

*Financial crises, Business cycles,  
and Bankruptcies in the Very  
Long Run: France during the  
19th Century*

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GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL  
AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

# Goal

- Compile a bankruptcy rate in France, 1820-1913
- Study its short-term fluctuations
- Link them with the varying policy of the central bank during crises

# Roadmap

- Computing the bankruptcy rate: the stock of firms (and what type of legal statute)
- Extracting the short-term evolutions
- Compares them with other business fluctuations indicators
- Looks at 19th century financial crises in France
- Links the pattern with the changes in the LLR policy of the *Banque de France*

# Hunting the primary numbers

- Bankruptcy numbers for each year
  - Taken in the *Comptes de la justice civile et commerciale* (1840-1913) and archives
- Number of firms that may file for bankruptcy
  - Excluded the agriculture and (sometimes) *Professions libérales*
  - Use a fiscal source: la *Patente* tax (revolutionary tax on each business selling something on the market) except farmers and some *professions libérales*


# Adjusting the series # of firms for legal changes

- Generate spurious fluctuations of the BR
  - Tax evasion and the 1841 census
  - Changes in geographic borders: 1860 (Savoie), 1870 (Alsace)
  - Fiscal reforms: 1844, 1850, 1858, 1862, 1868
- Fiscal reforms modified the population liable to tax's payment:
  - Commissioned workers
  - *Professions libérales*
- Corrections were implemented


# What types of firms?

- legal framework: *1807 code de Commerce*
- Individual private firms (unlimited liabilities)
- Partnerships
  - ordinary partnership (*société en nom collectif*): at least 2 individuals liable on personal wealth
  - limited partnership (*société en commandite simple*): general partner(s) – manage with unlimited liability – and special partner(s) – limited liability
  - Joint-stock companies, i.e. limited partnership with shares. Liability of partners identical to limited partnerships but shares are tradable
  - Public company (*société anonyme*): liabilities limited to capital contribution. Before 1867, required gvt agreement

# Share of companies in the total # of firms




# Share of the limited liabilities companies in the total # of firms





# French bankruptcy rate



# Long-run vs. short-run fluctuations of the bankruptcy rate

- Liquidity dry-ups:
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- Key question is whether or more refinancing during crises impacts on the moral hazard (and then on long-run evolution):

# Long-run vs. short-run fluctuations of the bankruptcy rate


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- ⇒ Use of filtering method to separate short-run from long-run components


# Vanishing fluctuations of the BR

Deviation of the cyclical component of the bankruptcy rate to its trend (HP filter)






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


# Moving variance of the deviation of the bankruptcy rate (10 yrs)




— Moving variance (10 yrs) of the deviation of the BR (in %) to its trend

# Removing the outliers (+ 2 st. dev)




— Moving variance of the deviation of the BR (in %) to its trend  
- - - Moving variance of the dev of the BR (in %) to its trend ('31, '33-4, '47 amd 70-1 excl)

# IP and BR Deviations compared




# Evolution IP index and BR




— Industrial production (base 1 in 1906-12)  
— Bankruptcy rate in %

# Deviations of BR vs wheat price




# Comparing it with the wheat price



- - - Moving variance (10 yrs) of the dev of the BR (in %) to its trend (outliers excl.)
- Moving variance (10 yrs) of the deviation of the BR (in %) to its trend
- Moving variance (10 yrs) of the deviation of wheat price to its trend

# Moving variance IP vs. BR



- Moving variance (10 yrs) of the dev of the IP (base 1) to its log trend
- Moving variance (10 yrs) of the deviation of the BR (in %) to its trend
- - - Moving variance (10 yrs) of the dev of the BR (in %) to its trend (outliers excl.)




# What about financial crises?

- Extract financial crises using
  - Stock prices index (Arbulu, 2006)
  - 3 months interest rate (offshore –London – before 1870) and onshore after)
  - CB liquidity ratio: banknote to metallic reserves
  - CB refinancing ratio: discount to metallic reserves
- Shows that crisis occurred regularly
- Indicators give broadly the same crises' years

# Deviations of the BR and crises

Deviations of the bankruptcy rate (HP filtered)  
to its trend and Juglar's criterion of crisis



# Central bank refinancing

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Two constraints were removed
  - From a policy of rationing during crises (up to the 1850s) to a policy of rediscounting at will (Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini, 2010) :  
increase of metallic reserve

# Central bank refinancing



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# Central bank refinancing


- Main instrument: bills of exchanges
- 19th c. changes of monetary policy stance:  
Two constraints were removed
  - From a policy of rationing during crises (up to the 1850s) to a policy of rediscounting at will:
    - increase of metallic reserve
  - Change in monetary policy implementation with the development of a network of branches
    - decentralized refinancing with tight bills' screening




