suspension on anticipated credit availability in New York City. If nothing else, the spike in call loan interest rates heightened the degree of financial market unease. *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle* published the call loan rate at which the majority of loans were contracted during the week of October 21, 1907. The call

²³ Annual percentage rate.

loan rate hovered at nearly 50 percent for most of that week, with repeated observations of transactions taking place at interest rates of 50 percent. Clearly, the drain of cash from the New York City financial market and hence liquidity from the financial system arose largely from the runs on trust companies during that week. Although the crisis was focused on trusts, the panic-driven runs were having a substantial impact on call loan market liquidity. At this point, however, the Panic was primarily a New York City event.

The New York Clearing House actions in the case of the Heinze-Morse national banks during the week of October 14 stemmed the nascent runs on deposits, preventing noticeable financial distress. The clearing house inaction with respect towards the Knickerbocker Trust led to cash drains from interconnected New York City intermediaries, liquidity shortages on the call loan market, and distress within the stock market. The question arises whether the initial panicbased runs on trust companies and the related distress on the call loan market was sufficient to generate liquidity or heightened risk perceptions in other financial markets.

Sprague (1910) provides detailed descriptions of transactions and cash movements between trusts and banks, between New York Clearing House banks and interior banks, and between the clearing house loan committee and banks that represent the conventional explanation of the Panic of 1907. The withdrawals described in Sprague (1910), using aggregate information on weekly cash flows to and from New York City banks, suggest that the suspension of Knickerbocker may have prompted withdrawals of cash by interior banks from New York City national banks. Sprague (1910, p. 258) emphasizes that requests for cash from the interior banks did not arise in response to the Heinze banking difficulties. If interior banks responded to the panic-related runs on trust companies, the suspension of Knickerbocker Trust and the related financial distress seems likely to be the proximate "source" of the crisis.

The contemporary descriptions in daily and weekly periodicals describe an anticipated drain of cash reserves from New York Clearing House banks (mainly the large national banks) and toward their depositors (sometimes banks as depositors) in the interior of the country. These reserve deposits were reportedly among the first to be liquidated in a crisis, and the news of the Knickerbocker Trust suspension and the stock market distress in New York City apparently increased concern among interior bankers. Prior experience during panics, especially the relatively recent 1893 panic, influenced the behavior of bankers in the interior of the country, especially if those bankers held a significant portion of their reserves at national banks in New York City. The New York City national banks were perceived as unresponsive to the needs of interior bankers in 1893, and the interior bankers viewed their deposits held in New York City banks as effectively unavailable to them once the New York Clearing House declared a partial suspension of payments. In that circumstance during the Panic of 1893, interior bankers were left with insufficient cash during a crisis, and one that uncharacteristically focused on interior banks. In contrast, the Panic of 1907 centered in New York City, and the crisis focused predominantly on trust companies, although as mentioned above, the ramifications of credit contraction arising from the runs on trust companies affected the key central financial market the call loan market – which was also a market that provided a secondary source of reserves for the United States banking system.

The developments on the New York Stock Exchange on Thursday, October 24, 1907 reflect the tenuous nature of credit available to stock market participants through the call loan market (see Carr and Bruner 2007, Sprague 1910, and Tallman and Moen 1990). The central fact for our purposes is that the call loan money market lacked adequate liquidity to offer credit to the New York Stock Exchange, and that the New York Clearing House members, the United

States Treasury, and major industrial leaders united to address that liquidity shortage.²⁴ Market participants understood that this solution provided temporary funding to satisfy the market for only a short-time. Descriptions of the Friday, October 25 market conditions emphasized the fragile nature of the call loan market. In response to an eventful week, the New York Clearing House met on Saturday, October 26, 1907 and announced the formation of a clearing house loan committee that would oversee the issuance of clearing house loan certificates. At the same meeting, it was also agreed that the New York Clearing House members would impose a restriction of convertibility of deposits into cash (or "partial suspension").

With some ambiguity regarding its timing, a genuine hoarding of cash outside the banking system began following the announcement of the suspension of convertibility. On a weekly basis, there is evidence of a consistent outflow of cash (and a requisite contraction of net deposits within New York Clearing House banks throughout November and December of 1907. Drains of cash from New York Clearing House national banks arising from trust company and interior bank depositor banks contributed further to the contraction of credit on the New York Stock Exchange. Chart 4 displays the reserve balance (surplus or deficit) among New York Clearing House banks versus the issuance of clearing house loan certificates. It is notable that the negative correlation between clearing house loan certificates and the reserve deficit among New York Clearing House banks is consistent across the three National Banking Era panics in which there were restrictions on the convertibility of deposits into cash.²⁵

The daily aggregate measures of clearing house loan certificates (CHLC) during the 1907 crisis are a novel element of our data set. Previous analysis of CHLCs focused on the total issue of them, and on the duration of their circulation among clearing house member banks. Chart 5

²⁴ See Wicker (2000) p. 94.