# Evolution CB refinancing (discounts and advances)




# Metallic reserves in the vaults of the central bank




# Deviation of CB refinancing





# Central bank's branching development



# Moral hazard and protested bills




# Financial intermediary bankruptcies



# Bankruptcy rate of financial intermediaries

Bankruptcy rate financial intermediaries



# Conclusion

- Century-long increase of the BR
- Fluctuations became smoother over time
- They peaked during crises
- Financial crises did not disappear
- But the monetary policy of LLR changed
  - Reserves increases allowing more refinancing
  - Expanding network decentralized both screening and refinancing with very limited risk for the central bank



# Corrections to patentes series (1)

- No corrections for the changes of geographic borders
- Fiscal evasion: for any  $t < 1842$

$$y'_t = x_t \left( \frac{x_{1842}}{x_{1841} * \left( 1 + \overline{x_{1820-1841}} \right)} \right)$$


# Corrections to patentes series (2)

$$\text{For any } t \leq 1844 \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} y_t'' = y_t' \left( 1 - \frac{68,000}{x_{1844}} \right) & \text{if } t \leq 1842 \\ y_t'' = x_t \left( 1 - \frac{68,000}{x_{1844}} \right) & \text{if } 1842 < t \leq 1844 \end{array} \right.$$


$$\text{For any } t \leq 1858 \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} y_t''' = y_t'' \left( 1 - \frac{120,000}{x_{1858}} \right) & \text{if } t \leq 1844 \\ y_t''' = x_t \left( 1 - \frac{120,000}{x_{1858}} \right) & \text{if } 1844 < t \leq 1858 \end{array} \right.$$

$$\text{For any } t \leq 1862 \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} y_t'''' = y_t''' \left( 1 - \frac{100,000}{x_{1862}} \right) & \text{if } t \leq 1858 \\ y_t'''' = x_t \left( 1 - \frac{100,000}{x_{1862}} \right) & \text{if } 1858 < t \leq 1862 \end{array} \right.$$


Real GDP




Index of industrial production



Index of industrial prices



Wheat prices




# Regression Dev. BR on lagged Dev. wheat

Dependent Variable: DEVTXFAILLJPERCEN				
Method: Least Squares				
Sample (adjusted): 1823 1912				
Included observations: 90 after adjustments				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
DEV WHEAT(-1)	0.284384	0.103613	2.744666	0.0074
DEV WHEAT(-2)	0.076624	0.109554	0.699413	0.4862
DEV WHEAT(-3)	-0.259010	0.103232	-2.508997	0.0140
C	-0.000860	0.012943	-0.066413	0.9472
R-squared	0.192724	Mean dependent var		-0.001419
Adj. R-squared	0.164563	S.D. dependent var		0.134285
S.E. of regression	0.122740	Akaike info criterion		-1.314075
Sum squared resid	1.295593	Schwarz criterion		-1.202972
Log likelihood	63.13338	Hannan-Quinn criter.		-1.269272
F-statistic	6.843690	Durbin-Watson stat		1.514417
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000344			


# Regression Dev. BR on lagged Dev. Wheat and Dev BR

Dependent Variable: DEVTXFAILLJPERCEN				
Method: Least Squares				
Sample (adjusted): 1823 1912				
Included observations: 90 after adjustments				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
DEVTXFAILLJPERCEN(-1)	0.297805	0.114174	2.608348	0.0108
DEVTXFAILLJPERCEN(-2)	-0.013197	0.117761	-0.112062	0.9110
DEVTXFAILLJPERCEN(-3)	-0.075676	0.110590	-0.684295	0.4957
DEWHEAT(-1)	0.172887	0.110009	1.571571	0.1199
DEWHEAT(-2)	0.026068	0.113548	0.229577	0.8190
DEWHEAT(-3)	-0.243108	0.112353	-2.163782	0.0334
C	-0.000834	0.012590	-0.066276	0.9473
R-squared	0.263147	Mean dependent var		-0.001419
Adjusted R-squared	0.209881	S.D. dependent var		0.134285
S.E. of regression	0.119364	Akaike info criterion		-1.338686
Sum squared resid	1.182571	Schwarz criterion		-1.144256
Log likelihood	67.24087	Hannan-Quinn criter.		-1.260281
F-statistic	4.940200	Durbin-Watson stat		2.043533
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000229			

# Log IP vs. log BR (+1)




# Crisis years according to liquidity ratio of the CB



Vertical lines are crisis' years according to Juglar's criterion


# 3 months interest rate in London




Vertical lines are crisis' years according to Juglar's criterion



# Short-term interest rate peaks



# Deviation of the cyclical component of the bankruptcy rate to its trend (HP filter)



— Cyclical component computed with HP filter, Lambda set to 6.5

# CB advances and discounts