²⁵ New York Times, November 6, 1893. Exhibit follows Appendix III.

displays the daily amount of clearing house loan certificates outstanding along with the daily call loan interest rates. The call loan interest rate falls from its steep rate of 50 percent following the accumulation of clearing house loan certificates outstanding over the first week of their issue. The call money interest rate continued to fluctuate following the issuance of CHLC, reaching 20 percent during the first week in November. The total amount of CHLC outstanding hovers near its maximum as early as November 14, 1907; it is notable that some disturbance in the call loan market in early December failed to prompt any additional issues of CHLCs.

Aside from the notable inverse co-movement following the initial issuance of CHLCs, there appears to be little measurable effect of CHLCs on call money interest rates. That observation supports views expressed by contemporary observers that the CHLCs may have prevented the unwanted premature liquidation of loans on call funded by New York Clearing House banks. Further, the CHLCs may have allowed the clearing house banks to take over call loans of trust companies that were struck with panic-related deposit withdrawals, preventing a massive sell-off of loans. But the CHLCs were limited in several ways; they could circulate only among clearing house members and could not be issued to the trust companies or the public. The volume of certificates was also constrained by the willingness of individual banks to take out loan certificates and the willingness of the Committee to issue them. The support provided by CHLCs to the markets reached a plateau of about \$80 million outstanding in mid-November 1907. Sprague (1910) notes that by the last 5 days of October, nearly 84 percent of clearing settlements at the New York Clearing House were settled with CHLCs, suggesting that further potential for releasing additional cash from the settlement balances was limited.

V. International Gold Flows -- How the Panic Spread Overseas

In his analysis of the Panic of 1893, Wicker (2000, pp. 133-134) explains how nearly \$40 million in gold imports came to the United States, but only after the suspension of convertibility was imposed. For the prior six weeks, the issuance of clearing house loan certificates of (\$41.49 million) failed to motivate the importation of more than \$5 million in gold. The key result of suspension was the cash premium, which made the importation of gold profitable.²⁶

For 1907, the net effect of the suspension of convertibility and issuance of clearing house loan certificates was to promote the importation of gold and thereby potentially alleviate to some degree the credit contraction after sufficient inflow of gold. The currency premium (about four percent around the announcement of suspension) gave significant incentive to import gold, and the clearing house loan certificates provided the financing. Chart 6 displays the currency premium and the net gold flows for the weeks during the panic.

A number of contemporary observers explained that the cash premium was the catalyst to motivate large-scale gold imports (see Muhleman 1908 p. 191, the New York Times, November 23, 1907, page 10, and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle). But it may be that the gold imports resulted from the combination of clearing house loan certificates to provide the credit capacity in banks to import gold, and the currency premium to provide the economic incentive to import it.

Muhleman (1908, p.191) explains the reasons for issuance of clearing house loan certificates by the New York Clearing House during a panic.

²⁶ Wicker (2000) echoes Sprague (1910) when he dismisses the effect of the currency premium on the subsequent gold imports when talking about the Panic of 1907. The analysis cited above provides an interesting contrast of his views with the evidence he cites.

By means of clearing house loan certificates they were enabled to increase the loans, instead of demanding payment; such demands would inevitably have aggravated the evil and precipitated serious disasters. The loans were expanded for three purposes: to finance the importation of gold, to enable the furnishing of cash to interior banks; to relieve interior banks of loans (probably speculative), in the center, which they were anxious to get rid of; and to enable the security market to have some means to check the ruinous fall in prices, particularly of bonds, which had set in.

Similarly, and more narrowly, Cannon (1908) explains the mechanism whereby clearing house loan certificates facilitate the importation of gold.

Very few people realize that in importing gold it is necessary to create a credit on the books of a bank, upon which the gold importer may draw, through the clearing house, in payment of the cable transfers and the bills of exchange necessary to cover the amount of gold to be brought over. Clearing house loan certificates enabled the banks to make these credits, and that is the reason we were able to import such a large volume of gold during the past few months. [Cannon 1908, p. 111]

From this perspective, it is *possible* that the New York Clearing House may have planned explicitly to exploit the combined effect of clearing house loan certificates and the suspension of convertibility to facilitate the large gold imports that took place during November and December of 1907.²⁷ The positive effect from these actions is an inflow of gold, thereby increasing the monetary base and alleviating the liquidity crisis that was obvious on the call loan market. On the other hand, the negative effect of the suspension of convertibility is that the announcement likely increased demands for cash (as reflected in the currency premium) and contributed to the hoarding of cash outside the banking system, which effectively nullified the palliative effect of

²⁷ We have found no primary evidence as of yet to support this speculation.

gold imports until the hoarding ceased (in January) and the cash returned to the central reserve cities (mainly, New York City).²⁸ In addition, we suggest that the large-scale imports of gold from abroad effectively spread the financial crisis in New York City worldwide, by draining liquidity away from other financial markets. Table 1 suggests that the spreads on exchange rates with the UK pound increased notably in October. Table 2 indicates that the daily spreads widened both before and following the suspension of convertibility. As a volatility indicator, the exchange rates suggest that the ramifications of the financial distress took several days to affect the exchange market.

VI. How the Panic Spread: Evidence from the Stock and Bond Markets

A. The Stock Market and Financial Distress During the Panic of 1907

The stock market had been mostly in decline through the first half of October 1907, as displayed in Chart 7, which displays an estimated measure for a daily stock index from October through December 1907 derived from the daily capital gain returns for stocks on the New York Stock Exchange compiled by G. William Schwert (1990). We emphasize two key points from the stock index chart: first, the absence of a more precipitous decline following the suspension of Knickerbocker Trust on October 22, 1907 and, second, the steep trajectory of the decline in the stock index early in the month, even before the collapse of the Heinze-Morse attempt to corner the stock of United Copper on October 15, 1907. The trend decline in the first half of October was steeper than the declines that follow after the suspension of Knickerbocker Trust.

The nadir of the index was on November 22, 1907; however, that point was less than four percent lower than the index level of October 24, 1907, the day that the New York Stock Exchange appealed to JP Morgan for liquidity to fund the call loan market. The stock market

²⁸ Goodhart (1969, p. 120) emphasizes how the gold outflows from Europe spread the liquidity crisis abroad.

appears to decline gradually and inconsistently after October 24, perhaps reflecting a sense of reassurance from the intervention of the Treasury, the New York Clearing House, JP Morgan, and John D. Rockefeller in the funding of the call loan market.²⁹

The absence of a continuous decline in stock values during the crisis hides some potential informative activity displayed in the daily return series. Despite a general trend decline in stock market values, the daily return observation of Monday, October 21, 1907 was among the highest observed in the year. The stock return on the New York Stock Exchange was over 2.5 percent after the New York Clearing House announced what likely appeared to market participants to be a settled solution to the Heinze banking problems. On the following day, October 22, 1907, the day when Knickerbocker Trust suspended its financial operations, the stock market experienced the largest one day decline of the three month period.

Our investigation of the transmission of financial distress throughout the general financial market hinges on the connections between the markets. The call loan market and the stock market provide a key link for our analysis, motivated by the perception that a large proportion of stock trades are financed through credit extension.³⁰ It is therefore perhaps surprising that we fail to observe a more striking decline in the stock market index as a result of the obvious difficulties in maintaining credit provision to restore the call loan interest rates to more normal ranges.

The evidence for the investigation indicates that financial distress was already apparent in the bond market in the United States prior to the collapse of Knickerbocker Trust. It is likely that

²⁹This observation is a stark contrast with what was observed in 2008 in the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers. After September 15, 2008, following the failure of Lehman Brothers, the daily decline of over 4 percent (for the Dow Jones and S&P 500 indexes) was followed by a subsequent net decline of over 35 percent by March 16, 2009.

³⁰ See Huebner (1922), pp. 292-294, and Meeker (1922) p. 68.

the Heinze copper stock corner attempt put some pressure on financial markets emanating from the stock and the call markets. The price declines both across bonds and within the stock market may have resulted from increased demands for cash among normally active participants on the market and spurred the initial declines in call loan liquidity.

B. The Value of the Bond Index and Stock Index

Railroad bond prices were an important indicator of financial conditions during the National Banking Era. By 1907, the market for railroad bonds had developed into an active and liquid market. We examine a data set that consists of the weekly price observations for 27 railroad bonds compiled by Kemmerer (1910, pp. 413-512). Kemmerer chooses these issues based on the perceived liquidity and the depth of market for the issues, so the bond prices reflect a sample selection bias toward survivorship and toward lower than average risk. For our purposes, the bond prices indicate the degree to which even those markets and financial issues that are perceived as low risk respond to the financial crisis.

We create an equally-weighted bond price index from 26 of the 27 bond price series.³¹ Chart 8 is a time series graph of the weekly bond price index (choosing January 1906 =100) in comparison to an estimated stock market index. The stock market index is estimated from the daily New York Stock Exchange return series constructed by Schwert (1990).³² The sharp declines in both series just before and during the Panic of 1907 are striking. The nadir of the stock index occurs November 16, 1907, whereas the trough for the bond price index occurs the following week. From the standpoint of the financial crisis, these bottoms take place somewhat later than November 5, 1907, when the conventional wisdom on the crisis suggests the panic

³¹ The Long Island unified gold fours of 1949 goes into receivership in 1908, and for consistency, we leave this series out of the bond index. It could easily be accommodated, but its absence likely has little effect on our results. ³² We look at the capital gain return only, abstracting from dividend yields, because we are only interested in detecting large negative returns.

subsided.³³ Further, we look closely at the differences in the log of the bond price index, which effectively measures "holding period" returns to the bonds. This rough measure of bond price fluctuations implicitly measures coupon payments, but it does not smooth out the price effects of semi-annual coupon payments.³⁴ We find that some rather sharp price breaks took place after November 5.

Table 3 displays the hypothetical one period return to the bond price index for the weeks of October and November 1907. With regard to the series, there are no observations coming close to the magnitude observed in these two months over the sample, 1900-1908.³⁵ Secondly, it is notable that the decline in the bond price index began as early as October 12, 1907 the week prior to the Heinze-Morse failed stock market corner. During the next week (of the failure), the bond price index fell notably by .74 percent, followed by declines of 1.63 and 1.7 percent during the weeks of October 26 (the week of the Knickerbocker Trust failure) and November 2 (the week after the New York Clearing House implemented a restriction on the convertibility of deposits into cash). These are the largest two week declines in the bond price index.³⁶ The stock market index, on the other hand, experiences its largest declines in the week of October 12, 1907 and the week of October 19, 1907 (the week of the Heinze failed corner attempt). The stock market continued to rack up sizable negative returns during the next two weeks, but its decline was neither precipitous nor unprecedented (as mentioned above).

Here, we characterize an operant "correlation risk," that is, a shift from a normal small positive or zero correlation across the time series returns (between bond and stock returns) to a

³³ See Bruner and Carr (2008).

³⁴ The timing of coupon payments may influence the measured co-movements in prices if a large proportion of the bonds have the same monthly payment schedule.

³⁵ Results and data are available upon request.

³⁶ We examine further the time series relationships among the bond prices by looking at differences in the yield to maturity for a set of bonds for which we have the coupon payment dates. Explained further in Appendix III, we estimate four principal components for a set of 18 bond yields to maturity.

number of assets that then change sharply to a large positive co-movement (declines) during a panic. The evidence displays extreme negative returns for each asset class, equity and bonds, during the Panic of 1907. The observations occur in November, after the imposition of restrictions on the convertibility of deposits into cash by the New York Clearing House. In fact, bond price index fell to a nadir on November 23, 1907, which coincides with the largest reserve deficit among New York Clearing House banks.

The two large outlier holding period returns to the bond index at the outset of the panic (noted in Table 3) along with two additional large negative returns in the weeks ending November 16 and November 23, 1907 highlights the extended duration of the financial distress. Further, these price declines may also emphasize the mechanism for transmitting the financial crisis throughout the world financial system. Recent work by Rodgers and Wilson (2010) demonstrates that several railroad bond securities, some of which are represented in our bond price index, were traded on international markets, especially in London. Rodgers and Wilson explain how the trading prices of the same securities could be linked by arbitrage, based on the cost of shipping securities (and gold) abroad. Then, they estimate the percentage price deviation necessary for an arbitrage opportunity. During the Panic of 1907, the decline of railroad bond prices may have reflected local, domestic liquidity problems, and would offer an opportunity to buy a lower priced bond in New York and sell short the higher priced bond in London. The proceeds of the short sale could be exchanged for gold, which could then be sent to NYC to pay for the loan to buy the bond security. Given their evidence, Rodgers and Wilson suggest that such arbitrage opportunities existed during the weeks of October 26, November 2, and November 16, 1907. We suspect that the announcement of restrictions on convertibility of

deposits into cash by the New York Clearing House, along with the associated premium on cash also could have affected the profitability of the transactions.

VI. Conclusions

This investigation examines high-frequency data for the period around the Panic of 1907 in order to detect when the distress among trust companies in New York City spread to other parts of the financial market, and then throughout the United States. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the runs on the trust companies, the credit contraction that followed, and the inability for the national banks in New York City to replace fully the credit lost from the trust company contraction all contributed to widespread financial distress. The sharp price declines both across bonds and within the stock market may have resulted from increased demands for cash among normally active participants on the market and spurred the initial declines in call loan liquidity. Among those financial markets that experienced distress during the Panic of 1907, the call loan market was where the distress first spread through to other markets. Despite attempts by the US Treasury, industrialists and the financiers like J.P. Morgan, the financial distress arising from the panic spread. Gold inflows from abroad were effectively neutralized by excessive demand for cash reserves by interior banks, which drained large amounts of cash from all three central reserve cities, but most notably from New York City.

The evidence suggests that serious financial distress started prior to the suspension of Knickerbocker Trust; however, the Panic of 1907 began in full force following the suspension of the trust. Material changes in the degree of the crisis and its spread throughout the interior of the United States remains less certain, possibly taking place later following the New York Clearing

House announcements of a partial suspension of payments and the issuance of clearing house loan certificates. Our present results have less to say about that point at this time.

The empirical analysis conjectures that when the Panic of 1907 took hold key interrelationships between financial data changed notably from those observed during normal times. The observations are not surprising, but the time series data suggest that the financial distress spread from the stock market and the call loan market to the foreign exchange and bond markets. The interior of the US responded to the crisis with a slight delay, but the actions of the New York Clearing House to restrict the convertibility of deposits into cash and the response of the interior banks to liquidate deposit accounts in New York City likely exacerbated the problems. The eventual resumption of normal liquidity provision to the call loan market required the return of deposits from the interior bankers into large, New York City national banks.

Data on the weekly railroad bond prices shows that the bond market was experiencing turbulence even before the call loan money market interest rate spiked on October 22, 1907. The finding suggests that the transmission of the Panic of 1907 to the rest of the financial market was not entirely dependent upon the actions of the New York Clearing House. On the other hand, the suspension of convertibility and the issuance of clearing house loan certificates, the two actions implemented by the New York Clearing House on October 26, 1907 preceded the observation of three of the largest negative returns on the bond price index and also led to a large-scale importation of gold into the United States. We view the combination of the actions of the New York Clearing House, by attracting a flow of high-powered liquidity from abroad, as the main mechanism in the transmission of the Panic of 1907 throughout the rest of the world.

APPENDIX 1A – DATA SOURCES

Call loan interest rates -

<u>Daily observations</u> are taken from the Financial Situation columns of the New York Times from September 30, 1907 through February 19, 1908. These articles describe the range of interest rates observed over the day, and occasionally describe the rate at which the bulk of trades were made. We referred to various issues of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (Volume for further clarifications and enhancements to the interest rate observations. Overall, the interest rate observations for the call money market remain tentative and we continue to look for ways to clarify the measurement of a daily call money interest rate.

<u>Weekly observations</u> are taken from from Kemmerer (1910) pages 235-236. <u>Monthly observations</u> are Macaulay (1937) also displays call money and commercial paper interest rates on a monthly basis.

Clearing house loan certificates – Daily observations are taken from the minutes of the meetings of the clearing house Loan Committee of the New York Clearing House. These are indicated by date, by issuer (requesting bank), and by amount.

Currency Premium – measured daily, by Andrew (1908).

Stock returns – We use the daily returns data from Schwert (1990) for the daily and weekly analysis. We use Cowles Commission Stock Index for monthly, taken from Macaulay (1937)

Net Gold Imports (Exports) – Weekly, Andrew (1910), Table 11 Exports and Imports of Gold at New York, 1899-1908, pages 172-176. Monthly, Andrew (1910), Table 10 Exports and Imports of Gold at New York, 1889-1908, pages 169-171.

Reserves of New York Clearing House Banks – taken from Andrew (1910), Table 31, Weekly Statement of New York Clearing House Banks, pages 75-118.

Exchange Rates: Daily, Source: Andrew (1910) <u>Table No. 14—Actual Rates For Foreign</u> <u>Exchange At New York On London For Bankers' Billsl</u>, page 186, <u>Weekly</u>, Andrew (1910) Table 12 New York Sight Exchange upon London, Paris and Berlin, page 177.

Panic of 1907 dummy variable: <u>Daily:</u> October 22, 1907 until January 11, 1908, =0, otherwise. <u>Weekly:</u> =1 from October 26, 1907 until January 11, 1908, = 0 at all other dates. Monthly: =1 for October, November, December 1907, January 1908; =0 otherwise. Applies to regressions and to graphics.

APPENDIX 1B– BOND SERIES DESCRIPTIONS

Bond 1	Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe adjustment gold fours of 1995:1896-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> May 1, November 1; bond 109 in Macaulay (1937) A bond included in Rodgers and Wilson (2010).
Bond 2	Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe general gold fours of 1995:1897-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> April 1, October 1; bond 94 in Macaulay (1937)
Bond 3	Baltimore and Ohio gold fours of 1948: 1900-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> April 1, October 1; Bond 90 in Macaulay (1937)
Bond 4	Central Pacific first refunding gold fours of 1949: 1900-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> February 1, August 1; bond 101 in Macaulay (1937). A bond included in Rodgers and Wilson (2010).
Bond 5	Central Railroad of New Jersey general gold fives of 1987: 1890-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> January 1, July 1; bond 104 in Macaulay (1937)
Bond 6	Chesapeake and Ohio general gold four-and-a-halfs of 1992: 1893-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> March 1, September 1; bond 135 in Macaulay (1937). A bond included in Rodgers and Wilson (2010).
Bond 7	Chicago, Burlington and Quincy (Nebraska extension) fours of 1927: 1890-1908.
Bond 8	Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul general gold fours of 1989: 1890-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> January 1, July 1; bond 87 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 9	Denver and Rio Grande first consolidated gold fours of 1936: 1890-1908.
Bond 10	Erie first consolidated gold fours prior lien of 1996: 1898-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> January 1, July 1; bond 146 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 11	Hocking Valley first consolidated gold four-and-a-halfs of 1999: 1900-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> January 1, July 1; bond 105 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 12	Iowa Central first gold fives of 1938: 1890-1908
Bond 13	Long Island unified gold fours of 1949: 1900-1908
Bond 14	Louisville and Nashville unified gold fours of 1940: 1898-1908.
Bond 15	Missouri, Kansas and Texas first gold fours of 1990: 1891-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> June 1, December 1; bond 134 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 16	Missouri Pacific first consolidated gold sixes of 1920: 1890-1908.

Bond 17	Missouri Pacific, St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern general consolidated gold fives of 1931: 1894-1908.
Bond 18	New York Central and Hudson River gold three-and-a-halfs of 1997: 1899-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> January 1, July 1; bond 95 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 19	New York Central and Hudson River (West Shore) first fours guaranteed of 2361: 1890-1908. Coupon payments: January 1, July 1; bond 70 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 20	New York, Ontario and Western refunding first gold fours of 1992: 1893-1908.
Bond 21	Norfolk and Western first consolidated gold fours of 1996: 1897-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> April1, October 1; bond 103 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 22	Northern Pacific prior lien gold fours of 1997: 1897-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> January 1, April 1, July 1, October 1; bond 102 in Macaulay (1937). Included in Rodgers and Wilson (2010).
Bond 23	St. Louis and San Francisco general gold fives of 1931: 1890-1908.
Bond 24	St. Louis and Southwestern first gold fours of 1989: 1892-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> May 1, November 1; bond 133 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 25	Southern Railway first consolidated fives of 1994: 1895-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> January 1, July 1; bond 119 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 26	Union Pacific land grant gold fours of 1947: 1899-1908. <i>Coupon payments:</i> January 1, July 1; bond 91 in Macaulay (1937).
Bond 27	Wabash first gold fives of 1939: 1890-1908. Coupon payments: May 1, November 1; bond 78 in Macaulay (1937).

NOTE: All bond data series are taken from Kemmerer (1910). The price series for these selected bonds were chosen on the suggestion of investment bankers as most likely to have traded in liquid markets. Kemmerer notes (page 174) that quotations for prices were one of the following in order of preference: 1) Prices at which sales took place (on Friday or closest day), 2) Mean of "bid" and "asked" prices on Friday (or closest day), 3) "bid" quotations on Friday, 4) "Asked" quotations on Friday, and 5) if no quotations, the mean of the prices at nearest weeks.

DATA APPENDIX II: Time Series Properties of Data Series

Weekly Data From January 7, 1899 until December 26, 1908

Correlations of *UK US Exchange Rate* (Demand or Sight exchange) observed high value Autocorrelations

Correlations of the *UK US Exchange Rate spread* (Range of values observed during the week) Autocorrelations

Weekly Data From January 4, 1902 until December 26, 1908

(Available from 1899 -- to be updated)

Correlations of *Net Imports of Gold* Autocorrelations

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
0.72	0.56	0.47	0.30	0.21	0.14	0.11	0.10	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04

Weekly Data From January 6, 1900 until December 26, 1908

Correlations of *Call Loan Rate* Autocorrelations

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
0.58	0.46	0.28	0.22	0.18	0.24	0.22	0.21	0.14	0.07	0.05	0.06

Weekly Data From January 7, 1899 until December 26, 1908

Reserves less required reserves Autocorrelations

Autocorrelations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 0.95 0.87 0.80 0.72 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.35

Weekly Data From January 6, 1900 until December 26, 1908

Stock market index – returns with dividends

Autocorre	lations
Autocone	rations


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
0.03	0.07	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.2	-0.02	0.05	0.07


APPENDIX III – Principal Components Analysis of Bond Yields to Maturity

The bond price index aggregates the prices of a set of bonds abstracting from the payment of coupon interest. In this section, we account explicitly for the effect of coupon payments on market prices; bond market participants calculate the value of accrued interest that is paid on the coupon date to the bearer of the bond as of that date. These calculations affect the market price, which should reflect that accrued interest, and reflect the coupon payment after the fact. We calculate yields to maturity for a subset of bonds, which accounts for the timing of coupon interest payments on those bonds. However, the yield to maturity calculation introduces the variation of yields as a result of differing maturities of the bonds. The maturities of each bond under examination exceed fifteen years, and most are over 40 years to maturity.

We performed principal components analysis on both holding period returns as well as on the yields to maturity (of a subsample of bonds). The results are generally similar. The estimated first principal component indicates when the variability of that component is largest. Chart III displays the first principal component time series from the set of yields to maturity.³⁷ Because the bond price index series along with the stock market index indicates similar findings, we keep the principal component analysis as support in an Appendix.

³⁷ The 18 bonds for which we calculate a yield to maturity are indicated in Appendix 1B by the presence of a coupon payment date. We cannot estimate a yield to maturity with precision for those bonds that lack a coupon payment date.





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Month		Exchange Rate Range	Range
January.	60-day.	4.7990-4.82	-0.021
	Sight.	4.8440-4.8610	-0.017
February.	60-day.	4.8025-4.8080	-0.0055
	Sight.	4.8440-4.8480	-0.004
March.	60-day.	4.7840-4.8050	-0.021
	Sight.	4.8275-4.8470	-0.0195
April.	60-day.	4.79 - 4.8350	-0.045
	Sight.	4.8365-4.8645	-0.028
May.	60-day.	4.8320-4.8410	-0.009
	Sight.	4.8610-4.87	-0.009
June.	60-day.	4.8350-4.8415	-0.0065
	Sight.	4.8655-4.8740	-0.0085
July.	60-day.	4.8320-4.8410	-0.009
	Sight.	4.8655-4.8725	-0.007
August.	60-day.	4.8210-4.8370	-0.016
	Sight.	4.8625-4.88	-0.0175
September.	60-day	4.8170-4.8275	-0.0105
	Sight	4.8525-4.8625	-0.01
October.	60-day.	4.77 -4.8260	-0.056
	Sight.	4.8225-4.8650	-0.0425
November.	60-day.	4.78 - 4.815	-0.035
	Sight	4.85 - 4.875	-0.025
December.	60-day	4.79 -4.81	-0.02
	Sight	4.8410-4.8670	-0.026

Table 1: Monthly UK-US Exchange Rate Ranges on Banker Bills During 190760 day and Sight

Source: Andrew (1910) page 206, Table 14: Actual Rates for Foreign Exchange at New York on London for Bankers' Bill, Daily, 1896-1909.

Note: Range observations in bold highlight outlier observations in the month.

October	1907
	1/0/

October 190						
	60 day			Sigh	t Exchange	•
Day	Low	High	Range	Low	High	<u>Range</u>
1	4.8225	4.823	0.0005	4.8575	4.858	0.0005
2	4.823	4.8235	0.0005	4.8585	4.86	0.0015
3	4.821	4.822	0.001	4.856	4.8565	0.0005
4	4.8225	4.824	0.0015	4.858	4.859	0.001
5	4.824	4.825	0.001	4.858	4.86	0.002
6	Sunday.			Sunday		
7	4.8225	4.8235	0.001	4.858	4.859	0.001
8	4.823	4.8235	0.0005	4.859	4.86	0.001
9	4.8235	4.824	0.0005	4.8595	4.861	0.0015
10	4.825	4.826	0.001	4.86	4.8605	0.0005
11	4.825	4.826	0.001	4.861	4.8615	0.0005
12	4.8235	4.824	0.0005	4.8625	4.863	0.0005
13	Sunday.			Sunday		
14	4.8245	4.8255	0.001	4.8635	4.865	0.0015
15	4.824	4.825	0.001	4.8625	4.863	0.0005
16	4.8235	4.824	0.0005	4.8615	4.862	0.0005
17	4.8225	4.823	0.0005	4.861	4.8615	0.0005
18	4.823	4.824	0.001	4.861	4.8615	0.0005
19	4.821	4.8215	0.0005	4.86	4.861	0.001
20	Sunday.			Sunday		
21	4.8155	4.816	0.0005	4.856	4.8565	0.0005
22	4.81	4.8105	0.0005	4.8525	4.853	0.0005
23	4.81	4.8105	0.0005	4.851	4.852	0.001
24	4.805	4.8075	0.0025	4.845	4.8475	0.0025
25	4.79	4.8	0.01	4.8325	4.8375	0.005
26	4.77667	4.7825	0.00583	4.82125	4.825	0.00375
27	Sunday.			Sunday		
28	4.77	4.78	0.01	4.824	4.825	0.001
29	4.77	4.78	0.01	4.8425	4.845	0.0025
30	4.7725	4.775	0.0025	4.84	4.845	0.005
31	4.79	4.7925	0.0025	4.845	4.8475	0.0025
November	Sunday			Sunday		
1	4.81	4.815	0.005	4.865	4.87	0.005
2	4.79	4.8	0.01	4.8675	4.88	0.0125

Source: Andrew (1910) page 206, Table 14: Actual Rates for Foreign Exchange at New York on London for Bankers' Bill, Daily, 1896-1909.

Note: Range observations in bold highlight outlier observations in the month.


Week of Observation	Bond Price Index	Stock Index	One-week Holding Period Return to Bond Index	Stock Return
September 7, 1907	91.52	74.92	-0.06	2.24
September 14, 1907	91.33	72.34	-0.21	-3.51
September 21, 1907	91.47	74.35	0.15	2.74
September 28, 1907	91.87	71.35	0.44	-4.13
October 5, 1907	91.88	71.58	0.01	0.32
October 12, 1907	91.52	67.84	-0.39	-5.36
October 19, 1907	90.85	65.11	-0.74	-4.10
October 26, 1907	89.38	62.71	-1.63	-3.75
November 2, 1907	87.87	61.52	-1.70	-1.91
November 9, 1907	88.26	61.72	0.43	0.32
November 16, 1907	87.49	59.83	-0.88	-3.12
November 23, 1907	86.19	60.40	-1.49	0.96
November 30, 1907	87.36	63.39	1.35	4.83
December 7, 1907	89.31	65.75	2.20	3.66
December 14, 1907	89.24	63.38	-0.08	-3.67
December 21, 1907	88.72	64.87	-0.59	2.32
December 28, 1907	88.96	64.16	0.28	-1.11
January 4, 1908	91.16	65.84	2.43	2.59
	Full Sample S	tatistics		
	sample average	e return	0.00	0.07
	sample standar	d deviation	0.33	2.14
	sample maxim		2.43	8.53
	sample minim	um	-1.70	-7.29

Table 3: Bond Price Index, Stock Price Index, and Weekly (Period) Returns:Selected Sample Taken from Sample January 13, 1900 - December 26, 1908

Source: Bond price index calculated from bond price series from Kemmerer (1910) pages 413-510. Stock index calculated from the daily stock return series in Schwert (1990).

Note: Numbers in bold are below the mean by more than twice the full-sample standard deviation of the return series. Numbers in italics are

Chart 1: Seasonality in Net Cash Flows Into New York City Banks



Source: Kemmerer 1910





Chart 2: Seasonality in the Call Loan Interest Rate

Source: Kemmerer 1910



Source: New York Times, Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Various issues




Chart 4: NYCH Bank Reserve Balance vs CHLCs

Sources: Clearing House Loan Committee Reports and Kemmerer (1910)




Chart 5: Daily Call Loan Rate vs Clearing House Loan Certificates

Source for CHLC: Reports of the Clearing House Loan Committee, various issues




Chart 6: Net Imports of Gold versus Currency Premium

Chart 7: Daily Stock Index

